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The research problem for this dissertation was to 
determine the affects of President Nixon's New Federalism 
in four Pacific Northwest cities. More specifically, the 
dissertation sought to determine and explain the effects of 
the State and Local.Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972, a basic 
component of the N~w Federalism, in Seattle, Tacoma, Port-
land and Eugene. The central goal of revenue sharing and 
the Neill Federalism is to decentralize government in tL:: 
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American federal system. The central fear of those who 
oppose the effects of such decentralization is that the 
poor and minority groups of America may be discriminated 
against by local special interest groups. The purpose of 
the dissertation was to see the extent to which the goals 
of the proponents and the fears of the opponents have so 
far been realized in the revenue sharing experience of 
four cities. A comparative case study approach was used 
whereby the General Revenue Sharing experience of each 
city was described and analyzed in terms of the goals of 
the New Federalism and the fears of its opponents. 
The data used for this investigation was obtained '. 
from taped interviews with city officials in each of the 
four cities. A questionnaire was prepared for the inter-
views which included questions pertaining to federal-
state-city relations in terms of grants-in-aid, the fiscal 
condition of the city, the decision-making process used in 
the city for allocating revenue sharing funds, who parti-
cipated in the decision-making process, who benefitted 
from revenue sharing in the city and the overall satis-
faction or dissatisfaction with the concept of the New 
Federalism and revenue sharing. 
In addition to the data collected from city offi-
cials who were directly involved in the city revenue shar-
ing process, additional data was obtained from those in-
terviewed showing how the revenue sharing money was dealt 
with. It should be noted that these city officials were 
administrative personnel as well as elected officials. 
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The results of the dissertation showed that the de-
centralization of American government sought by the Nixon 
Administration has so far not been obtained through Gen-
eral Revenue Sharing insofar as these four cities are con-
cerned. The money from General Revenue Sharing was not 
adequate for these cities to meaningfully gain increased 
power and independence from either their states or the 
federal government. The fiscal requirements of these 
cities due to inflation, labor costs, demands to compen-
sate for cutback categorical grants of the federal gov-
ernment and inadequate urban tax bases made the infusion 
of General Revenue Sharing money too small to allow the 
cities to undertake dramatic "new" departures because of 
these funds. Seattle and Eugene did undertake housing 
programs and Portland saw revenue sharing funds as "free-
ing up" other monies so the city could undertake a new 
neighborhood participation program, but as a rule these 
cities found the demands from traditional city services 
plus the increased burden of having to fund cutback feder-
al categorical grant programs as using up all their funds 
including revenue sharing. 
The dissertation laid particular emphasis on the 
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question of whether local poor people and minorities were 
deliberately included in the decision-making processes 
over revenue sharing and in the programs funded with rev-
enue sharing funds. It was found that Tacoma especially 
sought to develop a decision-making process that was in-
clusive of representatives from all segments of the city 
and that Seattle had perhaps the least inclusive decision-
making process. But there was not a direct correlation 
between degree of citizen-wide participation and benefits 
from revenue sharing going to all citizens equally. 
Although General Revenue Sharing is only one part 
of the New Federalism it appears that for the decentrali~ 
zation of American government to be meaningful, General 
Revenue Sharing will have to be dramatically increased in 
funding and supplemented with Special Revenue Sharing to 
take up the slack from cutback federal categorical grants 
intended for the human and community services areas. 
If the major goal of the New Federalism, decentrali-
zation, has not been accomplished so far, then the major 
fear of opponents has not been realized either. The dis-
sertation demonstrates a commitment on the part of the 
City Council majorities in each city to preserve the prog-
ress made in recent years to improve the lot of America's 
poor and minority citizens. These groups, while sometimes 
having not been greatly involved in the revenue sharing 
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decision-making processes, were recognized as deserving a 
part of the revenue sharing funds. The fear that without 
the federal government's specific prodding local special 
interests woumd act to ignore the interests of local mi-
norities and the poor was not confirmed by this study. 
~-.-.~---. 
PREFACE 
Most of the data collected for this study was ob-
tained through taped interviews of city officials 
in Seattle, Tacoma, Portland and Eugene. The in-
terviews took place in the summer of 1973. Each 
subject was asked for permission to tape the inter-
view and all consented. Whe~ the author was asked 
not to include some material, the request was, of 
course, honored. Thus, no "off the record" infor-
mation is included in this study. 
,---
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
When the history of the Nixon Administration is 
written, it will be filled with Richard Nixon's accom-
plishments in the foreign policy area and the desperate 
trauma of the Watergate Affair. His Administration is not 
noted for either its emphasis on, or accomplishments in, 
domestic affairs, yet President Nixon has set goals for 
his Administration in the domestic area that are of the 
utmost significance. Starting with election slogans in 
the 1968 campaign and carrying through to his 1974 State 
of the Union address, President Nixon has set forth as 
the major goal of his domestic policy the balancing of 
the distribution of power among the levels of government 
in the American federal system. His goal has been noth-
ing less than the decentralization of the American po1i-
tical system. This, of course, is a huge undertaking. 
In spite of the pronouncements of the 1974 State of the 
Union message that the corner had been turned in return-
ing power, funds and responsibilities to the states and 
communities of America from Washington, D.C., this study 
will indicate that little real decentralization has taken 
place so far. 
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It is no secret that the national government in our 
system has become immensely more powerful in the federal 
structure since the inception of the income tax and the 
dynamic policies of the New Deal. To substantially shift 
power back to the states and cities would take strong 
leadership from a determined President and the utmost 
cooperation from Congress, as well as the support of the 
nation's governors and mayors. Those in positions of 
social and economic power at all levels of the system 
would also have to commit themselves to the effort for 
it to succeed. Power tends to entrench itself in politi-
cal, social and economic institutions. If the current 
balance of power among the levels of the federal system 
is benefitting certain interests, and it is, it can be 
expected that these interests will try to keep the balance 
the way it is. Hence, a meaningful reversal of that power 
balance would take a sincere commitment on the part of 
many individuals, groups and institutions. An historical 
accounting of the Nixon Administration's domestic policy 
may show that it was unable to muster the force, influence 
or cooperation necessary to carry out its basic domestic 
goal, the decentralization of the American federal system. 
That conclusion may be premature. After all, rev-
enue sharing, a basic tool used by the Nixon Administra-
tion in the implementation of its domestic policy, has 
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only been in operation for about two years. Furthermore, 
the Administration has three more years in which to 
achieve its goals. Even if the President should not serve 
out his term, there is no indic~tion that the basic out-
lines of his domestic power redistribution goal would not 
be shared by Vice-President Ford. Because the goal of 
the Administration is nothing short of trying to reshape 
the power balance of the federal system, it is important 
to make some analysis of what progress has been made in 
that effort so far. Such an analysis is the purpose of 
this paper. 
The city will serve as the unit of direct analysis 
in this paper. This may seem a bit strange, since most 
interpretations of American federalism indicate a po1i-
tical system divided between the national government and 
the states. The United States Constitution does not men-
tion the urban area as having any legal being, rights or 
obligations in the federal system. Judge Dillon made the 
point very clear when he proclaimed that cities " ••• owe 
their origins to, and derive their powers from, the 
(state) legis1atures_"1 Dillon's word on the subject has 
lThis is the famous "Dillon Rule." It is discussed 
at length and contrasted with the opinion of Judge Cooley, 
who felt cities had an inherent sovereignty of their own, 
in Anwar Syed, The Political Theory of American Local 
Government,(New York: Random House, 1968), p. 68. 
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become the legal "rule" that has firmly established cities 
as the legal subjects of their state governments. Yet, as 
we shall see later, events have driven cities to the nec-
essity of dealing directly with the federal government. 
The need for money and expertise to help the city deal 
with its pressing needs has established a political, so-
cial and economic relationship between the cities and the 
federal government that can allow one to consider the ur-
ban area as a distinct element in the federal system. 
This simply means that Washington, D.C., deals not just 
with the government of the State of Oregon, for example, 
but it may have independent relations with the City of 
Portland as well. President Nixon recognized this devel-
opment within American federalism when he proposed the de-
centralization of the system and revenue sharing. When 
speaking on the subject, he mentions the need to return 
power, funds and responsibility to the states and also to 
the cities. Consequently, it is within this special fed-
eral context that we study revenue sharing and how it has 
affected the balance of power in the American federal sys-
tern. 
The task of this paper is to describe and explain 
how four cities have dealt with General Revenue Sharing 
through use of a comparative approach. General Revenue 
Sharing was created through the passage of the State and 
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Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972. It is the keystone 
of the Nixon Administration's plan for a "New Federa1ism,~ 
the term given for the effort to divert more "funds, power 
and responsibility" to the "states, communities and peop1~' 
of America in a decentralization effort. A fuller de-
scription of the General Revenue Sharing Act and a de-
tailed description of the New Federalism will be taken up 
in Chapter II and Chapter III of this study. For now, it 
is important to point out that in the past two years, 
states, cities and counties allover this nation have been 
receiving General Revenue Sharing checks. Consequently, 
it is possible for us to study what effect General Revenue 
Sharing has had so far. Four cities have been chosen for 
this study. They are Seattle and Tacoma, in the State of 
Washington, and Portland and Eugene,in the State of Oregon. 
~'fuy study cities instead of states or counties? why these 
cities? 
America is an urban society and has been for over 
a hundred years. The basic political, social and economic 
issues of the day are manifested most dramatically in ur-
ban areas. Questions of race relations, poverty, inf1a-
tion, crime and transportation are daily addressed by ur-
ban governments and by other public and private urban in-
stitutions. The economic plight of our cities is an old 
story. As Americans have flocked to the city, the city 
f ~ 
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has found itself in dire financial distress trying to meet 
the demands for services by all its new inhabitants. De-
mand for services combined with high wage demands on the 
part of city employees and inflation have added to the 
fiscal woes of cities. The political institutions of the 
city have also been under fire in terms of whether or not 
they are representative of, and responsive to, all the 
citizens of the city. In other words, the city is where 
the great social, economic and political issues of the 
day meet. Therefore, it is fitting that the city be the 
focus of a study that seeks to examine how the Nixon Ad-
ministration's plans to meet these issues through a de-
centralization of government are working. 
Seattle, Portland, Tacoma and Eugene are part of 
what can be called the "development belt" of the Pacific 
Northwest. Moving north from California and west from 
the rest of the nation" thousands of Americans in recent 
years have discovered the Pacific Northwest. Its com-
fortable (if damp) climate together with its relatively 
unpolluted environment have beckoned many. One feature 
that certainly has appealed to some is how uncrowded the 
region is. Washington and Oregon together contain only 
about five million people. Especially since dorld Nar II, 
the economic climate of the region has been generally 
healthy, offering job opportunities to those who might 
7 
want to move there. Each of the four cities in this study 
are located along Interstate Highway Five, the main land 
transportation arterial going north and south on the west 
coast. Most of the population and most of the non-agri-
cultural industry of the Pacific Northwest are located in 
the greater metropolitan areas of these four cities. They 
do have significant differences, however. 
Seattle is by far the largest of the four cities. 
Its population as of the 1970 census was about 531,000 
people. The population is very heterogenous, as it is 
made up of persons from many races and socioeconomic back-
grounds. The Boeing Company makes its home in Seattle and 
dominates the economic scene, not only of Seattle, but of 
much of Washington and the rest of the Pacific Northwest. 
At times, the Boeing Company has employed well over a hun-
dred thousand people in its Seattle area plants. Seattle 
and other towns in the Pacific Northwest are the home of 
many other businesses, large and small, which supply the 
Boeing Company with materials needed in the aerospace in-
dustry. As many of those interviewed in this study indi-
cated, as Boeing goes, so goes the economic climate of the 
entire Pacific Northwest. In the late 1960's the Boeing 
Company laid off thousands of employees because Congress 
decided not to fund the further development of the Super-
sonic Transport plane. Seattle began to suffer a severe 
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economic recession and the reverberations were felt 
throughout the Pacific Northwest. Seattle, then is an 
important city in our study of General Revenue Sharing and 
the New Federalism because it is the economic heart of the 
region and because it is a large city with a heterogenous 
population with all the usual challenges and problems 
faced by big American cities. 
Tacoma, Washington, is located about thirty-five 
miles south of Seattle along Interstate Five. Tacoma had 
a population of 154,000 in 1970. Although considerably 
smaller than Seattle, Tacoma has quite a large minority 
population. This is because the city has two large Armed 
Services bases and many of the personnel associated with 
these bases are of minority races, especially Blacks. 
Tacoma lives in the shadow of Seattle and has throughout 
its history. Seattle's port facilities and general en-
vironmental location seem to have given it advantages over 
Tacoma. The larger minority population of Tacoma is an 
important reason for including the city in our study. 
Another is that the town's size puts it into a population 
category quite separate from the other three cities. It 
therefore allows us to study General Revenue Sharing in 
several different sized cities. 
Portland, Oregon, is the second largest city to be 
studied. As the largest city in Oregon, it is still quite 
9 
a bit smaller than Seattle. Its population in 1970 was 
380,000. Portland has a very diversified economy and 
therefore, unlike Seattle, is not dependent upon one large 
industry for its economic prosperity. Those interviewed 
in Portland for this study, however, indicated that during 
the Boeing recession of the late 1960's, Portland, too, 
felt the effects. Portland's population offers us another 
size variation for studying the effects of General Revenue 
Sharing in urban America. 
Eugene, Oregon, is the smallest city to be studied. 
As of 1970, Eugene had a population of about 78,000. At 
the foot of the "development belt," Eugene is the home of 
the University of Oregon and several medium-sized busi-
nesses and industries. Agriculture and wood products in-
dustries are especially prominent. About three hundred 
miles south of Seattle along Interstate Five, and about 
one hundred miles south of Portland along the same route, 
Eugene offers still another population variation for our 
study. 
This study will try to make' a genuine effort to 
compare the experiences these four cities have had with 
General Revenue Sharing. It will not only describe the 
political experiences of these cities with General Rev-
enue Sharing, but also explain the differences and simi-
larities in their experiences. A simple description of 
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10 
what went on without identifying or explaining the simi-
larities or differences of these cities' experience would 
not really contribute to an explanation of politics and 
public affairs or an understanding of the progress of the 
New Federalism. Comparison, in other words, is a vital 
part of explanation. The cities studied in this paper of-
fer enough variation in their socioeconomic and political 
environments that through comparing their General Revenue 
Sharing experiences, we may come to some explanation about 
the effect of General Revenue Sharing in urban America. 
A major public policy program like revenue sharing 
is bound to have significant economic, social and politi-
cal ramifications for every city receiving the funds. It 
is very important to emphasize that this study will be 
primarily interested in the politics of General Revenue 
Sharing. The conclusions we will reach on General Revenue 
Sharing with regard to these four cities will be largely 
based on the responses given by City Hall officials inter-
viewed in each city. Some are politicians and some are 
administrators, but they were asked questions having pri-
marily to do with the political decision-making process 
used in each city as it decided how to allocate General 
Revenue Sharing funds. Also, they were asked whether they 
felt the political power balance was being affected by 
the Nixon revenue sharing program. Although political 
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aspects of the revenue sharing experiences of these cit-
ies are emphasized in this study, social and economic as-
pects are not ignored. 
As we shall see, Nixon's New Federalism promises to 
return "funds, power and responsibility" to the states, 
cities and "people" of America. Who are the "people"'? 
We will be concerned in this study with the social conse-
quences of General Revenue Sharing in terms of which peo-
ple in these cities participated in deciding where the 
revenue sharing money should go and which people in the 
city seem to be benefitting from the allocation of General 
Revenue Sharing funds. These are political questions. 
They are also social questions in terms of the inclusion 
or exclusion of some social groups in the revenue sharing 
experience. 
The economic aspects of General Revenue Sharing will 
also be examined. It is too early in the revenue sharing 
experience to make a thorough-going evaluation of the real 
economic impact of revenue sharing on the fiscal problems 
of city government and the distribution of income within 
the city's population. Therefore, this study limits it-
self to how City Hall officials interviewed feel about the 
economic condition of their city and the impact they feel 
General Revenue Sharing has and will have on that condi-
tion. Also, we will examine how each city has allocated 
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its General Revenue Sharing funds within its current gen-
eral fund budget. Examining where the General Revenue 
Sharing funds were allocated and in what amounts should 
tell us something about the economic impact of General 
Revenue Sharing in each city. 
The political, social and economic conclusions ar-
rived at in this study, then, will be based on the opinions 
of City Hall officials interviewed in each city plus an 
analysis of the decision-making and budget data given the 
author pertaining to the city's experience with General 
Revenue Sharing. Because of the dramatic significance of 
President Nixon's goal to shift the drift of power back to 
the states and cities away from Washington, D.C., the im-
portance of a study which seeks to evaluate the progress 
of such a program is clear, but it must be acknowledged 
that the conclusions summarized and evaluated in the last 
chapter of this study should be taken in proper perspec-
tive. As mentioned earlier, this analysis of General Rev-
enue Sharing is an early one. The program itself is very 
new. For the conclusions in this study to have added 
meaning they should be evaluated and compared with similar 
studies in other cities in other parts of the country. 
Also, if this study were followed up by a lnter study, in 
three years, for example, when the Revenue Sharing Act ex-
pires, a more thorough evaluation of the progress of the 
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Nixon Administration's efforts at decentralization might 
be made. The Congress, however, has called for data from 
which it can decide whether to expand or eliminate fed-
eral revenue sharing and a study of this sort can supply 
some data. Also, as indicated above, the significance of 
the Nixon effort in itself requires a study evaluating its 
effect. 
We have seen that it is the politics of revenue 
sharing that will be emphasized in this study. This will 
be done through evaluating the General Revenue 3haring ex-
periences of each of these four cities in terms of the 
goals set forth by the Nixon Administration for the New 
Federalism and the fears held by opponents of the New 
Federalism. The goals and fears of the New Federalism 
will provide us with a theoretical framework with which 
to describe and explain the General Revenue Sharing ex-
periences of Seattle, Tacoma, Portland, and Eugene. 
The goals of the Nixon Administration as it pursues 
the New Federalism and the fears held by those who oppose 
that program have very significant economic and social di-
mensions to be sure, and they will be examined, but our 
emphasis is political because what President Nixon is es-
pecially attempting is a political decentralization of 
power in Americao His major tool is the economic device 
of revenue sharing. Nixon realizes that it is the econo-
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mic situation of cities and states which has weakened 
them. The fact that they do not have the money to handle 
their social and economic problems has made them contin-
ually turn to Washington, D.C., for help. Washington of-
ten grants the money, but with strings attached. This has 
further made the cities and states beholden to the national 
government, so at the heart of any political decentraliza-
tion effort must be a program to give the cities and 
states adequate funds whereby they can deal with their 
problems with less dependence on the federal government. 
Hence, we have the Nixon Administration's program of rev-
enue sharing. 
To set the stage for an evaluation of General Rev-
enue Sharing in these four cities, therefore, Chapter II 
of this study will examine some of the financial difficul-
ties the cities are having and the programs developed by 
the national government to aid them, with a special em-
phasis on categorical grants-in-aid. At various times, 
the national government has also given block grants, 
grants with few, if any, strings attached, to cities and 
states. The State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 
1972 (General Revenue Sharing Act) is such a grant. Chap-
terII will also examine block grants and look at some de-
tail at the General Revenue Sharing Act itself. 
Chapter III will develop the conceptual framework 
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for our evaluation of General Revenue Sharing by explain-
ing the goals of the New Federalism and the fears held by 
its critics. Chapters IV through VII will contain the 
case studies of each of the four cities. At the end of 
each case study will be a "Sub-Conclusions" section where 
that particular city's General Revenue Sharing experience 
will be summed up and evaluated in terms of the conceptual 
framework of Chapter III. 
Chapter VIII will pull together the experiences of 
all four cities and analyze these in terms of the goals of 
the Nixon Administration for the New Federalism and the 
fears of those who dread the accomplishment of those goals. 
We will see the extent to which Nixonts goals seem to have 
been reached and why and/or the extent to which the fears 
of the critics have been realized and why. 
If the author has one distinct bias, it is concern 
for the fate of the disadvantaged in America as the New 
Federalism takes effect. In recent years important 
strides have been taken in this country to insure civil 
rights for all citizens and to try and develop programs to 
help the poor. ~e these advances to be supported and 
strengthened under the New Federalism or are they to be 
abandoned and left to recede? Throughout this paper, a 
special effort is made to pay particular attention to 
this issue. 
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We now move to a look at the fiscal plight of urban 
America and the device of categorical and block grants used 
by the national government to aid the cities. 
CHAPTER II 
THE FINANCIAL PLIGHT OF URBAN AMERICA: 
THE FEDERAL RESPONSE 
I. FROM RURAL TO URBAN AMERICA 
Thomas Jefferson hoped that the United States would 
remain largely a rural society. He felt Americans had the 
best chance of establishing a strong democracy if the peo-
ple remained the virtuous creatures rural life allowed 
them to be. While there is no underestimating the impor-
tance of rural life and the development of agriculture in 
contributing to the basic strength of America, the nation 
is definitely urban. By 1920, more Americans were living 
in towns and cities of over 2,500 population than in the 
countryside. Since that time, economic depression, the 
mechanization of farms and the tremendous growth of urban-
based businesses and industries has accelerated the move-
ment of people from the countryside to the urban area. 
The Great Depression, together with the great droughts of 
the 1930's in the mid-west, drove many farmers off the 
land. Either they could not afford to keep up paymellts 
on their farms or the top soils eroded or blew away, mak-
ing it impossible to continue farming. Where could they 
18 
g01 The answer was the city. Some went clear across the 
country to California, while some just went to the nearest 
city, but the city offered a chance to perhaps get a job 
and start a new life. For some it simply offered a chance 
for survival. The depression was raging in the cities, 
too, however. The influx of rural Americans into urban 
centers only exacerbated an already difficult situation, 
but in spite of the hardship, many former rural dwellers 
stayed in the city as they had nowhere else to go. 
The mechanization of American farms meant that ma-·· 
chines began to do the work that many individuals were 
formerly needed to perform. Therefore, men who only knew 
how to perform low-skill farm jobs went to the city to 
try to make a living. The cities were confronted with 
the problem of how to employ, house and educate these peo-
pIe. 
Among things Americans are best known for is their 
industrial capacity as a nation. Businesses and indus-
tries drew huge numbers of people to the cities in which 
they were located. Some men left the farm and came to the 
city even if they were not driven off by the Depression 
or mechanization. Some simply wanted more money and the 
jobs in the new factories and business of the city seemed 
to promise greater wealth. For these reasons and others, 
then, Americans have flocked to the cities to such an ex-
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tent that by 1960 the U.S. Census Bureau classified seven 
out of every ten Americans as city dwellers. The same 
source predicts that by 1980 perhaps ninety percent of 
America's population will be living in urban areas. 
As the cities of America have grown they have found 
that their populations have grown more heterogenous. 
This can be explained in terms of three migrations that 
have occurred to the cities •. The first and oldest migra-
tion was by white families who moved, as we have seen, 
from the farm to the small town and then from the small 
towns to the larger cities. M.ore recently, these "ori-
ginal" white urban settlers have made up the middle and 
upper-middle classes of American society. As members of 
these groups, many are finding life uncomfortable in the 
core of large cities and are moving in great numbers to 
the suburbs. One reason they are moving, it seems, is 
because of the other groups of people who moved into the 
city behind them. 
The second migration to the cities involved large 
numbers of immigrants primarily from the rural areas of 
Europe. They came to the "promised land" of America seek-
ing jobs and political freedom. They were "different" 
from those already settled in the cities in that they were 
foreigners and often Catholic. This "difference" caused 
them great hardships due to discrimination on the part of 
I 
;;: 
I' 
I 1 
1 
20 
the established "WASP'S:' Over time, however, most of these 
peoples have integrated into the social, economic and po-
litical structure of America. One reason they were able 
to become integrated into the system was the demand on the 
part of business and industry for low-skill labor at the 
same time these people were coming to this country. Thus, 
the new arrivals made some money, found adequate housing 
and educated their children. This afforded many the mobil-
ity they sought into the "establishment." 
The third and most recent group to migrate to the 
cities is the twentieth century movement of Blacks, as 
well as Puerto Ricans, Mexican-Americans and whites from 
depressed areas such as Appalachia. By the time these 
people began to arrive in urban areas, the businesses and 
industries that used to absorb newcomers now found it dif-
ficult to employ these latest arrivals. Certainly part of 
the reason was outright discrimination against people of 
a different color, but in addition, America had become 
technologically sophisticated and no longer required the 
same large numbers of low-skilled employees. ~hat were 
needed were highly skilled men and women who could work at 
jobs that often required many years of specialized and ex-
pensive training. The Blacks and others who now came to 
the city did not have such training and thus found them-
selves relegated to lives of unemployment or underemploy-
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mente Of course, many were able to find jobs and inte-
grate into the mainstream of the American system, but many 
others found themselves living in the discarded housing of 
better off citizens who had moved to wealthier neighbor-
hoods or to the suburbs to get away from the industrial 
and increasingly blighted core of town. The vehicles of 
mobility which enabled members of the second migration to 
integrate into the society and live the good life, then, 
were not and still are not available to large numbers of 
persons who made up the third migration into America's 
cities. 
II. THE COSTS OF GRmvTH 
T.hese migration patterns are directly related to the. 
fiscal plight of America's cities. Niddle class and up-
per-class citizens who have left the core of the city and 
moved to the sUburb have taken with them two important 
things. First, they have taken the dollars that would 
accrue to the city through the property tax it would col-
lect if the core of the city still had well-maintained 
and high-value homes. The tax base of the city has shrunk 
because the poor now live in the core and their property 
tax payments are lower because their property's assessed 
value is less, largely because the homes are in such dis-
repair. A primary source of income to the city is thus 
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diminished once those with wealth leave the city. Also, 
these same persons are likely to be socially and politi-
cally concerned citizens. If they would stay in the city 
they could use these abilities to help solve the city's 
problems. Also, some are specialists in social work and 
could significantly help the poor of the city core. The 
loss of money and expertise when middle-class and upper-
middle-class citizens move out of the heart of the city 
has meant, therefore, that the city has had to find other 
ways of getting these resources. With the latest migra-
tion to the city, accompanied by the loss of other citi-
zens to the suburbs, the financial needs of the city have 
increased dramatically. As might be expected, the poor 
are very needy and can't afford to pay for much them-
selves. Therefore, they have a great need for public, 
that is, city services. It is an expensive matter to pro-
vide those services. The poor are often in need of pub-
licly supported health care programs, day-care programs, 
pre-school programs and particularly good regular school 
programs to enable their children to "catch up" with chil-
dren from wealthier families who have been going to better 
schools in better neighborhoods all their lives. The poor 
often need more police patrols and more fire protection 
due to the high crime rate in urban cores and the poor 
quality of dwellings in core areas. The poor are simply 
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more needy in every way and to provide for them is an in-
creasingly difficult challenge for urban government. 
At one time, one could argue that the only function 
of city government was to provide for the basic protection 
of the lives and property of its citizens. Today's cities, 
however, find themselves being called upon to do more, and 
not just for the less well-off elements of the urban popu-
lation. Wealthier persons want the city to furnish and 
maintain parks and recreation programs. They want the 
city to support the arts and help clean up the air and 
water. They want the city to provide good public trans-
portation systems and provide an economic incentive for 
business and industrial growth by keeping the property 
tax low. They also want the city to be representative of 
their needs and perform its functions efficiently. This 
often calls for a large bureaucracy which is very expen-
sive. 
Two other factors have tremendous impact on the fis-
cal plight of cities. One is inflation. The other is 
labor costs. As we will see in the case studies which 
follow, inflation and particularly the increased wage de-
mands of city employees are a sUbstantial drain on the 
city treasury. Thus, from all segments of the urban pop-
ulation come demands that require a great deal of money 
to meet. To examine more thoroughly the expenses of 
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cities it might be useful to distinguish between two broad 
categories of expenditures: current operations and capital 
outlays. The first refers to the cost of running the var-
ious departments and agencies and providing services to 
the citizens. The second includes appropriations for the 
acquisition or construction of public buildings, parks, 
sewers and other facilities and for the purchase of major 
items of equipment such as fire trucks. 
Figure 1 below shows the average distribution of 
current operations expenditures in the thirty-eight most 
populous urban areas of the United States during fiscal 
1966. Education dominates the spending pattern, with 
Category 
Education 
Health and Welfare 
Police and Fire 
General Administration 
Streets and Roads 
Sewage and Sanitation 
Parks and Recreation 
Debt Service 
Other 
Percent of Expenditures 
43.5 
17.3 
10.8 
4.4 
3.9 
3.8 
2.5 
4.5 
9.3 
Figure 1. Percentage distribution, by function, 
of current expenditures of local governments in 
large SMSA's. SOURCE: "Local Government Finance 
in Selected ~etropolitan Areas, 1965-1966," 
U.S. Bureau of the Census. 
health and welfare a poor second. Police and fire pro-
tection run third with about eleven percent. Bollens and 
Schmandt in their work, The Metropolis, indicate that 
these proportions tend to vary with the population of a 
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city. The greater the size of an urban area, the greater 
percentage of the budget is spent on health and welfare, 
police and fire protection, waste disposal and parks. In 
smaller urban areas, however, there is less money spent on 
such services and often education runs as high as sixty-
five percent of total current operation out1ays.l 
As America has become more an urban society over 
the years, the expenditures for current operations have, 
of course, increased dramatically. This growth has also 
required cities to enlarge their physical plants, that is, 
increase their capital outlays. Along with the demand for 
more policemen, firemen, teachers and other workers has 
also been the need for additional classrooms, police and 
fire stations, roads and parks. As Bollens and Schmandt 
report, in 1967, local expenditures for capital outlays, 
including publicly owned utilities, total almost $13 bil-
lion, over one-third more than in 1962. Educational fac-
i1ities led the expenditures, taking about one-third of 
the tota1~ The next greatest expense was locally operated 
utilities, and third was streets and roads. Table 1 shows 
1967 urban area expenditures for capital outlays. Because 
this data is somewhat dated, it does not reflect what 
probably has become in very recent years a major c~pital 
IJohn C. Bollens and J.J. $chmandt, The Metropolis, 
(New York: Harper and Row, 1970>, p. 268. 
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expense for cities: environmental projects. The recent 
movement to clean up the air and water has brought demands 
to the City Council to do their share. Hence, sUbstantial 
sums have doubtless been spent in this area. 
TABLE I 
LOCAL GOVERNI'-lENTAL EXPENDITURES 
FOR CAPITAL OUTLAY 
Function 
Education 
Streets and Roads 
Local Utilities 
Health and Hospitals 
Sewerage 
Housing, Urban Renewal 
Parks, Recreation, 
Natural Resources 
Airports and Harbors 
All Other 
TOTAL 
1967 
Amount (millions) 
$ 4,313 
1,888 
2,044 
299 
1,093 
966 
$ 
664 
361 
1,334 
12,962 
% of Total 
33.3 
14.5 
15.8 
2.3 
8.4 
7.5 
5.1 
2.8 
10.3 
100.0 
SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Governmental 
Finances in 1966-1967, (Washington: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1968). 
Capital requirements will vary from city to city 
and also from central city to the suburban areas. In the 
core area, for example, it is likely that the major phys-
ical needs will be for renewal of blighted areas, replace-
ment of worn-out public structures and utilities and mod-
ernization of the transportation system. In the suburbs, 
capital outlays are mainly for new school buildings, 
streets and roads and park and recreation lands. 2 
2Ibid ., pp. 271-2. 
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According to B6llens and Schmandt, capital indebt-
edness of state and local governments combined has grown 
at a rate of over six percent annually while the national 
debt has been increasing by less than two percent. "On 
a per capita basis, the accumulated debt of the two lower 
levels in 1967 was $544 for every person in the country, 
while the similar figure for the national government was 
$1649. During the ten year period from 1957 to 1967, the 
outstanding long-term obligations of local units more than 
doubled (from $37.3 billion to $76.4 bi1lion)."3 It is 
clear, then that running a city is a very expensive busi-
ness and becoming more so as time goes on. If cities had 
no trouble raising the revenue to pay for these inc~eased 
expenses, there would be little to worry about, but as we 
have just seen, the indebtedness of cities in the capital 
outlay area alone, is increasing dramatically. Now that 
we know that the demand for city resources is very great 
and growing, it is necessary to examine where cities ob-
tain the revenue they need to provide the services demand-
ed by their citizens. It will become clear that obtaining 
enough money to support city expenses is the number one 
problem of local government. As we will see in the case 
studies that follow, just balancing the budget is a major 
fiscal difficulty. 
3Ibid ., p. 273. 
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As Bollens and Schmandt suggest in The Metropolis, 
in a real sense, national, state and local governments are 
competitors for the tax dollar. Each level has to try to 
draw more from existing revenue sources and impose new 
taxes to meet new responsibilities. In this competition, 
a kind of division of revenue sources has developed among 
these three levels of government in the federal system. 
Most of the federal funds are derived from income taxes 
on individuals and corporations, states depend heavily on 
sales and gross receipt taxes and, since about 1900, the 
general property tax has been acknowledged as the almost 
exclusive domain of local government. It is important to 
note, also, that other units of government such as county 
government and special districts such as school districts 
are also competing for the citizen's tax dollar. 4 
Since colonial times, the general property tax has 
provided the historical base of support for local gov-
ernment. Prior to 1932, the property tax was providing 
almost three-fourths of the general revenue of local gov-
ernments. In recent decades its importance has somewhat 
declined due to increased state and federal aid to cities 
as well as other forms of taxation now used by cities. 
Today it is estimated that the property tax finances only 
about forty-three percent of the aggregate budget of local 
4Ibid ., p. 255. 
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governments. 5 
After ~orld War II, cities found that mounting needs, 
along with rising costs and protests by property owners 
over the prospect of their property taxes increasing, led 
local officials to try to find other source of local rev-
enue. Among the newer sources of local government revenue 
are taxes on utility and business gross receipts, gasoline 
and other motor fuels, motor vehicles, cigarettes, alco-
holic beverages, income and retail sales. The last two 
have provided sUbstantial sums to large central cities. 
In addition to taxes, local governments receive 
funds from fees, permits and user charges of various kinds. 
Some cities, for example, provide sewage and water service 
to their citizens, who pay the city a fee based on the 
use of the service. Local taxes and fees, however, do 
not seem to provide enough revenue for cities to keep up 
with increasing costs and demands. Cities have had to 
turn to state and federal governments for fiscal assist-
ance. 
III. FEDERAL AID TO CITIES 
The states and the federal government have finan-
cial difficulties of their own. Nevertheless, they have 
repeatedly come to the aid of cities. In the competition 
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for the citizen's tax dollar the state and federal gov-
ernments get a large enough share and collect it in an 
efficient enough manner that they have seen it as their 
responsibility to help cities meet their financial bur-
dens. Since the early 1930's, the states and federal gov-
ernment have slowly but steadily helped finance, or have 
financed completely, many programs at the local level. 
In 1942, local government received a total of $1.8 billion 
in state and federal aid. By 1967, the amount had in-
creased to over $22 billion, enough to provide more than 
one-third of the total general revenue of local govern-
6 
ments. Table II is a summary of municipal government 
finances from 1957-1967. It shows municipal, state and 
federal sources of income for the city. 
In every category in Table II, the rate of increase 
was enormous for the ten year period. Total revenue for 
municipalities doubled between 1957 and 1967, the federal 
contribution by a factor of nearly five-fold. Yet, in 
spite of the federal contribution, the cities of America 
still face a severe financial crisis. The added revenue 
from increased populations within the cities and the rev-
enue from the federal government cannot keep pace with 
expenditures. In a book by the National Urban Coalition 
entitled Counterbudget, the gravity of the fiscal crisis 
6 Ibid., p. 263. 
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TABLE II 
SUMMARY OF MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT FINANCES 
1957-1967 
(in millions of $'s) 62-67 57-67 
1967 1962 1957 % inc. % inc. 
Revenue Total 24096 16794 12047 43 39 
General Revenue 19283 13127 9285 47 41 
Intergov'ta1 Revenue 5081 2668 1756 90 52 
(from State on1y)-- 4001 2128 1489 88 43 
Gen'l Rev, own sources 14202 10459 7529 36 39 
Taxes 10507 7940 5908 32 34 
Property 7351 5812 4297 26 35 
Sales and 
Gross Receipts 1645 1303 934 26 40 
General 977 866 602 13 14 
Selective 669 437 332 53 32 
Other 1511 824 676 83 22 
Charges and rv:isc. 3695 2519 1621 47 55 
Utility Revenue 4043 3136 2378 29 32 
Water Supply 1807 1453 1079 24 35 
Electric Power 1467 1114 810 32 38 
Gas Supply 228 170 114 34 49 
Transit 542 399 375 36 6 
SOURCE: 1967 Census of Governments, Vol. 4, No.4, 
"Finances of M.unicipa1ities and Township Governments," 
(~ashington: u.S. Government Printing Office, 1969), p.11. 
was summarized: 
••• To help meet this recurring crisis, federal 
and state aid to cities increased by more than 
400 percent between 1955 and 1968, yet such aid 
still amounted to only 23% of city revenues in 
1968, compared to 15% in 1955 ••• 
Assuming that the present level of federal 
grants-in-aid to states and localities is main-
tained ($30 billion), we estimate that the state-
local revenu, gap in 1975 will be approximately 
$67 billion. 
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The importance of state and federal aid to the city 
cannot be underestimated, but even though that aid has in-
creased dramatically over the years it does not seem to be 
enough to rescue the city from severe fiscal troubles. 
The dependence of urban America on federal aid especially 
is evident from a careful look at Table II and the above 
statement from the National Urban Coalition. Realizing 
how much cities, and states, too, need federal aid to meet 
their needs, the federal government has developed two 
basic types of aid programs: categorical grants-in-aid 
and block grants. Although our primary interest is in 
block grants because General Revenue Sharing is of that 
type, it is also important to understand categorical 
grants. The New Federalism and the revenue sharing pro-
gram of the Nixon Administration is in part a reply to 
those who have criticized categorical grants to states and 
cities. 
7Robert S. Benson and Harold Wolman, eds., Counter-
budget: A Blueprint for Changing National Priorities, 1971-
1976,(New York: Praeger Publishing, 1971), pp. 121-123. 
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Categorical Grants-in-Aid 
The basic issue involved in a state or city receiv-
ing categorical grants-in-aid from the federal government 
is not just that federal money is coming in, but also fed-
era1 controls. In the last twenty years or so, grant-in-
aid programs have become a most important source of fed-
eral influence over state and local po1icy.8 Approximately 
one-sixth of all state and local government revenues are 
from federal grants of this type. 9 The money is paid 
through a great number and variety of programs. There 
are several hundred programs in existence today. A state 
or locality could apply for money for anything from voca-
tional training programs to a program for mine drainage 
and solid waste disposal. A major problem faced by both 
cities and states is keeping up with available programs 
and determining their purposes and requirements. And, a1-
though there are a great number of categorical grants 
available, most grants of this sort go to states and cit-
ies for welfare and highways. The amount of money taken 
in by states and communities in categorical grants has in-
creased rapidly over the years and so has dependence of 
states and communities on those federal funds. lO 
8Thomas R. Dye, Politics in States and Communities, 
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1973) p. 53. 
9Ibid • 
lOIbid., pp. 53-55. 
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As we have seen, the financial crunch of state and 
local government is one important reason there has been a 
growth in federal aid to these levels of government. There 
are other reasons as well, however. Some who argue in fa-
vor of categorical grants-in-aid center their arguments 
around the greater progressivity of the federal tax struc-
ture. Programs that are funded by state or local funds 
are funded on a tax structure that is regressive or only 
mildly progressive, but if the money is funded through a 
federal program it is funded on a more progressive basis. 
This may explain, in part, why many "liberal" Congress-
men favor federal grants-in-aid to states and communities. 
Another argument in favor of such an aid program 
suggests that it provides the national government with an 
opportunity to try to provide a uniform level of public 
service throughout the nation at a minimum or basic level. 
For example, a categorical grant could be established to 
provide a minimum level of existence for the poverty 
stricken regardless of where they live. Or, a program 
could try to establish equality in educational opportun-
ity throughout the nation. 
The mere availability of categorical grant funds 
would allow the national government to have great influ-
ence, even control, over state and local government, but 
categorical grants have specific guidelines attached to 
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them that make the "control" aspect of such grants more 
direct. Thus, when the national government decides it 
has a particular interest (for example, highway construc-
tion, poverty or urban renewal) it can make funds avail-
able for those programs and then require the states and 
localities to strictly follow federal guidelines in order 
to keep the funds or get more of them. In effect, cate-
gorical grants permit the national government to set na-
tional goals and priorities in all levels of government 
without formally altering the federal structure. The ac-
ceptance of these federal funds, then, means that state 
and local officials are left with less freedom of choice 
than they would have had otherwise. Thomas Dye sums up 
the situation this way: 
In short, through the power to tax and spend for 
the general welfare, and "conditions" attached to 
federal grants-in-aid, the national government has 
come to exercise great powers in many areas ori-
ginally "reserved" to the states -- highways, wel-
fare, education, housing, natural resources, em-
ployment, health and so on. ll 
Of course, categorical grants have enabled cities 
and states to provide many services to their citizens that 
they would not have otherwise been able to afford. One of 
the most important of these is the development of regional 
planning and regional councils of government. In order to 
get some categorical grants, local government had to dem-
IIIbid., p. 58. 
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onstrate they were engaged in planning for their future 
development. Yet this extensive grants-in-aid program has 
helped create a centralization of power in Washington that 
has created much controversy. For example, federal grant 
programs have frequently been seen as working at cross-
purposes with one another. The federal public housing 
programs have tried to provid~ low-rent housing for the 
poor, but federally funded urban renewal programs have 
often torn down low-rent housing 1 Another criticism of 
this sort of grant programs is that it tends to create an 
administrative quagmire in Washington and in the states 
and cities. A great deal of time and money is spent at 
the local level in applying for and administering grants 
and the result is much inefficiency on the part of many 
bureaucrats. An effort to deal with this problem has 
been the development of integrated grant accounting. A 
city will make a broad request for aid to the federal gov-
ernment and the government will transfer requests for 
specific programs to the government agency responsible 
for that program. Hopefully, this will alleviate the ex-
treme fragmentation of categorical grants now plagueing 
local government. 
Finally, and most critically for our purposes, the 
categorical grant-in-aid system assumes that federal of-
ficials are better judges of goals and priorities at all 
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levels of government than state or local officials. As 
Thomas Dye has put it, "State and local officials do not 
determine what activities in their states and communities 
will receive federal money, federal officials determine 
these prioritiese,,12 This notion of federalism may be ex-
aggerated. Certainly many major public policy decisions 
are made at the state and city levels. Yet Dye's point is 
an important one. Even if some decisions are made at the 
state and local level, most major ones, he is suggesting, 
are made at the federal government level. Dye continues 
by suggesting that whether federal officials or state and 
local officials are better judges of public goals and pri-
orities is a "political question." That is, of course, 
very true and the controversial nature of that political 
question is demonstrated by America's experience with a 
series of categorical grant-in-aid programs all committed 
to a \lIar on Poverty. 
The Lyndon John~on Administration took the political 
position that a top priority of American public policy 
should be the elimination of poverty in the United States. 
with this goal in mind, the Administration finally got 
through Congress the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964. 
The Act authorized a number of antipoverty programs and 
gave the Office of Economic Opportunity great flexibility 
12Ibid., p. 59. 
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in dealing with state, local or private organizations. 
The Act's most distinctive creation was the "Community 
Action Agency" a nonprofit agency and independent of local 
government, designed to coordinate a locality's social 
service resources related to the poverty question and to 
utilize them in a Community Action Program to alleviate 
poverty. The Community Action Program was to be developed 
and administered with the "maximum feasible participation" 
of the residents in the local area. The point was to 
enlist those who knew most about the plight of the poor, 
the poor themselves, to establish meaningful ways to deal 
with the poverty problem in their area. Perhaps the most 
controversial aspect of the Act was that grants were made 
directly to the Community Action Agencies. A state 
governor could veto a contract between a Community Action 
Agency and Washington, but that veto could be overridden 
by the Office of Economic Opportunity director in Washing-
ton, D.C. In essentially bypassing local government and 
local elites and giving great amounts of federal aid to 
local service agencies, War on Poverty categorical grants 
alienated the local power structure. Control over 
financial resources is an important element of political 
power, and no local government official or local elite 
is going to appreciate the loss over the local disburse-
ment of federal categorical grants. 
L 
39 
The War on Poverty categorical grants were distinc-
tive, then, because they were grants directly to social 
service agencies and not to state and local governments. 
Not only had the Johnson Administration decided that the 
national government had the right to decide that it ought 
to be national policy to eliminate poverty, it also de-
cided that state and local governments were not the best 
administrators of such a policy. The job was to be done 
by local social agencies with the participation of the 
poor themselves. 
In the early 1970's, the Green Amendment to an 
appropriations bill for the Office of Economic Opportunity 
enabled local government to take over Community Action 
Agencies unilaterally. In spite of this development, 
local political leaders were wary of the possibility of 
being bypassed in future federal programs that seek to 
deal with local problems. 
The controversial goals and design of the War on 
Poverty categorical grants combined with observations as 
to whether the programs were doing much Dr the poor after-
all, led some to question the whole system of categorical 
grants as a means of helping local government address its 
fiscal difficulties. We have seen that other objections 
to categorical grants already existed. They tended to 
create a giant bureaucracy in Washington ?nd also in the 
states and cities. State and local governments were 
drowning in governmental red tape. Many objected to 
the national control over local policy that categorical 
grants gave the federal government. Some also objected 
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to the idea that the national government was the best 
judge of what needed to be done at the state and local 
level. These objections to categorical grants led some 
politicians to search for another means by which the 
federal government could aid the financially pressed 
states and localities. By the time of the Presidential 
campaign of 1968, serious alternatives to categorical 
grants were in the works by all major candidates. Richard 
Nixon, who, of course, was to win that Presidential 
election, advocated a system of block grants that would 
supplement and then later replace most categorical grants. 
The block grant itself was not a new idea, but dissatis-
faction with categorical grants was so widespread that 
it appeared the time had come for a further look at block 
grants as a way for the federal government to help states 
and cities. 
Block Grants 
Generally, a block grant is federal funds made 
available to a city or a state with few if any guidelines 
directing how the money is spent. States and localities 
would be free, with such a grant, to use the money accord-
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ing to their own estimates of their needs. In recent 
years the principal use of block grants has been in the 
Model Cities program, where the grants go directly to 
cities to again deal with the poverty problem, and in the 
law enforcement grants under the Crime Control and Safe 
Streets Act of 1968, where the grants are channelled 
primarily to the states. As will be discussed more fully 
later, opponents of block grants contend that state and 
local governments are not adequately staffed to assume 
the huge bureaucratic responsibility of deciding where 
block grants should go and then administering the alloca-
tion. Critics of block grants also fear that some cities 
and states might not deal fairly with minority interests 
without the watchf~l eye of the federal government upon 
them. We saw earlier that categorical grants are a prime 
means whereby the federal government can establish nation-
al priorities and enforce them throughout the country. 
Those critical of block grants fear for the interests of 
the disadvantaged once the federal government gives up 
the categorical grant tool of looking out for their inter-
ests. Another common argument against block grants is 
that a governmental entity should have wide latitude in 
spending only those monies they have been able to raise 
themselves. Only in fuis way will they act responsibly 
in allocating the funds. The accumulated opposition to 
block grants historically has been substantial enough to 
restrict that sort of federal aid to local government to 
a relatively low level. The Bureau of the Budget esti-
mated that block grants would amount in fiscal 1969 to 
$249.4 million, out of a total grants-in-aid of $20.3 
billion. 13 Revenue sharing, a type of block grant and 
the type which concerns us in this study, has a long 
history among American federal aid schemes. 
The first major federa~ revenue sharing program 
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was in 1836 when the federal government split most of the 
surplus in the Treasury among the states. But revenue 
sharing, until recently, never really caught on, probably 
because there were few federal Treasury surpluses and 
national politicians and bureaucrats were reluctant to 
relinquish large amounts of money and the attached poli-
tical power to other levels of government. Since 1958, 
however, several revenue sharing proposals have been made 
in and out of government. As 3u~gested above, dissatisfac-
tion with categorical grants and the ov~rall financial 
crisis of state and local government drove politicians 
and fiscal experts to seek a new means of aiding local 
government. The revenue sharing plans that have been 
offered in Congress since 1958 have provided for an auto-
l3Congressional Quar~erlY, (Washington, D.C.: Con-
gressional Quarterly Service, Spring, 1970), p. 118. 
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matic distribution of a portion of federal tax revenues 
to the states and local government, with few, if any, 
strings attached. The Congressional Quarterly suggests 
that their research shows Republicans have generally 
favored replacing categorical grants entirely with funds 
from revenue sharing, while Democrats have most often 
seen revenue sharing as only a supplement to existing 
14 
categorical 9rant programs. 
Former Representative Melvin Laird (R, Wisconsin), 
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now Special Assistant to President Nixon, has been credit-
ed with having introduced in 1958 the first bill which 
embodied many of the features now considered to be essen-
tial aspects of revenue sharing. Laird's bill provided 
for the automatic return of a portion of federal revenues 
to the states with only a few conditions attached. 
Laird's bill did not get far in Congress, but the 
concept was picked up again by Walter W. Heller in 1960. 
From 1961-4 he was chairman of the Council of Economic 
Advisors. As Carr, Bernstein, Murphy and Danielson sug-
gest: 
(Heller) was seeking a means of relieving the 
fiscal pressures on the states and localities, 
of increasing their fiscal independence, of 
supplementing programatic grants with uncon-
ditional assistance, and of insuring that more 
of the annual increments of federal income 
taxes produced by the growth in GNP was 15 
spent for domestic public sector needs. 
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Under the Heller plan, one percent of federal income tax 
collections would be placed in a trust fund to be dis-
tributed to the states primarily on the basis of popula-
tion for their unconditional use. Heller believed the 
plan was a good one because it would not only aid state 
government financially, but it would relieve the "fiscal 
drag" on the economy resulting from a higher growth rate 
of federal tax revenues than of federal expenditures. 16 
Initially President Johnson endorsed the plan in 
1964 but backed off when protests from liberals, labor 
and urban interests objected to unconditional grants to 
state governments and insisted that federal assistance 
continue to use federal resources according to national 
priorities and national standards. Instead, Johnson 
embarked on his "creative federalism" scheme to consoli-
date and streamline categorical grants and to seek greater 
consultation with local and state officials in the develop-
ment and administration of federal grants. Two major 
block grants did corne out of Johnson's Administration! 
15 Robert R. Carr,et al., 
Democracy, 6th ed. (New York: 
1971), pp. 88-9. 
Essentials of American 
Holt Rinehart and Winston, 
16Congressional Quarterly, Spring, 1970. 
the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 
and the Model Cities Program, but these are not revenue 
sharing block grants. 
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Creative federalism did not seem to satisfy the 
advocates of revenue sharing. Their ranks grew in the 
1960's as is witnessed by the National Governor's Con-
ference endorsement of revenue sharing in 1965. In 1967 
one fifth of the members of the Ninetieth Congress cospon-
sored revenue sharing bills and a Gallup Poll reported 
that 70 percent of the American people favored the con-
cept. 17 As the 1968 Presidential campaign progressed, 
both candidates endorsed revenue sharing concepts. Final-
ly in 1969, President Nixon proposed to distribute $500 
million in additional federal aid to the states, with the 
allotment for general revenue sharing rising to about $5 
billion by 1976. Revenue sharing fit well into President 
Nixon's conception of a "New Federalism" that would reduce 
Washington's direct involvement in domestic programs. At 
first the President met with resistance from the cities 
because he proposed that revenue sharing funds be funneled 
through state capitals. Urban interests refused to 
support the program until the Administration agreed that 
a sizeable proportion of the shared revenues would be 
17Carr et a1., Essentials of American Democracy, 
p. 89. 
earmarked for direct delivery to counties and cities. 
A revived administration revenue sharing bill included 
that provision. 
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The Nixon Administration, in its belief that state 
and local governments have the real responsibility for 
the detailed policy development and administration of 
many functions that the federal government has taken 
upon itself since the New Deal, has set about to design 
a comprehensive revenue sharing program. The Administra-
tion, therefore, has proposed that Congress pass General 
Revenue Sharing and Special Revenue Sharing packages. 
General Revenue Sharing became law in 1972 and Special 
Revenue Sharing is still being debated in Congress. 
In 1971 the Administration presented its revenue 
sharing package to Congress. The Administration's plan 
called for sharing $16 billion in federal revenues. The 
amount would include $5 billion in "new money" in the 
form of General Revenue Sharing carrying virtually no 
restrictions, and $11 billion for Special Revenue Sharing. 
The latter would be financed by dismantling some 100 
existing grant programs with narrow purposes, and replac-
ing them with some six broad categories of existing 
grants-in-aid, urban development, rural development, 
education, transportation, manpower training and law 
enforcement. The money would be allocated to the states 
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on the basis of population and tax effort, and they would 
divide up the funds so that one-third went to the state 
government and two-thirds would be divided among the 
local governments (cities and counties, also on the basis 
of population and tax effort). States and local govern-
ments would be free to spend the funds as they chose in 
each category (as it turned out, General Revenue Sharing 
established very broad categories as does the proposed 
Special Revenue Sharing>, subject only to the require-
ments of federal civil rights laws. 
As stated above, General Revenue Sharing was 
supposed to be "new money" in state and local treasuries. 
It was not supposed to replace presently established 
categorical grants. Its intention was simply to help out 
the financially hard pressed state and local governments 
by using the superior taxing ability of the federal 
government to raise funds to be distributed and finally 
spent at the state and local level. Because this was the 
stated purpose of General Revenue Sharing and because so 
much pressure from governors and mayors around the country 
was put on Congress to give them this aid, the program 
got through Congress without much trouble. Congressman 
Wilbur Mills (0, Arkansas), Chairman of the House Ways 
and Means Committee, had long opposed the concept of 
giving money to spend to units of government that had not 
raised the money, but he, too, finally agreed to support 
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the Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972, which is the 
formal name for the General Revenue Sharing Act. Special 
Revenue Sharing is another story. 
Those interviewed for this study suggest President 
Nixon has not been able to get a Special Revenue Sharing 
package out of Congress partially because \vatergate and 
related difficulties have substantially weakened his in-
fluence over Congress. Congressmen, especially Democrats 
who have felt ignored and even insulted by the President 
as he carries out an essentially "Executive Branch" 
foreign policy with little regard for Congress, now see 
him weakened by scandal and see holding up his legislative 
program as one way to "get back at him." Even if the 
President were not weakened by Watergate problems, he 
would find it difficult to get Special Revenue Sharing 
out of Congress. The reason is simply that Special 
Revenue Sharing was specifically designed to eliminate 
some Great Society programs that liberal Congressmen 
worked long and hard to see actualized in federal legisla-
tion. Such established programs as grants for elementary 
and secondary education, model cities, a host of anti-
poverty programs and urban renewal, would be transferred 
to states, counties and cities. In the minds of many 
Senators and Congressmen, these programs were established 
in the first place because states and cities were not 
doing their share to rebuild the cities or help the poor 
and the minorities to achieve an equal opportunity. It 
is true, local government did not have the money to do 
the services required of them and so the categorical 
grants were instituted. But did local government and 
local elites really want to address the problems of the 
less fortunate in their communities? Antipoverty pro-
ft d b f 1 1 1 · t t 18 grams are 0 en oppose y power u oca ~n eres s. 
President Nixon said in his August, 1971 New 
Federalism speech that the purpose of revenue sharing 
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was to return "power to the people," but the question is, 
which people? National elites who worked hard for Great 
Society programs and racial minorities and the poor fear 
that the beneficiaries of existing categorical programs 
will obtain fewer funds or be bypassed entirely under 
the revenue sharing program. Although Congress passed 
General Revenue Sharing, it may not pass Special Revenue 
Sharing because it seeks to eliminate certain pieces of 
sacred liberal legislation. No one can argue with the 
fact that many Great Society and War on Poverty programs 
have not worked as they were supposed to, or at least in 
the way that President Johnson led the disadvantaged to 
18 Edward Hayes, Power Structure and Urban Policy, 
Who Rules in Oakland?, (New York: McGraw Hill, 1972). 
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believe they would work. Much of the money seems to have 
gotten into the hands of social administrators who have 
not distributed it or used it to help the needy. But to 
dismantle the program entirely, including its more 
successful programs such as Head Start and Model Cities, 
would and has brought great opposition from liberal 
Congressmen. 
The 1974 Nixon Administration budget in its termi-
nation statement on a variety of categorical grant pro-
grams indicated that the Administration expects cities 
and states to continue the programs with revenue sharing 
funds, both General and Special. If Special Revenue 
Sharing does not become law soon, it can be assumed that 
local government will have tremendous demand from social 
service agencies for the cities' limited General Revenue 
Sharing funds. The National League of Cities and the~J, S. 
Conference of Mayors on February 3, 1973, said the "mag-
nitude of program cuts in the budget will leave local gov-
ernment far behind their position last year, before Gen-
"19 
era1 Revenue Sharing was enacted. 
Implicit in all this is perhaps the most important 
factor that distinguishes categorical grants from block 
grants such as revenue sharing. By distributing federal 
19Conqressiona1 Quarterly, February, 1973, p. 223. 
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funds among states and cities with little or no restric-
tions, the federal government and powerful national 
interests would forfeit any opportunity to use federal 
grants as an instrument for achieving national purposes, 
motivating local tax reform, or encouraging constructive 
change. Such a policy is essentially a forfeiture of 
political power from national power centers to local 
political power centers. 
The enactment of General Revenue Sharing, then, is 
an important public policy issue and one deserving of 
study. Before examining the theories that will be used 
to analyze General Revenue Sharing as it has been used 
in Seattle, Tacoma, Portland and Eugene, and before look-
ing at the four case studies themselves, it is necessary 
to describe in detail the Revenue Sharing Act itself. 
The State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972 
In 1971 when President Nixon offered his revenue 
sharing package to Congress, that body had for quite some 
time been debating the merits of such a federal aid 
scheme. When Secretary George Schultz came before the 
Senate Finance Committee, as its first witness to testify 
on the President's bill and the revenue sharing bill 
already passed by the House, he proceeded to answer some 
of the "most frequently made" objections to revenue 
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sharing. It is useful to look briefly at these objec-
tions and Schultz's answers because they typify the entire 
Congressional debate that resulted in the process by which 
the State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972 finally 
became law. The following comes from Schultz's Congres-
sional testimony: 
1. How can we share revenues when the Federal 
Budget is in a deficit? The basic reform and re-
vitalization of our federal system is a No. 1 pri-
ority in the nation. The malaise and frustration 
of the American public require that we redefine 
our approach to assisting states and local govern-
ments, now, today. Tomorrow is too late. 
2. Won't revenue sharing actually increase the 
control of the federal government over the states 
and localities rather than decrease it? ••• The 
concept of General Revenue Sharing has developed 
out of a growing concern that the traditional forms 
of federal aid involve too much federal control. 
we believe that this less conditional form of 
fiscal assistance will result in a reduction of 
federal control and will serve to revitalize the 
decision-making capacity of state and local gov-
ernment. 
3. Doesn't revenue sharing violate a time-hon-
ored principle of public finance by divorcing 
taxing responsibility from spending responsibility? 
••• (I)t should be recognized that our categorical 
grants-in-aid programs have in fact done this for 
some time. Despite the federal controls, the 
spending under these programs ••• has been by state 
and local governments ••• Congress is making the 
overall spending decisions by inaugurating the 
revenue sharing program. Should it find that the 
goals of revenue sharing are not being achieved, 
the Congress can change the program or change it 
as it sees fit. 
4. Why not provide a federal tax credit for 
state and local income taxes? It is our view that 
the tax credit is an inferior device for fiscal 
reform and fiscal relief. The beneficiaries of 
the credit would be, at the outset, local citizens. 
There would be no fiscal relief to localities, be-
cause few have local income taxes. There would 
be no fiscal relief to state government. In addi-
tion, the tax credit would provide a permanent 
advantage to high-income states. Others have sug-
gested that instead of revenue sharing, we ought 
to increase further our reliance on federal cate-
gorical grants to states and localities. I can-
not imagine a less productive alternative. We do 
not need more of the same. We do need a basic 
reform in t~o way we provide aid to the states and 
licalities. 
Schultz goes on to outline the Administration's 
basic proposal for General Revenue Sharing and at the 
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same time he notes what the House actually did in passing 
the State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972. 
1. The President proposed that specified amounts 
of funds be returned to states and localities each 
year. In order to assure that these units of gov-
ernment would have an opportunity to order their 
own priorities and plan their spending, the Admin-
istration proposal would have tied the amount to 
the individual income tax base ••• The amounts to 
be distributed (under the House Bill) are not tied 
to the tax base, but are specified in the statute ••• 
The total (revenue sharing money disbursed) over 
the five years of the program is $29.8 billion -
virtually identical to the five year total under 
the President's proposal. 
2. The President proposed that the funds be dis-
tributed to the states and localities on a fair and 
equitable basis. Specifically, the portion going 
to the states would have been determined by popu-
lation adjusted for revenue effort. The portion 
going to the localities would have been distributed 
on the basis of local revenue raised relative to 
the total of all revenues raised in the state. (The 
House Bill) distributes $1.8 billion directly to 
the state governments. Of this total $900 million 
would be distributed on the basis of general tax 
20George P. Schultz, Secretary of the Treasury, Tes-
timony, Hearings of the Committee on Finance, U.S. Senate, 
92nd Congress, 2nd Session, (Washington: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1972), pp. 78-79. 
effort in the state and the remaining $900 million 
on the extent to which the state relies on the in-
dividual income tax. 
3. The President proposed that the use of the 
funds by the states ~nd localities be unrestricted, 
except that they would have to be expended legally 
and without discrimination. (The House Bill) in-
cludes a nondiscrimination provision and attaches 
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no strings to the use of the $1.8 billion which goes 
to the state governments. Local units would, how-
ever, have to use the $3.5 billion allocated them 
for priority purposes. They can spend the funds for 
public safety, environmental protection and public 
transportation programs. Allowable capital expen-
ditures items are: sewage collection and treatment, 
refuse disposal systems and public transportation. 
4. The President proposed that funds within 
each state be distributed on the basis of relative 
local revenues. The House Bill contains a series 
of complex formulas that distribute funds on the 
basis of population, urbanized population and pop-
ulation weighted inversely by per capita income. 
5. Under both the President's proposal and the 21 
House Bill, the financial reporting will be simple. 
Secretary Schultz finally suggested to the Senate Com-
mittee that the Administration would prefer that the Sen-
ate make some changes in the House Bill and bring it more 
closely into conformity with the Administration's original 
revenue sharing proposal. Specifically, the secretary 
asked the Senate to consider replacing the House emphasis 
on state income taxes as the basis for distributing funds 
among the states with a provision that would give more 
money to states with a better overall state and local tax 
effort. Also, Schultz asked that the Senate consider re-
moving the House restrictions on local uses of revenue 
sharing funds. The "high priority categories", he felt, 
2lIbid ., p. 80. 
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should be removed. ~vhi1e making some other suggestions 
to amend the House Bill, the Secretary indicated the above 
recommendations were particularly significant and con-
c1uded his testimony by saying that the House Bill "bears 
an essential similarity to the President's proposal" and 
that he endorsed it but at the same time would like to 
work with the Senate to improve upon it. 22 
A long parade of mayors, Congressmen, Senators and 
representatives from labor and other special interests, 
especially urban, carne before the Senate Finance Commit-
tee to comment on the concept of revenue sharing and some-
times to offer their own amendments to the House Bill. 
Senator Howard Baker (R - Tennessee) testified in a vein 
typical of many others. 
The fiscal needs of our state and city and county 
governments are both urgent and widely known. The 
steady flow of fiscal resources away from state and 
local government and toward the central government 
since the adoption of the 16th Amendment is well 
known. The exhaustion or near-exhaustion of avail-
able revenue bases at the state and local level is 
well known, as is citizen exhaustion with rising 
taxes, especially the property tax. Revenue shar-
ing is not a panacea for all of these ills, but it 23 
is a very major step indeed in the right direction. 
Wes Uhlman, Mayor of Seattle, also testified before 
the Senate Finance Committee and his remarks are worth 
22 Ibid., p. 81. 
23Senator Howard Baker, Testimony, Hearings of the 
Committee on Finance, U.S. Senate, 92nd Congress, 2nd 
Session, (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 
1972), p. 107. 
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quoting because they are fairly typical of the arguments 
in favor of revenue sharing offered by the many mayors 
who testified as well as those offered by urban interest 
groups. 
Existing methods of financing (Seattle's) oper-
ations are not able to meet rising demands for 
services and rising costs of existing services. 
The City Of Seattle is almost totally dependent 
on the State of Washington for our revenues. The 
State, in turn, relies heavily upon two of the 
most unfair and regressive taxes used today, the 
sales tax and the property tax. 
These taxes have been utilized to their limits. 
For us to raise them any further in our city 
would be to drive out forever the middle-class 
homeowner, the businessman ,and corporations and 
industries. A resident of our state pays an aver-
age of forty percent of his income in one form of 
taxes or another. Tax reform is desperately need-
ed, and we welcome the provisions of the revenue 
sharing bill which encourage reform. But it must 
be remembered that the cities of poorer states 
have as many needs as the cities of wealthier 
states. Only the federal government has the re-
sources, the tax structures, the flexibility and 
the magnitude to perform the kind of tax reform 
that is necessary. 
Seattle contributes in excess of half a billion 
dollars each year to the federal government in in-
come taxes alone. We are now asking that a small 
portion of that money be returned to us to save us 
from financial starvation. The $10.6 million 
which we would receive under (the House Bill) will 
not be a panacea for us. It will not trigger any 
dramatic transformations. Seattle icannot become a 
Shangri-La on ten million dollars a year. That is 
less than a sixth of the money we need to repair 
our bridges alone. 
vvhat this money will do is enable us to survive 
at minimal levels without further decreasing ser-
vices to our citizens. We may even be able to rise 
above the bare essentials and in some places ac-
tually display the creativity, diversity and pro-
gressive thinking which comprise the key to the 
future of urban America. 24 
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A reading of the Congressional proceedings dealing 
with revenue sharing gives one the impression that the 
fiscal needs of state and local governments were so great 
and so real that no Congressional opposition would be 
significant enough to outlast the numerous supporters 
of the concept. In October of 1972 the President signed 
into law the first maj:.)r piece of legislation in his New 
Federalism program, the State and Local Fiscal Assistance 
Act of 1972. It is necessary now to take a detailed look 
at the Act. \.Je will be able to see that it is substan-
tially like the House version outlined above with a few 
variations. 
Specific Provisions of the Act 
The Act authorizes $30.2 billion to be obtained from 
individual federal income taxes that is to be disbursed 
to more than 38,000 states and communities throughout the 
United Stales over a five year period. Approximately 
half of the 1972 payment of $5.3 billion was disbursed in 
the fall of that year with the remaining part of the 1972 
entitlement being mailed out in January of 1973. This 
amount is to increase in annual increments for each of the 
24Wes Uhlman, Mayor of Seattle, Washington, Testimo-
ny, Hearings of the Committee on Finance, U.S. Senate, 
92nd Congress, 2nd Session, (Washington: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1972), p. 302. 
r 
four remaining years. Therefore, the life of the Act 
runs five years beginning January 1, 1972. "A total of 
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$5.64 billion will be paid in fiscal year 1973 in addition 
to the $2.6 billion mentioned above; $6.05 billion in 
fiscal year 1974; $6.20 billion in fiscal year 1975; $6.35 
billion in fiscal year 1976 and $3.325 billion for July-
December, 1976.,,25 
The state governments shall receive one-third of 
the state's allocation •. The remaining two-thirds of the 
state's allocation shall be divided among the various 
units of local government. "The money will be apportioned 
to counties, cities, and towns using a formula based on 
population, the general tax effort factor, and the rela-
tive income of these units." The Act allocates monies 
to States under one of two formulas. Computers have been 
used to take and apply both formulas for each state and 
the higher amount will be allocated. 
One formula is a three factor formula--the 
amount received bears the same ratio to $5 
billion as the population of the state multi-
plied by the relative income factor of that 
state, multiplied by the general tax effort 
factor of the state bears to the sum of these 
products for all states. The other is a five 
25These and the following facts and figures on the 
State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972 come from 
"Detailed Fact Sheet on Revenue Sharing," Part I, Depart-
ment of the Treasury, (Washington: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1973) or from the "State and Local Fiscal 
Assistance Act of 1972," itself. 
factor formula which is based on general popu-
lation, urban population, per capita income, 
state income tax collection, and the general 
tax effort of the state. 
The law requires "expenditure and obligation re-
ports." The entitlement reports must be published in 
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general circulation within the geographical areas of each 
state and local government. The reports are also to be 
circulated to the communication media such as radio and 
television. The point, the Act says, is to provide citi-
zens with information regarding the use of revenue shar-
ing money. 
The Act also requires that each unit of government 
receiving revenue sharing funds submit a report at the 
end of each entitlement period to the Secretary of the 
Treasury "setting forth the amounts and purposes for 
which funds received during such period have been spent 
or obligated." Also, the Act requires that each level 
of government that plans to receive revenue sharing funds 
after January 1, 1973, "shall submit a report to the 
Secretary (of the Treasury) setting forth the amounts and 
purposes for which it plans to spend or obligate the 
funds which it expects to receive during such period.,,26 
26"State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972," 
Administrative Provisions, Section 121 (a) and (b), 
68 Stat. 931. 
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A specific restriction in the Act is the provision 
that revenue sharing funds may not be used by state or 
local government as matching funds for federal programs. 
Also governments below the state level may not use the 
funds for education. Also, state and local governments 
are required to place revenue sharing monies into trust 
funds and account for them separately from other funds. 
This is to make it easier for the Treasury Department to 
make "compliance studies" to assist Congress in assessing 
the program itself at the end of the five year period. 
Another fundamental restriction stipulated in the Act is 
that "no person shall on the ground of race, color, 
national origin, or sex be excluded from participation in, 
be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimina-
tion under a program or activity funded in whole or in part 
with revenue sharing funds." 
It will be remembered that the House version of the 
revenue sharing bill made the provision that local govern-
ments could only spend their funds for "priority expendi-
tures." This stipulation remains in the final Act, in-
spite of Administration objections. Nixon wanted no re-
strictions on any level of government. Priority expendi-
tures mean: 
(1) Ordinary and necessary maintenance and opera-
ting expenses for: 
(a) Public safety (including law enforce-
ment, fire protection, and building 
code enforcement); 
(b) Environmental protection (including 
sewage disposal, sanitation and pollu-
tion aba temen t) ; 
(c) Public transportation (including tran-
sit systems and streets and roads); 
(d) Health; 
(e) Recreation; 
(f) Libraries; 
(g) Social services for the poor and aged; 
(h) Financial administration; and 
(2) Ordinary and necessary capital expenditures 
authorized by law. No unit of local govern-
ment may use entitlement funds for non-
priority expenditires which are defined as 
any expenditures other than those included 
in (1) and (2) above. The chief executive 
officer of each unit of local government 
must certify to the Secretary that entitle-
ment funds received by it have been used 
only for pr~9rity expenditures as required 
by the Act. 
The Act further stipulates that prevailing wage 
rates must be paid to persons employed in projects in 
part or fully funded with revenue sharing funds. Also, 
the federal government can withhold funds to states or 
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localities if they are found in violation of any provision 
of the Act. 
An important part of the Treasury Department's 
interim guidelines is in Subpart E - "Fiscal Procedures 
and Auditing." Section (b) says that a unit of govern-
ment must use or appropriate its revenue sharing funds 
within 24 months from the date of the receipt of the 
27 "F ac t Sheet," p. 4. 
62 
federal check or seek an extension form the Secretary of 
the Treasury. A more important provision is in Section 
(b) which says "A recipient government which receives en-
titlement funds under the Act shall provide for the 
expenditure of entitlement funds in accordance with the 
laws and procedures applicable to the expenditure of its 
28 
own resources." This means that units of government 
receiving revenue sharing funds need use only their regu-
lar budget decision-making procedures in deciding who 
should participate in deciding where revenue sharing funds 
should go in the final allocations. 
The Office of Revenue Sharing of the Department of 
the Treasury furnishes a document entitled "Questions 
and Answers Relating to State and Local Fiscal Assistance 
Act of 1972." The document offers further elaboration 
as to the precise intent of the Revenue Sharing Act where 
the Act itself remains ambiguous. One question the 
document raises is "will any programs be terminated be-
cause General Revenue Sharing has begun?" The answer: 
"no." It adds, "Revenue sharing does not mandate any cuts 
in existing programs. The purpose of the Revenue Sharing 
28"Title 31 - Money and Finance," Part 51, Subpart 
E, Sections (b) and (c). Department of the Treasury, 
(Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972). 
The document's introductory statement by Secretary Schultz 
states the doctrine is the "interim regulations" govern-
ing the Revenue Sharing Act. 
law is to allocate funds to state and local governments 
to augment existing programs and aid certain capital 
expenditures. ,,29 The important word here is "mandate." 
The Act may not mandate any cuts in existing programs, 
but it does not preclude those cuts. As we shall see, 
this is a very critical point in the minds of city 
officials. 
The document also raises and answers another im-
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portant question much in the minds of local governmental 
officials. "May revenue sharing funds be used to reduce 
taxes'?" Answer: "yes." "Whether local governments use 
the funds for this purpose is a judgment which each 
government must make, based on its evaluation of local 
30 
needs." It is significant that the Treasury Department 
makes this point because a great deal of the Administra-
tion's rationale for the Act was that its monies might be 
used to lessen the tax burden of the local citizens, but 
the Act itself does not expressly mention whether the 
revenue sharing funds can or cannot be used for that 
purpose. 
29"Questions and Answers Relating to State and Local 
Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972," Office of Revenue Sharing, 
Department of the Treasury, (Washington: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1973), p. 9. 
30Ibid ., p. 13. 
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We now have some notion of the financial plight 
of urban America:and the forms of federal aid that have 
been developed to lessen the urban fiscal crisis. General 
Revenue Sharing is the latest form of such aid. Before 
examining how Seattle, Tacoma, Portland and Eugene have 
dealt with revenue sharing, it is necessary to develop 
theoretical frames of reference which, hopefully, will 
help us to assess the significance of revenue sharing to 
the American federal system. 
CHAPTER III 
THE NEW FEDERALISM: HOPES AND FEARS 
CRITERIA FOR EVALUATION 
I. THE DISTRIBUTION OF POWER 
IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 
The United States was designed by its founders to be 
a federal republic. This meant that while there was to be 
a strong central government, there were also to be strong 
states with the power to determine certain local priorities 
and policies independently from the national government. 
Some have suggested that the American federal system re-
sembles a layer cake with local governments as the base, 
state governments in the middle and the national govern-
ment at the top. This view implies that the state and 10-
cal governments are "closer to the people" than the na-ei 
tional government. Associated with this viewpoint is the 
idea that governmental activities in the United States 
are parceled out to either the states, the communities 
or to the national government. The layer cake theory 
also suggests that there is only so much power govern-
ment can exercise, and that it is held in various 
amounts by various levels of the federal system. The 
theory approaches the zero-sum game idea, that if the 
national government has a great amount of power, the 
state and local governments necessarilY:1have less. As 
we will see, there are important elements of the layer 
cake theory of federalism in President Nixon's notions 
in the New Federalism. 
T The layer cake theory with its idea of s~paration 
of national, state and local powers has been popular, 
but there is evidence that it has never been a very 
accurate model of American federalism. Thomas Dye 
suggests that: 
American federalism has been characterized 
by far more cooperation, coodination and shar-
ing of responsibilities than by separation ••• 
At all times in our history, the national 1 
government and the states have shared powers. 
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Dye continues to say that in almost every area of govern-
ment responsibility, the various units of the federal 
system have coordinated and cooperated and in fact, 
no function seems to be exclusively the province of 
one unit or another. And even in terms of "closeness 
to the people," the federal government has offices in 
every part of the nation to deal directly with citizens 
in virtually all functional areas of governmental 
responsibility. Dye concludes by saying, "In practice 
then, federalism has come to mean the sharing of power 
lThomas R. Dye, _P-::o=-l ... i_t_~_· c.;;;....-.s ___ i~ni'-S_t~a-:ot..-e..-s--=a'='"n~d~C ___ o~m-:m~u~n:-~i"-· .-t.-i..-e .... s , 
(Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1969) 
p.SO. 
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between the nation and the states, rather than a sharp 
separation between national and state responsibilities."2 
This viewpoint of American federalism has been called by 
Morton Grodzins, the marble cake theory. He explains: 
The American form of gov.ernment is often, but 
erroneously, symbolized by a three layer cake. 
A far more accurate image is the rainbow or 
marble cake, characterized by an inseparable 
mingling of differently colored ingredients, 
the colors appearing in vertical and diagonal 
strands and unexpected whorls. The colors are 
mixed in the marble cake, so function~ are 
mixed in the American federal system. 
We will see in the course of this study that the 
marble cake theory of American federalism will be useful 
in describing aspects of the New Federalism. This 
author agrees with Thomas Dye that the marble cake 
theory is the most accurate in viewing the distribution 
of power and responsibility in the American system. It 
seems clear that there is no fixed amount of political 
power to be distributed among the units of the federal 
system. Instead there is competition among those units 
for political power in general with each hoping to have 
influence in determining public policy in various areas 
of functional responsibility. Whereas today it would be 
2Ibid • 
3Morton Grodzins, "The Federal System in American 
Assembly," Goals for Americans, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: 
Prentice Hall, 1960), p. 265. 
accurate to say that all units of government in America 
have more power than they once had, the national govern-
ment has far more power than any other unit. 4 
Why has the national government obtained so much 
more power than the other units of the federal system? 
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As we saw in the last chapter, a major reason is the 
financial power gained by the federal government through 
the revenues accumulated by the federal income tax. In 
terms of the concerns of this study, it is this increased 
fiscal power of the national government and the increased 
need for funds by cities that is the most important 
explanation for the increase in the power of the national 
government. But it should be noted that there are other 
reasons for the growth in the power of the national 
government. 
For example, over time, the United States Supreme 
Court has made landmark decisions that have required 
certain actions to be taken by state and local govern-
ments. If state and local governments do not take these 
actions, it becomes the responsibility of the executive 
branch of the national government to enforce the Supreme 
Court decision. 
A familiar example is the 1954 Supreme Court deci-
4Dye , Politics in States and Communities, pp. 50-1. 
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sionof Brown v. The Board of Education. In that deci-
sion, the Court ruled that segregation in public school-
ing was discrimination and, thus, unconstitutional. It 
ordered southern schools to desegregate with "all delib-
erate speed." Although some southern school districts have 
complied voluntarily, others have not and the national 
government has sometimes used various instruments-of-
coercion, including the U.S. Army, to force compliance. 
Another reason the national government has gained 
power is the accumulation of expertise in its bureaucracy. 
State and local governments simply do not have access to 
all information on the complex problems that face them 
and have had to rely on the national government to send 
experts in to help. Such dependence on the part of the 
states and cities has meant a further leverage point 
whereby the national government can exercise power over 
the other units in the federal system. 
A further factor is the power that has evolved in 
the American Presidency. The national government is led 
at a particular time by an administration in control of 
the executive branch. Even without control of both 
houses of Congress, a President and his political party 
can exercise great power in national affairs. If the 
President has the support of the Congress on most issues 
and the Supreme Court does not oppose him, his administra-
··F V,: 
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tion can be extremely powerful in its ability to set 
national priorities and policy trends. In recent history, 
Franklin Roosevelt and Lyndon Johnson had this much power 
during most of their Presidential careers. No single 
state or community can match the power of such a national 
administration. By nature and by design, the states do 
not speak with a single national voice. Occasionally 
resolutions will emerge from National Governors confer~r: 
ences suggesting how the states stand on an issue,or a 
region of the nation will speak with one voice on an 
issue, as the South has many times. But, in neither case 
do the states, individually or as 'regions, have the com-
• 
mand over the allocation of resources (power) that a 
national administration can muster at a given time. 
Our main interest, however, is the fiscal power 
of the federal government. And as we saw in our dis-, 
cussion of categorical grants and block grants, this 
power of the national government has allowed it to make 
national policy in areas such as civil rights, ecology, 
and planning, and to require the other regimes in ehe 
federal system to follow those national priorities if 
they want the federal aid they so desperately need to run 
their local governments. 
The Controversy Over National Priorities 
The setting of these national priorities by the 
national government has been controversial for many rea-
sons. Sometimes individual citizens and officials at 
"lower" levels of government simply do not agree with 
the policy set by the national government. They may 
oppose the idea of a minimum wage or the concept that 
there should be federal aid to local education. They 
may oppose the integration of public schools or the 
development of Model Cities communities in their state 
or town. But the argument against the national govern~ 
ment setting and enforcing national priorities may 
emerge for other reasons. 
Many Americans, using the layer cake analogy, do 
not feel it is the province of the national government 
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to determine what a city or state should do, especially in 
certain areas that over time they have come to feel are 
strictly of local concern. In support of this view of 
American federalism, it is argued that in order to get 
the states to ratify the Constitution, it was clear to 
the writers of the document that large areas of respon-
sibility would have to go to the states. Hence, the Tenth 
Amendment and the implicit notion in the Constitution 
itself that the states were to retain power of control 
over their highways, education, banking, taxation, divorce, 
liquor laws and their own civil and criminal codes. The 
states, in other words, were intended by the Constitution 
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to have considerable self government in determining some 
policies and priorities for their citizens. In some re-
spects the states and localities do exercise considerable 
control in these areas. But as we have seen, much of that 
control is now either shared with, or has been aodicated 
to, the national government. A major reason, again, is 
the financial inability of the states and localities to 
deal with these areas alone and thus, the need to apply 
for federal funds with their attendant guidelines intended 
to establish the priorities of a national administration 
on a nationwide basis. 
Since the New Deal, the national government has 
considerably widened its activities at the state and 
local level in the areas of civil rights and programs for 
minorities and the disadvantaged. It is particularly 
upsetting to some Americans that national standards 
should be established for dealing with the poor and 
minority groups in their areas. One need only look at 
the controversy over the enforcement of the Brown v. The 
Board of Education decision to see how violently citizens 
can respond to the imposition of national standards at 
local level when local residents consider the issue in-
volved strictly a local concern. The tremendous contro-
versy surrounding President Johnson's War on Poverty is 
another example. As those interviewed for this study 
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testify, many local citizens were upset over the giving 
of federal funds directly to local social service agen-
cies so that those agencies, independent of local govern-
ment, might address the needs of the local poor. This 
aspect of the War on Poverty threatened local leaders 
and the local bureaucrats who felt that through this type 
of federal program, power and control was slipping from 
their hands. 
By the late 1960's then, the national government 
had long been establishing priorities and setting poli-
cies intended to make state and local governments con-
form to national standards. The national priorities 
reached to virtually every area of concern in the society. 
Even areas previously "reserved" to the states, such as 
education and law enforcement, were largely influenced 
by federal regulations accompanying the federal aid 
sought by states and cities, giving substance to the 
marble cake theory of federalism. 
Although leaders in states and communities agreed 
they needed the federal funds to carryon services to 
their citizens, they did not all agree that those funds 
should be used as a tool for establishing national policy 
at the state and local level. By the time Richard Nixon 
ran for President in 1968, there was considerable dis-
enchantment nationally with "big government" and the 
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liberal argument that with its money and ideas, Washington, 
D.C., can solve all the nation's problems. The chaos of 
the War on Poverty, the campus riots over Vietnam, the 
rising crime rate and the general inefficiency and in-
effectiveness of big government developed a national mood 
that seemed to some Americans to call for a return to 
basics. A return to a more balanced federal system where 
the states and cities would regain a broader measure of 
power and responsibility. Some citizens hoped that with 
more power, state and local governments might be able 
to deal more successfully with the issues the federal 
government had been trying to deal with for so long with 
little success. 
A Response to the Controversy: The New Federalism 
Richard Nixon is a man well aware of political 
trends. It is not surprising that his basically conser-
vative background combined with his instinct for politics 
led him to propose as a basic element in his Presidential 
campaign platform, a "New Federalism." The theory of the 
New Federalism is that American government has become 
too highly centralized in Washington, D.C. What is 
needed is to bring government closer to the people. The 
President seemed to be arguing in terms of the layer cake 
theory; that is, if more power was given to states and 
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communities, government would be closer to the people 
than it would be with so much power concentrated in 
"remote" Washington, D.C. More specifically, human ser-
vice programs and community service programs were to 
become policy areas of state and local government respon-
sibility. They would be funded with no-strings-attached 
federal funds. The revenue sharing program was to be 
the cornerstone of the New Federalism program. It was 
Nixon's answer to those who have criti~ized the weak-
ness of state and local government and the inefficient 
and highly centralized government in Washington, D.C. 
After five years of the Nixon Administration and 
about two years of General Revenue Sharing, what has 
happened? The purpose of this study is to evaluate the 
New Federalism and General Revenue Sharing in terms of 
the effect they have had on four cities. The purpose 
of this chapter is to set forth the specific criteria 
that will be used in that evaluation. The New Federalism 
and General Revenue Sharing in Seattle, Tacoma, Portland 
and Eugene will be evaluated in terms of the political 
hopes or goals the Nixon Administration has for the 
program and, just as importantly, the fears held by 
critics of the program. The political goals of the 
Nixon Administration and the New Federalism are decen-
tralization of government, more financial independence 
and decision-making by state and local government, more 
control at that level over human and community services, 
and a return of government "to the people." 
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These goals have been countered by others who 
deeply fear what such a program might actually accomplish. 
Some fear that decentralized government may mean)_still 
more inefficient government in terms of neglecting the 
needs of some citizens. Some fear that stronger cities 
and states may only strengthen local interest groups 
who will bargain away any chance for justice for all 
Americans. Some fear that returning:-Tgovernment "to the 
people" may mean just certain people. They fear that 
only state and local special interests will be strength-
ened and the priorities and policies they set may be 
counter to the needs of local minorities and the disad-
vantaged. They fear, in other words, that the progress 
made in recent years in civil rights and legislation to 
help the poor may be compromised or wiped out by giving 
new power and responsibility to state and local govern-
ment in the human and community service areas. 
We now move to an elaboration on the meaning of the 
New Federalism and its goals and fears of those who are 
critical of it. Within this chapter, these goals will 
be clearly specified to be used as criteria in an eval-
uation of how the New Federalism and General Revenue 
77 
Sharing have been working in four cities. Also, at the 
end of the chapter, specific points comprising the fears 
held by critics of the New Federalism will be enumerated. 
These points will also be used as criteria to see if the 
New Federalism is mmving in directions feared by its 
opponents. 
II. THE NEW FEDERALISM 
GOALS OF THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION 
It is difficult to precisely define the New 
Federalism. President Nixon and members of his Adminis-
tration have spoken about the concept at various times, 
and from their statements it is possible to identify 
what appear to be the central themes of the New Federalism 
idea. These themes of the New Federalism also comprise 
the hopes or goals of the Administration with regard to 
its federal program. 
Return Power, Funds and Responsibility to the States 
and to the People 
In analyzing information on the New Federalism, 
Richard Nixon's own statements on the subject are useful. 
As his statement below attests, he is interested in re-
distributing power. The President's goal of returning 
"power, funds and responsibility to the states and locali-
ties" appears to be a notion derived from the layer cake 
theory of federalism. The idea is that the top layer of 
the cake has become too powerful and overburdened and 
it is time to strengthen the middle and bottom layers. 
The President's own remarks affirm his allegiance to the 
layer cake concept. 
Nixon usee the term "New Federalism" first in a 
speech on August 8, 1969, when he said: 
After a third of a century of power flowing 
from the people and states to Washington, it 
is time for a New Federalism in which power, 
funds and respmnsibility will flow from Wash-
ington to the states and to the people ••• 
Washington has taken for its own, the best 
sources of revenue ••• 
We intend to reverse this tide, and to turn 
back to the states a greater measure of re-
sponsibility -- not as a way of avoiding prob-S lems, but as a better way of solving problems. 
Nixon amplified this theme in his 1971 State of the 
Union message. 
The time has come for a new partnership between 
the Federal Government and the States and local-
ities -- a partnership in which we entrust the ~ 
States and localities with a larger share of the 
Nation's responsibilities, and in which we share 
our Federal revenues with them so that they can 
meet those responsibilities. 
The President was proposing, he said, a "New American 
Revolution." 
5"Transcript of Richard Nixon's Address to the 
Nation, Outline Proposals for Welfare Reform," New York 
Times, 9 August 1969, p. 10. 
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••• a peaceful revelution in which power will 
be turned back to the people -- in which govern-
ment at all levels will be refreshed, renewed 
and made truly responsive. This can be'a 
revolution as profound, as far reaching, as 
exciting, ~s that first revolution almost 200 
years ago. 
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As we saw earlier in this paper, a welfare program 
and a manpower training program were to accompany the 
revenue sharing program as the policy components of 
President Nixon's New Federalism package. The evaluation 
of the progress of the New Federalism in the four cities 
studied in this dissertation is a partial one in that 
only General Revenue Sharing is being considered. Yet, 
revenue sharing is the heart of the New Federalism be-
cause it gives the basic wherewithal..by which the_:states 
and localities are to assume more power and responsibility 
and government is to be brought closer to the people of 
this nation. The President's remarks confirm the im-
portance of revenue sharing to the New Federalism scheme. 
In his layer cake notion, it is to be the central vehicle 
for reversing the trend of more and more power flowing 
from the States and communities to Washington. 
Decentralization: Different Levels of Government Have 
Different Functional Responsibilities 
In a recent conference on the New Federalism, Mr. 
6Richard Nixon, State of the Union Message, 1971, 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971), 
p. 3. 
Richard P. Nathan, a former Assistant Director of the 
Federal Office of Management and Budget in the Nixon 
Administration, and a leading figure in the Administra-
tion's New Federalism initiatives, explained what he 
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believed to be the central theme of the concept. He 
suggested that a major problem in America today is that: 
We have evolved tow~rd a governmental system 
in which every layer of government -- federal, 
state and local -- is responsible for every 
program area, and it is therefore very diffi-
cult to determine who ~s accountable for any 
specific program area. 
He interprets the central theme of the New Federal-
ism to be a sorting out, a rationalizing of what sorts of 
functions each unit of government in the federal system 
ought to provide. Once this has been determin~d, the 
Administration would seek to "assign" functions to the 
proper level of government. He believes the Nixon 
Administration is now moving in directions that suggest 
the New Federalism is to mean the following framework 
for assignment of essential governmental responsibilities: 
1. Income maintenance or welfare programs: to 
be a federal responsibility. 
2. Human service programs(education, health, 
manpower): to be a state and local responsi-
bility. 
3. Community service programs (urban develop-
7Josepq Foote, ed., The New Federalism: A Confer-
~ (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International 
Center for Scholars, May, 1973), p. 38. 
ment, police and fire protection, etc.): to 
be a state and local responsibility. 
4. Environmental programs (air and water pollu-
tion): to be a federal responsibility. 
5. Research and development programs: to be 
a federal responsibility. 
6. Institution building grants: to be a fed-
~ responsibility. 
(this) framework., in general rests on the prin-
ciple that problems that have a spillover effect 
and that are truly national in character and 
beyond the reach of the states should8be under the mantle of the federal government. 
Mr. Nathan concluded his remarks at the Conference by 
saying: 
To summarize, I think whatiis important in the 
New Federalism is not just the revolution of the 
functions of domestic government away from 
Washington and back to the states and localities. 
Rather, it is the basic premise that we need to 
devise a politically rational and reasona~ly 
clear policy framework that sorts out the pro-
gram areas in which we should enhan§e state and 
local efforts and responsibilities. 
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Mr. Nathan's views on the goals of the New Federal-
ism support the notion that the Nixon Administration sees 
American federalism in terms of the layer cake theory. 
Nathan seems to be saying that we have drifted from layer 
cake federalism in America to marble cake federalism and 
it is time to get back to the layer cake distribution of 
power and responsibility. Certainly this is suggested 
8Ibid., p •. s. 
9Ibid., p. 40. 
when he calls for the assigning 6f specific functions to 
specific "layers" of the federal system. He sees the 
marble cake notion of shared functions among units of 
government as an inefficient means of solving national 
problems. 
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Mr. Nathan's contribution to the meaning as well as 
the goals of the New Federalism is very significant. He 
becomes more specific where the President was general. 
Nathan is saying the basic purpose of the New Federalism 
is not just to decentralize the American government. In 
addition, the concept seeks to "devise a politically 
rational and reasonably clear policy framework" that 
decides which functions of government are to be the re-
sponsibilities of which levels of the federal system. 
He feels the Nixon Administration is moving in a direction 
that s9-¥s human services and community services are to 
be the responsibility of state and local government. 
Those interviewed in this study would probably 
agree. As we shall see, however, most of them do not 
like the means by which Nathan and President Nixon are 
making their point. Most of the city officials inter-
viewed feel human services and community services pre-
viously funded and administered by the federal govern-
ment are coming to be state and local responsibilities 
by default. As Nixon cuts back categorical grants in 
those areas, and only replaces those federal funds with 
the General Revenue Sharing block grants, the states 
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and cities have little choice but to fund, as best they 
can, community and human service programs they feel are 
worthwhile. In fairness it must be said that Special 
Revenue Shar.ing was designed by the Administration to be 
a block grant ',.t9 be used by states and cities to pick up 
human services and community services previously funded 
with federal categorical grants. But Special Revenue 
Sharing is stuck in Congress, and the categorical cut-
backs continue. Whereas many of those interviewed do 
not object to assuming some human and community service 
responsibilities at the local level of government, in 
accord with Nathan's assignment of functional responsi-
bilities, they do object to the current means of assign-
ment. 
There is no::question that revenue sharing is central 
to the New Federalism concept. Money means power and 
local government can only assume the functions outlined 
by Mr. Nathan if it:,gets substantial federal aid. It 
must be unrestricted aid, too, if the autonomy suggested 
by Nixon and Nathan in local decision-making is to be a 
real component of the New Federalism. 
Returning Government to the People 
As we have seen, President Nixon's call for a New 
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Federalism suggests that COO much power has drifted to 
the "top layer" of the cake and some must now be trans-
ferred back down to the "lower" layers. This seems to 
haveY·been the President's meaning when he suggested that 
"power, funds and responsibility" should be returned to 
the "states and localities." But he also added " ••• and 
to the people." The President, of course, may have 
meant noth~ng more than through returning power to the 
governments of states and localities, power would also 
be flowing to the citizens of these communities. But 
the President's statement is vague and, hence, open to 
various interpretations. The various interpretations of 
what Richard Nixon meant by returning power to "the 
people" have tremendous significance for how Americans 
understand the goals of the program and who is to part~­
cipate in their realization. 
What th~ President probably meant by returning 
power to "the people" was returning revenue sharing money 
to states and communities for their governments to use 
on behalf of their citizens. In the political turmoil 
of the late 1960's, however, ~another interpretation was 
possible. 
Throughout the 1960's, Black Americans and poor 
Americans were activated as individuals and as groups. 
Through their own initiatives and through government 
""'i':'""'" • 
L. 
sponsored programs, such as the War on Poverty, Black and 
poor Americans began to participate in programs that 
were designed to better their lot. More than bettering 
their material situation, these programs suggested that 
disadvantaged Americans had too long been left out of 
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the decision-making processes affecting their lives. The 
civil rights movement and the War on Poverty provided 
an opportunity for the disadvantaged to speak up and to 
participate in the formulation and enactment of programs 
important to their lives. Some "power" had returned to 
"the people." 
The real accomplishments of the civil rights 
movement and the War on Poverty in terms of success are 
debateable. But one thing seemed clear by the end of 
the 1960's -- many Americans who previously thought there 
was no hope for them to participate in making political 
decisions now felt there was hope. The door was opened 
in the 1960's for Black's and the poor to get involved 
in politics and, of course, they would want it to stay 
open. Therefore, it would not be surprising if Nixon's 
call for returning government to "the people" was inter-
preted by American Blacks and the poor as meaning they 
should be given an added chance through revenue sharing 
to participate in making public policy. 
It is a major theme of this study that Nixon's New 
Federalism can be seen to have within its rhetoric a 
strong encouragement for individual participation in 
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the making of public policy. As we shall see in the 
following case studies, the New Federalism was so inter-
preted by many city officials. Whether the President 
intended this interpretation or not, it would probably 
be fair to surmise that his use of the term "the people" 
may have been in response to the call for "power to the 
people" of the 1960's. Yet there has always been the 
notion that individual citizens should have the opportu-
nity to participate in the making of local policy within 
the various units of the federal system. As we will see 
shortly, the political thought of Jefferson and Madison 
suggested that citizens acting individually or as mem-
bers of interest groups should participate in policy 
making. Madison was worried that anyone group might be-
come too powerful, but he understood that Americans as 
citizens of their communitie~ and as citizens of their 
states, and as citizens of the United States, should 
have the opportunity for political participation in each 
of these units of the federal system. There is, there-
fore, a strong element of individualism in terms of the 
notion of individual partic~pation in the federalism 
aspect of American political thought. 
The 1960's saw a reawakening of the notion of the 
87 
possibility of individual political efficacy. In addition, 
Thomas Jefferson and James Madison contributed the ideo~ 
logical rationale for Americans to use in explaining why 
returning government to "the people" should be interpreted 
to mean citizen participation in the making of public 
policy. The civil rights movement and the War on Poverty 
gave many previously nonparticipating citizens the chance 
to participate and implanted in their minds the notion 
that this should be a permanent state of affairs. But 
did the Nixon Administration see things this way? 
Before looking at how Jefferson, Madison and the 
War on Poverty have inspired many Americans to feel the 
individual should play a role in determining local policy 
under the New Federalism, it is important to see how a 
member of President Nixon's White House staff interprets 
the returning government "to the peop.1e" aspect of the 
New Federalism. 
Kenneth R. Cole, Jr. succeeded John D. Ehr1ichman 
as Director of the Domestic Council in December, 1972. In 
this position as an assistant to the President, Cole is 
responsible for coordinating intergovernmental activities 
between the federal government and state and local govern-
ments. He contributes to an understanding of the New ~ 
Federalism and its goals by emphasizing the fact that a 
central purpose of the concept is to make officials in 
local government more accountable to the people. He ex-
plains: 
As we look out at the way the federal govern-
ment does business, the way it works with state 
and local governments, we believe the govern-
ment officials who are closer to the people 
are better able to solve the people's problems, 
and are better able to solve those problems on 
the basis of priorities that exist in their 
communities, as opposed to priorities that some 
federal bureaucrat may decide for himself are 
the critical priorities. So we think lola1 officials will be made more accountable. 
Mr. Cole elaborates on this aspect of the New 
Federalism by suggesting that now many mayors go after 
the federal dollar and spend that money on all kinds of 
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programs that may not be truly responsive to the needs of 
the city's citizens. The General Revenue Sharing aspect 
of the New Federalism, he feels, solves this problem by 
granting money todties in block form and calling upon 
the city and its citizens to decide how the money is to 
be spent. "That gets the citizen in'bhe community back 
into the game. They are not in the game now."ll We 
have seen, however, that the State and Local Fiscal 
Assistance Act of 1972 does not require citizen partici-
pation. The only requirement is that, at a minimum, 
10Kenneth R. Cole, Jr., "Conversational Contact," 
Evaluation vol. 1, (November 2, 1973), pO:- 7. 
11Ibid., p. 12. 
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regular budget procedures be used in the allocation pro-
cess. The extent of citizen~participation, that Cole 
seems to feel will be quite extensive, is a very vague 
aspect of both New Federalism's theory and the Revenue 
Sharing Act itself. 
Mr. Cole goes on to suggest that not just local 
officials will be accountable to the people in a more 
meaningful fashion under the New Federalism, but also 
governmental programs. Because local decisions will be 
determining how much revenue sharing money is spent on 
what programs, local citizens, he feels, will want to 
continue those programs that are clearly useful and drop 
those that are not. In Mr. Cole~s opinion, then, the 
New Federalism is an effort to bring both money and power 
to decide to the local level. It is an effort to bring 
government closer to the people so that they can evaluate 
both programs and officials by retaining those that are 
useful and throwing out those that are not. It is to be 
a process of decentralization. 
Returning Government to the People: Individualism in the 
Federal Context 
The goal of bringing government in. the United States 
closer to the people is a very important, yet vague goal. 
It is critical to an understanding and an evaluation of 
the New Federalism that the meaning of "returning govern-
',". 
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ment to the people" be made as clear as possible. Mr. 
Cole is as specific as any Administration spokesman in 
suggesting that returning government to the people means 
local citizens are to participate in making local policy 
decisions by endorsing or throwing out local officials 
and programs that do not meet the citizensJ needs. This 
implies that through the vote the citizen is to partici-
pate in the New Federalism. Cole is vague on whether the 
citizen is supposed to also be given an opportunity to 
participate in local decisions regarding the allocation 
of General Revenue Sharing funds. It seems that it is 
up to the individual state, county or city to make that 
decision for itself. These units of government must 
decide who "the people" are that will participate in and 
benefit from the New Federalism. The "spirit" of the New 
Federalism and the "letter" of the Revenue Sharing Act 
stipulate that state and local governments are to be 
strengthened through the New Federalism. But govern-
ments do not work in a vacuum. The data from this study 
shows that there are individual citizens at the local 
level who still believe in the theory of Jeffersonian 
individualism and feel that the individual at the city 
level should participate in local policy making activi-
ties. They see the occurrence of General Revenue Sharing 
in their area as an opportunity for such individual parti-
pation. There are also citizens who were politicized by 
the War on Poverty programs and who now feel their input 
should be given in any General Revenue Sharing delibera-
tions. They participated in War on Poverty and Model 
Cities programs and do not want to be excluded now. 
Jeffersonian Individualism 
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Thomas Jefferson believed that the individual citi-
zen was sovereign in America. In matters of public policy 
at the local level, the individual citizen should be 
heard. Jefferson was an avid student of John Locke's 
Second Treatise on Civil Government. In that work, Locke 
states that the individual is sovereign and he leaves a 
state of nature and moves into society. By means of 
committing himself to a social contract, he moves from 
society to a system of government. That contract says 
that the government created by individual citizens 
exists to ensure their natural rights that belong to each 
of them. These are life, liberty and property. If a 
government is unable to ensure these rights, men are 
rightly entitled to replace that government with another, 
the central point being that the individual citizen is 
sovereign. The government exists to serve him. Jefferson 
agreed with Locke and believed that government was most 
manageable and democracy most possible in small "ward 
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republics." In these small communities, the individual 
citizen was supreme. He agreed that some responsibilities 
of government might best be performed by larger units of 
government, such as county, state or national government, 
but only those duties that cannot be performed at the 
local level. Jefferson said: 
In government, as well as in every other busi-
ness of life, it is by division and sub-divi-
sion of duties alone, that all matters great 
and small, can be managed to perfection ••• And 
the whole is cemented by giving to every citi-
zen, personally, a par12in the administration 
of the public affairs. 
Jefferson believed in a republican form of govern-
mente His definition of a republican government was gov-
ernment by the citizens "acting directly and personally." 
He felt that a government is more or less republican as 
it has more or less of this "ingredient of the direct 
action of the citizens." This could be best accomplished 
in a rural township or New England community of his time, 
he felt. He further argued that where direct and personal 
citizen participation cannot be obtained, resort must be 
made to representatives. 13 
Thomas Jefferson was interested in creating an 
12 The Works of Thomas Jefferson, ed. Paul L. Ford, 
vol. XI (New York: G.P. Putnam and Sons, 1965), p~ 347. 
l3Ibid ., p. 529. 
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environment whereby the individual could live in maximum 
freedom. Government was a necessary evil. It existed to 
carry out those responsibilities that individuals cannot 
alone perform. Government existed to protect the indi~ 
vidual~s rights to life, liberty and property. Such a 
government, Jefferson felt, should be limited by a 
Constitution and governed as directly as possible, and 
certainly at the local level, by the active participa-
tion of individual citizens. Jefferson obviously had 
great faith in thei.wisdom and intelligence of individuals 
and he relied on that faith in their abilities to ensmre 
a democratic government in their communities. Again, it 
must be emphasized that Jefferson was talking about the 
individual directly governing a small, often rural commu-
nity. Critics of his time, and today as well, argue that 
such reliance on the abilities of the individual to govern 
himself wisely cannot hold for larger communities and 
especially in technocratic societies like modern America. 
There are simply too many individuals for everyone to 
have his say, even at the local level, even if he is only 
directing an elected representative. The issues are too 
complex for each individual to participate intelligently 
in the policy-making process. But Jefferson was hoping 
America would remain basically rural and agricultural, 
hence, democratic and virtuous. 
Jeffersonian political theory and its belief in 
the individual as the most basic unit of society gains 
support from the writings of Alexis de Tocquevil1e. In 
his great work, Democracy in America, de Tocqueville be-
gins his description of American government and politics 
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by saying that "wnehever the political laws of the United 
States are to be discussed, it is with the doctrine of 
. t f th 1 th t t b· "]4 sovere~n y 0 e peop e a we mus eg~n ••• 
It has become the governing principle of the American 
polity. He went on to observe that the doctrine of the 
sovereignty of the people really meant the sovereignty of 
the individual. 
In the nations by which the sovereignty of the 
people is recognized, every individual has an 
equal share of power and participation equally 
in government of the state ••• Every individual 
is always supposed to be as well informed as 
virtuous, and as strong as any of his fellow 
citizens. He obeys society ••• because he ack-
nowl~dges3the unity of an associationoof fellow 
men and knows that no such association can 
exist without a regulating force ••• This doc-
trine i t5universal1y admitted in the United States. 
Thomas Jefferson, then, believed strongly in the 
doctrine of local autonomy. And the individual is the 
central concern of that doctrine, for it aims at preserving 
14Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 
Phillips Bradley, ed., (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1953), 
Chapter 4, p. 1. 
15 Ibid., pp. 64-5 
L 
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his inherent and sovereign right to govern himself. He 
feared government of any type, but especially highly 
centralized government on a national scale as it might 
inhibit the individual "who is sublime." As Anwar Syed 
put it in The Political Theory of American Local Govern-
~, to Jefferson, sovereignty resides ultimately in the 
individual, that his personal supervision and direction 
of government constitute the height of democratic vir-
tue, and the smaller the locality, the more likely it is 
to be democratic. 16 
Vincent Ostrom's Interpretation of "The People" in The 
Federalist 
Thomas Jefferson represents one way to define what 
is meant by "the people." To Jefferson, individuals made 
up "the people" and they were sovereign, the most import-
ant "unit" in the making of public policy. Political Sci-
entist Vincent Ostrom has done a detailed study of the 
most basic document in early American history, The 
Federalist, by Madison, Jay and Hamilton. In his work, 
The Political Theory of a Compound Republic, Ostrom seems 
to feel that collectives play the central role in ~ 
l6Anwar Syed, The Political Theory of American 
Local Government, (New York: Random House, 1966), p. 4. 
Federalist, and the individual is important in terms of 
being part of a group.17 
Ostrom explains that in their effort to design a 
form of government that could deal effectively with 
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states' interests and national problems and still address 
itself to the needs of individuals, the Founders developed 
Ene scheme of federalism. As an organization of govern-
ment, federalism is a compromise between an extreme 
concentration of power in a national government, and a 
loose confederation of virtually independent states such 
as existed in America under the Articles of Confedera-
tion. Federalism is a system of government in which 
power is divided between a central government and a re-
gional or subdivisional government. Ostrom refers to 
this form of government as a compound republic of con-
current regimes. It is a republic because citizens 
elect representatives to governmental office to make 
public policy on behalf of the people. It is a compound 
republic because there is the national government and 
the regimes of the several states and the counties and 
cities of America. All these regimes are working con-
currently for the cause of the individual at the same '.::' 
17Vincent Ostrom, The Political Theory of a Com-
pound Republic, (Blacksburg, Virginia: Public Choice 
Press, 1971). 
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time. 18 
Ostrom interprets The Federalist as arguing for the. 
establishment of a system of concurrent regimes in the 
United States to he]pprevent what he refers to as "the 
republican disease." What is this disease? He argues 
that the Founders firmly believed in mankind's ability to 
govern himself. They also knew, however, that men can 
be selfish and power hungry. It is possible that through 
the majority vote process, majority factions could develop 
that might tyrannize minorities. That is the republican 
disease. A compound republic on concurrent regimes can 
prevent this from happening due to their being, in such 
a system, so many "independent" governmental structures 
each electing their own officials that the chance of one 
tyrannical majority controlling all regimes, frDm top to 
bottom, would be unlikely. Federalism, as a compound 
republic with concurrent regimes, is the "republican 
remedy" for. the "republican disease.,,19 
Ostrom is suggesting, then, that the authors of 
The Federalist intended people in the United States to 
govern themselves by electing representatives and, thus, 
forming a republican government. Republicanism is to 
18Ibid., p. 21. 
19 Ibid., p. 53. 
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operate concur~ently in the systems of all regimes in the 
country. If a citizen cannot find redress for a grievance 
from one level of government, he has others he can appeal 
to. The theory suggests that if a citizen finds a major-
ity at one level of government, let us say his home town, 
is against him on an issue to such an extent his freedom 
of expression is abrogated, it is unlikely that the same 
majority will oppose him at both the state level and the 
national level, that is, at every regime in the compound 
republic. An American citizen, by participating in con-
current regimes, is likely to find a hearing at one 
level or another and, thus, escape being a victim of the 
republican disease. 
James Madison: A Further Emphasis on Groups 
Vincent Ostrom's interpretation of The Federalist 
suggests what to some is meant in American political 
thought by "the people." This interpretation says that 
"the people" means citizens organized in "groups" or 
communities. James MadisQn, in his writings in The 
Federalist, was interested in "factions." He saw poli-
tics as a struggle among groups, not individuals. Madison 
saw the realities of the American scene differently from 
Jefferson. Madison saw man as sometimes a rational crea-
ture of good will, but he also saw him as selfish and 
power hungry on occasion. Because of these things, 
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Madison's "unit" of concern was different from Jefferson's. 
As Anwar Syed has put it: 
Whereas Jefferson founded his theory on the 
'people' -- conceived in the abstract as con-
sisting of individuals, each of whom was 
rational, virtuous, kind, considerate, reason-
able -- Madison took the 'faction' as his . 
point of departure. In ~he Federalist No. 10, 
he defined 'faction' as a 'number of citizens, 
whether amounting to a majority or a minority 
of the whole, who are united and actuated by 
some common impulse of passions, or of inter-
est, adverse to the rights of other citizens, 
or to the permanen~Oand aggregate interests 
of the community.' 
In The Federalist No. 10, Madison denounced local 
democracy and lamented the "notorious factions and 
oppressions" which take place in corporate towns. Reali-
zing that "the people" are going to organize in factions 
to exercise political power, Madison sought a system of 
government whereby faction 'would balance faction. He 
was very concerned with the republican disease articulated 
earlier by Ostrom. Madison believed that the federal 
system, along with the three branches of the federal govern-
ment checking and balancing each other, would form 
centers of countervailing power that could check the 
selfish power-seeking ambitions of any single faction. 
This again is a republican remedy to the republican disease. 
What is significant, however, is that Madison never did 
20Syed , The Political Theory of American Local 
Government, p. 125. 
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consider the individual as the basic unit of concern in 
American politics. He looked at America in terms of 
groups. By "the people" he means groups of people. The 
political scientist Samuel P. Huntington contrasted the 
Jeffersonian and Madisonian positions this way: 
The Jeffersonian ideal of grass roots democracy 
stands in direct contrast to the Madisonian 
concept of extensive republicanism. To Jefferson 
the ward republics embodied the republican ideal 
in its purest form. To Madison, the ward repub-
lics embodied the evils of factionalism in their 
worst form. To Jefferson, the principal threat 
to republicanism was the tyranny of arbitrary 
centralized autocracy. To Madison, the princi-
pal threat to republicanism was the tyranny of 
arbitrary local minorities. To Jefferson, a 
republic was a system of government which pro-
vided for the participation of the people. For 
Madison, a republic was a system of government 
which separated the people from government by 
means of representation. To Jefferson, direct 
democracy was the epitome of republicanism 
and representation a dilution of it. To Madison, 
representation was the essence of republic~~ism 
and direct democracy the antithesis of it. 
Of course, Jefferson has had his followers, even 
to this day, but there is little doubt that most American 
political thinkers have tended to reject the important 
elements of his theory - natural rights, social contract, 
sovereignty of the individual and popular democracy -
as realistic concepts for describing and analyzing modern 
21Samuel P. Huntington, "The Founding Fathers on 
the Division of Powers," in Area and Power, Anwar Maass, 
ed., (Alencoe: The Free Press, 1959), pp. 189-90. 
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America. Instead, the Madisonian concept of factions or 
groups has become the most popular tool for dealing with 
American politics. In his book, Pluralist Democracy in 
the United States: Conflict and Consent, Robert Dahl 
develops a pluralist theory of American politics that 
largely follows the basic constructs of Madison. Dahl 
explains: 
The theory and practice of American pluralism 
tends to assume, as I see it, that the existence 
of multiple centers of power, none of which is 
wholly sovereign, will help (may indeed be neces-
sary) to tame power, to secure the c02~ent of all, 
and to settle conflicts peacefully ••• 
Strictly speaking, Dahl's pluralist theory is far 
more complex than the suggestion that America is made up 
of groups of persons organized into various associations 
that must be balanced off, one against the other, in order 
to maintain order in this society. In his study of poli-
tical power configurations in New Haven, Who Governs?, 
Dahl develops quite an elaborate and controversial in-
terpretation of pluralist theory.23 Group theory and 
pluralist theory were developed by political thinkers, 
from Madison on, because they saw little reality to the 
22Robert Dahl, Pluralist Democracy in the United 
States: Conflict and Consent, (Chicago: Rand McNally and 
Co., 1967), p. 24. 
23Robert Dahl, Who Governs?,(New Haven,Connecticut: 
Yale University Press, 1961). 
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Jeffersonian idea that the individual really ruled this 
country. As time went on, the rationality of man came 
into question and the average citizen was not seen as all 
that preoccupied with participating in politics. 24 Yet in-
dividualism is not dead. 
Modern Jeffersonian Individualism 
Jefferson argues that the individual should make 
public policy at the local level. He should rule. The 
Jeffersonian ideal is alive. This does not mean the ideal 
is practiced by a majority of the American people. Most 
studies demonstrate that it is not. The masses are usu-
ally apathetic. The theme of Dye and Ziegler's, The Irony 
of Democracy,is that apathetic masses in fact allow the 
elites of America to insure the survival of democratic 
values in this nation. 25 Nevertheless, all people are not 
apathetic all the time, and when a President calls for re-
turning power to the people, enough people still believe 
in their right to participate in local decision-making 
that they expect to be allowed to participate. 
24For an interesting and informative description 
and analysis of group theory, plural elite theory and 
single elite theory, see David Ricci, Community Power 
and Democratic Theory: The L01iC of Political Analysis, (New York: Random House, 1971 • 
25Thomas Dye and Harmon Ziegler, The Irony of 
Democracy, Second Edition, (Belmont, California: Wads-
worth, 1972). 
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The concept of individual sovereignty was streng-
thened in America by Lyndon Johnson's War on Poverty. In 
an effort to reduce poverty and involve the poor in the 
effort, the Johnson Administration pushed through Congress 
the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964. It is important 
that we examine the Act and some of its effects because 
it has a profound influence on both local government and 
poor citizens at the local level. Thus, it has had a ma-
jor impact on how broadly or narrowly local government 
has seen fit to interpret the New Federalism's goa1sof re-
turning government to "the people." 
The War on Poverty and Jeffersonian Individualism 
The War on Poverty reinforced the belief in the 
American myth of the efficacy of the individual. This is 
a very significant factor in explaining how a city may 
interpret the New Federalism goal of returning power to 
"the people." Both individual citizens and groups they 
may belong to which were activated by the War on Poverty 
may expect to participate in the General Revenue Sharing 
of the New Federalism. Lyndon Johnson enabled many poor 
and minorities to participate in making decisions affect-
ing their lives and chances are they will want to continue 
to do so under the Nixon Administration. 
Passed during the Johnson Administration, the Eco-
nomic Opportunity Act of 1964 was the cornerstone of 
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President Johnson's War on Poverty. While not trying to 
establish Jeffersonian democracy in America, Johnson's 
War on Poverty programs were intended to include citizens 
in the making of public policy in their local towns and 
neighborhoods. Title II-A, Section 202(a)(3), of the Act 
authorized the creation of Community Action P~ograms 
which were to be developed and administered with the "max-
imum feasible participation" of residents of the areas 
served. The literature of the Community Action Programs 
and the War on Poverty is vast, and the questions raised 
in that literature range from asking about Johnson's real 
motive for creating those programs to the effectiveness 
and durability of the programs themselves. For our pur-
poses, however, the significance of the War on Poverty 
programs is the emphasis put on involving the individual 
citizen in the local policy-making process. 
Federal funds were sent directly to local social 
service agencies and they were called upon to go out into 
their neighborhoods and gather up citizens to come to 
neighborhood meetings and together decide how to spend 
federal money to solve their problems. The individual 
citizen was the heart of the program. Local government 
was by-passed as an instrument of public policy formation. 
The fact that local government did not dole out the fed-
eral funds, of course, also upset many local politicians 
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and bureaucrats. So, in spite of the reduction in the 
number of individuals participating in public policy deci-
sion-making in this country since the nation's earliest 
days, President Johnson was now trying to include poor 
individuals in the local policy-making process. In a true 
Jeffersonian sense, the local poor person was considered 
best able to know his situation and what to do about it. 
At least this was the rhetoric of the War on Poverty. 
There were, however, elements of Madison in the War 
on Poverty program. Social service agencies were, after 
all, groups. The Community Action Programs were groups. 
While the intention of the War on Poverty seemed to be to 
include the citizen more completely in the local policy-
making process, it certainly was calling for him to be 
organized into, and be represented by, groups in the local 
area. But the emphasis was on citizens, whether as indi-
viduals or groups. They were to participate to the max-
imum extent in making policy that would alleviate their 
condition of poverty. 
In his work, Participation of the Poor, Ralph M. 
Kramer suggests that "it was ••• the inclusion of the con-
cept of 'maximum feasible participation' of the poor that 
lifted the CAP out of the tradition category of grant-in-
aid or technical assistance program and introduced a new 
set of political and social issues that may have an impact 
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on local communities for many years.,,26 Kramer also quotes 
page seven of the CAP Guide as saying: 
The long range objective of every community action 
program is to effect a permanent increase in the 
capacity of individuals, groups and communities 
afflicted by poverty to deal effectively with their 
own P29blems so that they need no further assist-
ance. 
The Johnson Administration appeared to want to bring 
government closer to a particular segment of the American 
people. The Administration seemed to want poor Americans, 
as individuals and as groups, to come together in their 
neighborhoods to seek solutions to their problems. Fed-
eral money was given directly to them to help them organ-
ize, develop and administer programs. The Johnson Admin-
istration appeared to be quite specific by what it meant 
by "the people." It meant poor people as individuals and 
groups. The War on Poverty sought to help them and in-
clude the poor themselves in the effort as much as possi-
ble. And, as Kramer suggests, a goal was to keep them 
involved for a long period so that their needs would long 
be apparent to local interests, whether in or out of gov-
ernment. 
26Ralph M. Kramer, Participation of the Poor . 
(Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1969~, p. 2. 
27 Ibid., p. 10. 
101 
The War on Poverty and the New Federalism: 
Keeping Individualism Alive 
The fact that many of the poor were inspired by the 
War on Poverty and that many organizations of poor were 
formed to participate in making public policy at the local 
level has significance for the New Federalism. So does 
the fact that some of the poor did not participate and 
that many War on Poverty programs did not work. The War 
on Poverty did not eliminate poverty in America. Leaders 
of some Community Action Programs and social service agen-
cies did not represent well the interests of the poor in 
their areas. The local officials interviewed for this 
study substantiate this. They also substantiate the fact 
that local government and local special interests were up-
set over being by-passed in the disbursing of federal 
funds under the War on Poverty. 
The War on Poverty made allot of people mad, but it 
also gave real hope to others. Some programs originated 
during the Johnson years, such as Head Start and Model 
Cities, have worked well in some cities. Allover America 
the disadvantaged and the minorities were given hope that 
the War on Poverty might give them a chance to have a say 
about what bothered them and what should be done about it. 
In other words, the Great Society programs did politicize 
many poor Americans. Many of ~.~the" people" Johnson was 
aiming to activate did become active. Many of them want 
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to continue to be active, but as we saw earlier in this 
paper, the Nixon Administ~ation has cut back or eliminated 
many of the programs originated under the War on Poverty. 
The categorical grants for these programs are drying up. 
As we shall see in the case studies which follow, many of 
those politicized under the War on Poverty are still ac-
tive and are now lobbying City Hall for General Revenue 
Sharing funds to replace the lost categorical monies. 
Because of Johnson's War on Poverty programs, when 
Richard Nixon tells the country that he wants to return 
funds, power and responsibility to the states, localities 
and the people, it is not surprising that many poor Ameri-
cans feel they are justified in believing the President 
means to include them. But what does President Nixon mean 
when he says the New Federalism seeks to return the gov-
ernment to "the people"'? An important goal of this study 
of revenue sharing and the New Federalism in four cities 
is an effort to see how "the people" has translated itself 
in the practice of the New Federalism. Because the Presi-
dent's meaning is not specifically clear, it is up to the 
local area concerned to decide who "the people" are that 
benefit from revenue sharing and the New Federalism. The 
people who benefit can be seen as those who participate 
in the decision-making process of government in d~ciding 
where the General Revenue Sharing funds are to go. Also, 
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the people who seem to be benefitting from the allocations 
of General Revenue Sharing funds can lead to a definition 
of who "the peopa:e" are that the New Federalism is addres-
sing. In the case studies that follow we will be very 
careful to try to determine who the people are who bene-
fit from revenue sharing. Such an analysis will also give 
us an idea of what the Administration means by "returning 
government to the people." 
We have seen that the goals of the New Federalism 
appear to be the establishment of some sense of reality 
to the layer cake theory of federalism. Also, in its goal 
of returning government "to the people," the New Federal-
ism leaves open to the states, counties and cities the 
chance to reinforce the theory of Jeffersonian individual-
ism in America. 
The goals of the New Federalism, then, are as fol. 
lows: 
(1) See to it that power, funds and responsibil-
ity flow from Washington, D.C., to the states, lo-
calities and the people. . 
(2) Make government, at all levels, more respon-
sive. This can be done by making specific layers 
(national, state, local) of government responsible 
for specific programs so it will be easier for the 
people to know which layer of government to hold 
accountable for which programs. A goal is the de-
centralization of American government in terms of 
certain functions being assumed by certain levels 
of government. For example, human and community 
services would be functional areas of concern to 
state and local governments, not the national gov-
ernment. 
(3) Involve the average citizen in local de-
cision-making processes on public policy matters. 
Bring government closer to the people. Citizens 
and state and local officials are to work to-
gether in establishing priorities and policies 
based upon local characteristics and needs. 
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If these are the goals or hopes of the Nixon Administra-
tion for the New Federalism, there are some Americans who 
hold certain fears as the Administration pursues these 
goals. 
III. THE NEW FEDERALISM: FEARS OF SOME CITIZENS 
OF WHAT IT MAY ACCOMPLISH 
While the goals of the New Federalism appear to have 
some merit, to other Americans the thought of their reali-
zation incites very real apprehension. Essentially, all 
the "fears" to be analyzed here revolve around the possible 
effects of decentralized government. If this primary goal 
of the New Federalism is accomplished, what will it do to 
federally sponsored programs that have been developed for 
the poor and minority groups? Will decentralized govern-
ment strengthen local interest groups that have little 
sympathy for the disadvantaged in their communities? Will 
local minorities be able to playa role in the local de-
cision-making process that deals with revenue sharing? 
Will the city be so strengthened by the New Federalism 
that the cause of equal justice for all may be threatened? 
These and related issues will now be examined as we take 
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note of the apprehension some Americans have over the pos-
sible success of Nixon's New Federalism. 
The Fear That Decentralization May Cause Abandonment of 
Programs for the Disadvantaged 
We have seen that a central goal of the New Federal-
ism is the decentralization of governmental responsibili-
ties. Back in 1967, Richard N. Goodwin, an advisor to 
President Kennedy, spoke of the need to decentralize the 
huge powers and responsibilities that had accrued over the 
years to the federal government. He suggested that "both 
burden and enterprise must be shifted into units of action 
small enough to allow for more intimate personal contact 
and numerous enough to widen the outlets for direct parti-
't' d t 1 "28 C1pa 10n an con ro ••• He goes on to make a crucial 
point that President Nixon and his supporters also seem to 
say is at the theoretical center of the New Federalism; 
The issues involved in decentralization are remote 
from the old struggles over states' rights and big 
government. Those struggles centered on the ques-
tion of whether any effort at all should be made 
to solve social problems through collective action 
and public resources. Decentralization, however, 
assumes that this question is resolved affirmative-
lY"and,see~9the issue as one of structure and or-
gan1zat1on. 
The theory of the New Federalism suggested in this 
chapter seems to make just this point. The Nixon Admin-
28Foote, ed., The New Federalism, p. 2. 
29Ib~d., 2 3 • pp. -. 
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istration is advocating a structure and organizational 
change in the American system in that it seeks more power 
and accountability at the state and local levels of gov-
ernment. As we saw from Mr. Nathan's remarks, some func-
tions would remain federal responsibilities and others 
would be remanded to the states and localities. Nowhere 
is there the suggestion that government at any level 
should defer its responsibility "to solve social problems 
through collective action and public resources." Instead, 
the New Federalism is calling for "a better framework for 
the assignment of essential governmental responsibilities" 
and not an avoidance of those responsibilities. The fear 
is that there is not a "national consensus at all levels 
that there should be collective action to solve social 
problems through public resources." The fear is that 
with money and policy-setting responsibilities assigned 
to them, powerful local interests may not use their pub-
lic resources to solve social programs at all. 
The Fear of Strengthened Local Special Interests 
at the Expense of the Disadvantaged 
Fears that local factions might be intolerant afc~ 
local minorities are not new in the American experience. 
Fear that one faction, with great power, might tyrannize 
citizens without power in the community was a basic part 
of James Madison's political thought. Unless factions 
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were controlled, the basic liberties of individuals would 
be threatened. Madison feared a tyranny of the majority 
and also of the minority. He lamented the "notorious 
factions and oppressions" which may be found in corporate 
towns. He argued that the smaller the units of govern-
ment, the fewer the interests residing in it and the great-
er the possibility of one man or groups of men lording 
over others. Indeed, Madison theorized in The Federalis~ 
No. 10 that the entire system of a compound republic of 
concurrent regimes was a means whereby citizens could ap-
peal to "higher" lev,els of government for redress if 
their basic liberties were threatened. More contemporary 
writers on the subject of local government and American 
political theory share Madison's concerns. 
Roscoe Martin questions how secure the rights of all 
citizens might be if they had to rely on local government 
and local citizens to insure those rights. He feels that 
small governments, especially rural ones, are "govern-
ments of men and not laws." He argues that local gov-
ernments are rules by political bosses who "suppress dis-
sidents ruthlessly, even if they are benevolent to their 
followers." "The citizen, apathetic and uninformed, does 
not consider local government as government at all. Gov-
ernment for him is at the state capital and more especial-
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ly in Washington."30 
Robert C. Wood would agree with Martin and Madison 
that local government is basically undemocratic. He has 
argued that "the present quiltwork of local government 
plays into the hands of groups who wish to maintain their 
social and cultural homogeneity, and to this end use lo-
cal political power to exclude from their midst people 
having different standards.,,3l 
Although the Jeffersonian dictum of the virtues of 
local self-government runs deep in American ideology, 
there are those who distrust people who might rule at the 
local level. There is a fundamental fear, also, that ba-
sic justice is jeopardized when the citizens of a local 
community have to rely on their immediate neighbors for 
redress of their grievances. Syed has argued that the 
"assumptions and the structural design of Jeffersonian 
theory are incompatible with its ethical goals - justice 
and the civilization of the individual."32 He goes on to 
quote de Tocqueville as observing: 
••• the individual, possessed of the notion that 
he is sovereign, tends to become selfish, self-
centered, unmindful of his responsibilities to 
his fellow men, and apathetic towards the politi-
30Syed , Political Theory, p. 129 
31Ibid., p. 131. 
32Ibid., p. 159. 
cal process. The concept of the individual's 
sovereignty is subversive to both society and 
government ••• The common principles--sovereignty 
of the people and majority rule--breed among 
citizens of ward repu~3ics intolerance of the 
rights of minorities. 
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Of course, the United States is not made up of ward 
republics, but many individuals who either observe the 
domestic scene or work in local or national politics 
share many of the same fears of too much power in the 
hands of local government. More specifically, they fear 
what might happen to the rights of the poor and minorities 
in states and communities if they are left to the govern-
ing authorities of those areas and are abandoned by the 
national government. For more thqn twenty years, the 
national government has championed the rights of minor-
ities and more recently it has tried to help the poor 
throughout the nation. Some fear the New Federalism is a 
call to strengthen state and local governments in such a 
way that the liberties, not to speak of the recent pro-
gress, of minorities and the poor might be substantially 
endangered. This issue was specifically addressed by many 
participants at a May, 1973, conference sponsored by the 
Woodrow Wilson International Center of Scholars. 
The conference dealt with the New Federalism. Some 
participants questioned Mr. Goodwin's interpretation of 
33Ibid., p. 161. 
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decentralization. At the same time, some intoned the 
fears just outlined of the possible effect on local mi-
norities and the local poor if more power, funds and re-
sponsibility are given to local government. Many at the 
conference did not agree with Goodwin that a national con-
sensus had been reached stating that collective action on 
a national basis, using public funds, was the best way to 
solve social problems. Indeed, several participants felt 
that decentralization was simply an Administration effort 
to strengthen states and local governments in such a way 
that they might be able to ignore national priorities and 
policies that have evolved in recent years. They feared 
that state and local government would deal with major 
social questions in accord with the wishes of local power 
structures and interest groups who likely will not share 
the concern registered by the national government for 10-
cal disadvantaged citizens. In this vein, the summary 
section of the report from the conference made these re-
marks: 
During the conference, concern was expressed 
that a loosening of federal responsibility in set-
ting policy for the use of the funds in the human 
services and community services area would result 
in a step backward for those who need help most. 
One fear was that state and local politicians 
were under too much influence fDom local affluent 
interest groups to spread the money around to all 
segments of the community rather than direct the 
money to the areas of need. (Governor Carter of 
Georgia) expressed this belief: Even the most 
enlightened legislature is going to spend on an 
equal basis those moneys that formerly went to 
the poor. (Mr. Hundley, Director of Seattle's 
Model Cities Program) agreed that the money' 
"will never find its way, not a tenth of it, down 
to those people who need it most." 
An allied concern was that, under the New 
Federalism, Congress would lose the position it 
should have in setting public policy for the 
nation. 
(Congressman Ashley of Ohio) felt that "eong-
ress does have a role in identifying national 
purposes and goals, inddeveloping ~trategies 
for the achievement of these goals, and in mon-
itoring the results." He went on to say, ••• 
"the progress that has been achieved with re-
spect to meeting our social problems has been 
very largely the produ34 of federal action and federal requirements." 
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At the same conference, Mr. Clarence Mitchell, who 
is the director of the Washington bureau of the National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People, argued 
that it is necessary for the federal government to take 
the initiative in setting national priorities and require-
ments on the use of federal money in grant programs. He 
said that "the worst possible choice we could make in this 
country is to pursue to so-called general revenue sharing 
program and the idea of the special revenue sharing pro-
gram. You just start a program of giving all this feder-
al money to the local entrepreneurs and the local people 
who are going to use it for buying helicopters and reduc-
ing taxes ••• and we turn this country back.,,35 
34 Foote, ed., The New Federalism, p. 6. 
35Ibid • 
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Others at the conference, however, felt the risk of 
abandoning previously established national policies for 
the poor and minorities was not as great with the New Fed-
eralism. Some simply argued that we should trust the wis-
dom of local governments to do what is best for their cit-
izens. Governor Rockefeller of New York and Mayor Lugar 
of Indianapolis, for example, "defended the ability and 
wisdom of the states to set policy and administer fairly 
programs targeted at the needy in their communities.,,36 
Mr. Lugar said that "at some point a rough compromise has 
to be reached in which the competence of local people is 
recognized as probably the superior alternative, given 
all the pitfalls of the present system ••• ,,37 
In the same vein, Gladys Noon Spellman, President 
of the National Association of Counties argues that "all 
wisdom is not on the federal level ••• the local level of 
government is where the decisions ought to be made, and 
that's where the overall thrust of the New Federalism 
seems to be, to strengthen the hand of the local citizen 
by giving him a greater input into the decision-making 
38 process." 
What will happen to War on Poverty programs under 
36Ibid • 
37Ibid • 
38Ibid., pp. 6-7. 
119 
the New Federalism? What will happen to the fate of the 
poor who have lately relied on the federal government to 
help them? Can racial minorities and poor citizens count 
on state and local government to take up their cause and 
protect the progress made in helping them in recent yearS? 
As we have seen, much political theory that has emerged 
over the years puts little trust in the willingness of lo-
cal government to work for the benefit of their minorities. 
There is a basic fear that local factions, be they major-
ities or minorities of opinion, tend to tyrannize those 
who are "different." Hence, a basic fear of some is that 
the New Federalism, in strengthening state and local gov-
ernment may be abandoning the national effort of the past 
few decades to address meaningfully the real needs of 
America's poor and racial minorities. In the case studies 
which follow, we will examine whether there is evidence 
that this may be happening. We can do so by examining 
whether General Revenue Sharing funds are going to pro-
grams for the poor and minority groups in these cities. 
Specifically, is the New Federalism money going to shore 
up cutback categorical grants from the federal government 
that were directed to the community's less fortunate citi-
zens? On the other hand, as we have seen, some feel that 
local government will be responsible to the needs of all 
members of the community. The feeling persists that local 
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leaders can be trusted to do what is best for their cit-
ies. As we examihe revenue sharing in Seattle, Tacoma, 
Portland and Eugene, we will try to see if City Hall of-
ficials in those towns agree that the "money, power and 
responsibility" given them through General Revenue Sharing 
has been used wisely and in the best interests of all 
their citizens. 
The Fear That the Disadvantaged Will Be Excluded 
From Local Decision-Making 
We saw earlier that a goal of the New Federalism 
was to return funds, power and responsibility to the 
states, localities and "the people." Now we see that a 
fear held by some is that "the people" to gain may not be 
those most in need of governmental help, the poor and the 
minorities. Along with the fear that these people might 
not get their fair share of General Revenue Sharing funds 
is the fear that they will be excluded from the local de-
cision-making process that allocates the monies in the 
first place. Of course, there might be a better chance 
for the poor and minorities to be part of "the people" 
who gain "power, funds and responsibility" if they are 
among those who decide how the funds are to be allocated 
in the city. Because the Revenue Sharing Act does not 
specify who is to participate in the decision-making pro-
cess, it is up to local government and local influentials 
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to make that decision. The Act only requires that the 
regular budget process of the state, city or county be fol-
lowed. That process usually includes local budget commit-
tee meetings which are open to the public. When the bud-
get committee reaches a decision, it recommends a policy 
for spending to the City Council, which also holds open 
meetings on the subject. It sounds like quite an open 
process, but as we saw earlier, a major goal of the War 
on Poverty was to try to politicize the poor. The poor 
and minority groups, and also the aged, often do not par-
ticipate in local decision-making processes. Sometimes 
they feel they don't know enough about the issues to par-
ticipate, or they feel they will be politely listened to 
and then ignored, or they feel their lack of resources in 
terms of funds and votes makes them unimportant as a lo-
cal political force. So the War on Poverty sought, as 
we have seen, to politicize these people. A measure of 
the War on Poverty's success will be whether that politi-
cization worked. 
It will be a purpose of this paper to see whether 
those citizens in these cities who were part of the War on 
Poverty programs were sufficiently politicized and acti-
vated to lobby for General Revenue Sharing funds. Speci-
fically, have they ~aken part in the local decision-mak-
ing process over the allocation of GeneraliRevenue Sharing 
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funds? We will also examine the extent to which local 
government has gone out of its way to include the whole 
community, espe~ially those less accustomed to participa-
tion in local government, in the General Revenue Sharing 
decision-making process. In reality, the Nixon Adminis-
tration has left it to local government to determine how 
inclusive the term "the people" is to be through their 
decision-making processes and disbursement of General 
Revenue Sharing funds. In the case studies to follow we 
will see what four cities have done in this matter. 
The Fear That Decentralization Will Strengthen 
Interest Group Liberalism at the Local Level 
and thus Frustrate Justice 
The remaining discussion of the fears held by some 
with regard to the New Federalism will revolve around an 
important critic of American liberalism, Theodore Lowi. 
In his work, The End of Liberalism, Lowi offers some con-
ventional arguments for the development of liberalism in 
America and some of the difficulties liberalism is now 
facing in realizing its goals. 39 Where Lowi becomes con-
troversial is in the solutions he offers to the failures 
of liberalism. This discussion will be based on elements 
of the Lowi arguments that seem to pinpoint what some fear 
may be the detrimental effects of the New Federalism. A 
39Theodore J. Lowi, The End of Liberalism, (New York: 
W.W. Norton and Co., 1969). 
special effort will also be made, however, to indicate 
where the Lowi solutions to liberal problems may be at 
fault. 
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We have seen that a primary goal of the New Federoal-
ism is the decentralization of American government and 
also that some people fear the results of that decentrali-
zation. The primary fear is that local government may not 
make policy with the input of the poor and minorities, or 
for their benefit. Lowi is also concerned that some citi-
zens in America may not be getting the justice they de-
serve. He argues that the interest group politics that 
is so much a part of the practice of American liberalism 
has compromised the interests of minority groups and the 
poor. He further argues that although there would be 
merit in divesting the federal government of some of its 
power, the only level of government that should be con-
sequently strengthened is the state level, definitely 
BE1 city government. 
Lowi argues that many of the stated goals of liber-
alism are worthy. He believes the community as a whole 
has a responsibility to help the discriminated-against and 
the poor, and although social justice is a sacred goal of 
liberalism, so also is compromise. Lowi feels that al-
though many pieces of legislation for the less fortunate 
have come out of Washington, they have not resulted in 
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accomplishing their goals because the legislation did not 
contain specific guidelines of implementation. Once a 
piece of social legislation leaves Washington with very 
ambiguous guidelines of implementation, it is easy for lo-
cal interest groups to compromise away the spirit of the 
legislation. For example, if Washington passes an act 
calling for local efforts to deal with poverty and gives 
the city the money to do so but does not specifically di-
rect how the act is to be carried out, local interests 
opposed to the act can nullify its effect by dickering and 
lobbying with local governmental authorities. 
Federal bureaucrats at the local level are also com-
promised in the same way. Justice is not giveQ, therefore, 
to those for whom the act was intended. There is not a 
rule of law in America, he argues, only a rule of process. 
What is needed is legislation with precise rules govern-
ing its application at the local level that cannot be 
"bargained away." Administrators at the local level need 
statutory guidance so that legislation passed in Washing-
ton can be strictly enforced at the local level. The re-
sult would be the establishing of the rule of law in 
America and real justice. 
Lowi is not against interest group bargaining per 
see What is important, however, is that all bargaining 
and compromising go on before the legislation is enacted. 
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Such bargaining should take place at the formu1ation_ 
stage. Once an act becomes law it should be enforced, 
with strict guidelines, at the local level so all citizens 
can benefit in a just manner, and in the way Congress in-
tended. Lowi sums this up in the thesis statement of his 
book. " ••• {P)olicy without a rule of law will ultimately 
come to ends profoundly different from those intended by 
their most humanitarian and libertarian framers. (An evil 
outcome to such programs can be predicted by) the absence 
of public and explicit legislative standards by which to 
guide administrative conduct."40 
Lowi argues that it is up to the courts to require 
the legislative branch to establish firm guidelines for 
liberal legislation. There is some question whether this 
is a realistic answer to the problem of interest group 
liberalism. Traditionally, the American courts have re-
strained themselves from proscribing how the legislative 
branch should conduct its business, requiring only,.of 
course, that the Constitution be followed. Interest group 
liberalism is so firmly entrenched in the American politi-
cal process that it would be naive for Lowi to suggest 
that there would be any hope of the legislative branch 
setting firmer guidelines to liberal legislation by itself. 
Nevertheless, the difficulties caused by the whole interest 
40Ibid., p. 263. 
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group political process in this country is a significant 
and important critique on modern public policy-making. 
Our examination of the State and Local Fiscal As-
sistance Act of 1972 in Chapter II made it quite clear 
that the act has broad guidelines. The point of the leg-
islation, of course, was to give just the latitude to 10-
cal interest groups and local government that Lowi be-
lieves is responsible for the lack of effective problem-
solving by liberal government. As we shall see, the lo-
cal officials interviewed for this study indicated that 
there was great interest group activity in deciding what 
would be done with General Revenue Sharing funds and who 
would do the deciding. We also saw that General Revenue 
Sharing funds can be used for almost anything. As such, 
one can suppose that Lowi would consider the intent and 
effect of General Revenue Sharing would be to set back 
further the effectiveness of American liberalism as well 
as the rule of law and justi~e in America. 
The Fear That Decentralization Will Strengthen the 
Autonomous City and Frustrate Justice 
Lowi would be especially displeased with the New 
Federalism goal of seeking to strengthen city governments. 
He believes that the authority now exercised by cities, or 
at least the interest groups of the influential within 
them, plays an important role in the inability of American 
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liberalism to accomplish its goals. Too often, Lowi ar-
gues, cities are treated as legal federal entities and 
city administrators given too much discretion and indepen-
dence in applying federal law to local situations. "Na-
tiona1 legitimacy is tarnished to the degree that it is 
loaned to the cities for discretionary use - there is an 
absence of the rule of law in such a process ••• it is why 
liberal governments cannot achieve justice.,,41 He argues 
that the federal Constitution created two types of citi-
zenship in America, national and states, " ••• but there is 
no constitutional grounds for city citizenship.,,42 
Lowi fears that the nation is too decentralized so 
that there is not enough central authority to implement 
meaningful social legislation. The compromise process of 
interest group liberalism is bad enough at the national 
and state levels and the added entity of local brokerage 
politics makes even more remote the chance to achieve a 
real rule of law in this country. He especially distrusts 
local elites and feels they are capable of taking away the 
goals for social justice that is the purpose of much lib-
eral legislation. At this point Lowi clearly agrees with 
spokesmen at the New Federalism conference mentioned ear-
lier in this chapter. It will be remembered that several 
4lIbid., pp. 263-4~ 
42f~id., p. 273. 
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of them feared revenue sharing because they were sure it 
would mean the transfer of national power to determine 
policy from Washington, D.C., to less socially sympathetic 
local elites. 
The Fear That Decentralization Will Jeopardize 
Civil Rights and Set Back Justice 
Lowi feels it should be a goal of this nation to de-
stroy the corporate or "autonomous city" and strengthen 
the states. 43 Even then, aid should only go to state gov-
ernments that prove, before the fact, that state programs 
will deal with the rights of their citizens. The more 
concurrent regimes there are, the more opportunities for 
brokerage politics to subjugate the establishment of the 
rule of law. It is clear to Lowi that the cities have 
proven they are unable to cope with urban problems, even 
with federal help, and he adds, "(W)e have, in any case, 
no other place but the states to turn to.,,44 He is, of 
course, suggesting that the states will need federal aid 
to deal with their problems and that aid must be accom-
panied with strict standards. n(T)here will be no social 
justice with federal programs without a rule of law that 
states unmistakably what is to be achieved and what is to 
43Ibid ., p. 274. 
44Ibid., p. 305. 
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be forbidden."45 Yet Lowi is not calling for un1imit~d 
power for the national government, either • 
••• (R)estoration of the rule of law provides a 
basis for establishing some practical limitations 
on the scope of federal power. If an applicable 
and understandable set of standards must accom-
pany every federal program, federal power could 
not extend to those objects for which no general 
rules are either practicable or desirable. Thus, 
where regional or local variation is desired, the 
federal government is not even the appropriate 
unit. Unconditional rebates would be infinitely 
preferable. When regional variation is not de-
sirable, it is usually because s~me problem uni-
formly distributed across the country has been 
identified and is well known, as for example civ-
il rights, military service, tax liability, ac-
cess to airwaves, obligations of contracts, free 
speech and petition, in which case there is no 
barrier, except fear, to prevent enactment of 
statutes in which clear and effective standards 
~an !gcompany delegations of vast public author-
~ty. 
In many ways this statement takes us to the heart of 
some important revenue sharing issues raised earlier. 
Lowi endorses "unconditional rebates", which is essentia1-
1y what General Revenue Sharing is, "to those general ob-
jects for which no general rules are either practicable 
or desirable." But strict guidelines must accompany fed-
era1 aid when regional variation in the applicationsof a 
policy is n2i desirable, and this is sometimes the case 
when "some problem uniformly distributed across the coun-
try has been identified and is well known." The revenue 
45Ibid., p. 266. 
46Ibid., p. 305. 
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sharing debate points out, however, that there may be less 
national consensus than Lowi suggests as to what areas of 
American public policy should be applied uniformly through-
out the nation without regional or local variation. 
As we have seen, some critics of revenue sharing 
fear that it might negate what progress has been made in 
the civil rights area, an area Lowi feels has been "iden-
tified" as one deserving of national priority in the app 
plication of its goals and standards. It is true, how-
ever, that Lowi feels the primary reason national programs 
have failed is because, as we have seen, they were not 
accompanied by "clear and effective standards" that would 
require local conformity to national standards, rather 
than their conforming to the priorities of local elites. 
But is revenue sharing the type of "unconditional 
rebate" aimed at "those objects for which no general rules 
are either practicable or desirable," or is it simply 
another federal program without established guidelines 
that further sets back the cause of planning and justice 
that has plagued federal programs for so long? It is a 
matter of interpretation. Many of the city officials in-
terviewed for this study see General Revenue Sharing funds 
and the entire thrust of the New Federalism as suggesting 
that in the human and community service areas it is up to 
the states and localities to set their own policies and 
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priorities. This does not sound like the areas Lowi had 
in mind when he suggested that unconditional rebates 
m~ght be a good idea. He would probably argue that the 
New Federalism and General Revenue Sharing are ~ desir-
able and in fact considerably exacerbate the lac~ of jus-
tice in America because (1) the funds are relegated to the 
states and cities with virtually no guidelines, to be used 
in human and community service areas where strict guide~ 
lines should be required to see to it that the poor and 
minorities are served, and (2) such funds going to cities 
will theoretically strengthen them and thus alao the cause 
of interest group liberalism. Lowi might welcome the part 
of the revenue sharing plan that seeks to strengthen the 
states, but that benefit would be negated several times 
over because it accompanies strengthening cities. 
Lowi's analysis of modern liberalism is significant 
because it raises questions about the real problem-solving 
ability of modern big government. Richard Nixon, too, has 
decided that too much reliance on big government, at least 
at the national level, is not a good idea. We can see, 
however, that Lowi would not agree with President Nixon's 
means of redressing the difficulties of big government. 
Lowi's fears for the rule of law and justice in America 
and his fear that the city is an inappropriate place for 
wide-ranging decisions affecting social concerns, are 
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shared by others we have examined in this chapter. In the 
following case studies, we will see whether city officials 
feel more guidelines in federal legislation are desirable. 
We will also see whether they feel progress made in recent 
years for the poor and minorities in America is likely to 
be continued in their cities under General Revenue Sharing 
and the New Federalism. We will also analyze their com-
ments on the General Revenue Sharing decision-making pro-
cess in their city to see if interest group liberalism 
seems to have been strengthened by revenue sharing. Also, 
in the opinion of city officials, does the city seem to be 
strengthened enough by General Revenue Sharing to where 
it is the "autonomous city" that Lowi fears'? 
What then are the fears held by some Americans as 
they see the implementation of General Revenue Sharing and 
the New Federalism? From the foregoing discussion, it 
seems the major fears are: 
(1) Decentralization will cause the abandonment 
of programs for the disadvantaged. 
(2) Decentralization will strengthen local spe-
cial interests at the expense of the disadvantaged. 
(3) Decentralization will exclude the disadvan-
taged from local decision-making. 
(4) Decentralization will strengthen interest 
group liberalism at the local level and frustrate 
justice. 
(5) Decentralization will strengthen the auto-
nomous city and frustrate justice. 
(6) Decentralization will jeopardize civil 
rights and set back justice. 
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In this chapter, we have looked at the goals of the 
New Federalism as set forth by President Nixon and his 
advisors. We have further seen that General Revenue Shar-
ing is a main ingredient in achieving these goals. We 
have also examined some of the fears held by those skep-
tical of General Revenue Sharing and the New Federalism. 
Specifying these goals and fears provides us with tools 
with which to evaluate how General Revenue Sharing and the 
New Federalism have been working in Seattle, Tacoma, Port-
land and Eugene. Each of the points outlined as goals and 
each outlined as fears will be used as criteria by which 
to evaluate the progress of General Revenue Sharing in 
these four cities. Congress has specifically called for 
careful scrutinY. of General Revenue Sharing after the 
first five years of the program so it can decide whether 
to continue it or not. This paper is an early effort at 
evaluating General Revenue Sharing for those in government 
or the average citizen, so that he may determine its ef-
fects on urban America. 
In the concluding chapter to this study, we will 
pull together the experiences of these four cities and 
evaluate them in terms of the goals and fears held for the 
New Federalism and General Revenue Sharing. Also, at the 
end of each case study, certain preliminary or sub-conclu-
sions will be offered with respect to that particular 
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city's experience with General Revenue Sharing. We now 
move to the first case study. It is of the largest city 
studied and evaluated, Seattle, Washington. 
CHAPTER IV 
GENERAL REVENUE SHARING IN SEATTLE 
I. CITY FINANCES AND REVENUE SHARING 
WHAT SEATTLE HAS DONE 
Seattle, Washington, has the largest population of 
the cities to be studied in this paper. As of 1970 9 
Seattle's population was about 531,000 peop1e. l As the 
largest city in the State of Washington, Seattle has a 
diverse urban population comprised of persons from many 
ethnic groups and races. The Boeing Company is the lar-
gest single employer in the city and Seattle's economic 
fortunes are greatly influenced by Boeing's prosperity 
or lack of it. 
It is not surprising that a city of this size would 
have financial problems. Indeed, as the data from inter-
views with those people in City Hall indicates, Seattle 
is clearly in the most difficult financial situation of 
the four cities studied. Without exception each official 
interviewed suggested Seattle was in the midst of a fis-
cal crisis which was going to be particularly acute by 
1975. As stated by Frank Doolittle, Finance Director of 
1The 1972 World Almanac and Book of Facts, 
(New York: Newspaper Enterprise Association, Inc., 1972), 
p. 193. 
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the Office of Management and Budget, it is a matter of 
anticipated expenditure levels exceeding recurring revenue 
sources. 2 Before getting into the General Revenue Sharing 
story specifically, it might be useful to relate Mr. 
Doolittle's findings regarding Seattle's fiscal situation. 
His findings help to put the revenue sharing issue of this 
city into perspective. In his capacity as Financial Econ-
omist for the city, Doolittle prepared a document stating 
the difficulties the city could anticipate in balancing 
the 1974 budget. 3 His findings are summarized on the fol-
lowing page in Table III. 
are: 
Doolittle's concluding remarks explaining this table 
Even with the use of approximately $4.5 million in 
General Fund Asset Balances to cover a deficit be-
tween recurring revenues and recurring expenditures, 
there still remains an unfunded deficit ranging 
from $2.2 - $5.7 million. ThUS, a potential ~efi­
cit of $6.7 - $10.2 million seemingly exists. 
Doolittle recognizes that state law requires a bal-
anced budget, and he suggests that with cost cutting, in-
creases in recurring revenues, and a General Fund Asset, 
2Frank D. Doolittle, ttAna1ysis of General Fund 
Revenues and Expenditures", 23 July 1973, Office of Man-
agement and Budget, City of Seattle, Seattle, Washington, 
p. 1. 
3Ibid., pp. 1-2. 
4 Ibid., p. 2. 
TABLE III 
ANALYSIS OF SEATTLE GENERAL FUND 
REVENUES AND EXPENDITURES 
SEATTLE, WASHINGTON 
1973-4 
EXPENDITURES 
1973 Level of Service Costs 
General Fund 
General Revenue Sharing 
Total costs in 1973 Budget 
1974 Mandatory Increases in Costs 
of Maintaining January 1, 1973, 
Services Levels 
Labor Costs 
Labor Settlement 
Other Personnel Cost 
Total Increases in Labor 
Non-Personnel Costs 
Total 1974 Increases 
$71.6 million 
5.4 million 
$77.,0 million 
$6.5 - $7.5 
2.5 - 3.5 
$9.0 - $11.0 
2.0 - 3.5 
$11.0 $14.5 
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1974 Potential Budget $88.0 - $91.5 million 
(Table continues on next page.) 
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TABLE III (cont.) 
REVENUES 
1973 Revenues/Income 
General Fund Recurring 
Revenues $69.1 million 
General Revenues Sharing 5.4 tt 
Total Recurring Revenues $74.5 million 
Deficit Financed from 
General Fund Asset Balance $ 2.5 million 
Total Revenues/Income $77.0 million 
1974 Revenues/Income 
General Fund Recurring 
Revenues $71.8 million 
General Revenue Sharing 9.5 " 
Total Recurring Revenues $81.3 million 
Available General Fund 
Asset Balances to Cover 
Deficit $ 4.5 million 
Preliminary Total Revenue 
Available in 1974 $85.8 million 
SOURCE: Frank D. Doolittle, "Analysis of General 
Fund Revenues and Expenditures", 23 July 1973, Office of 
Management and Budget, City of Seattle, Seattle, Wash-
ington, p. 1. 
3 
c. 
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the city should be able to balance its budget in 1974. 5 A 
look at Doolittle's data also shows that revenue sharing 
plays an important role in his calculations for 1974. 
The revenue sharing period, however, that we are 
most interested in is 1972-3. The Office of Management 
and Budget in Seattle's Executive Branch and the Mayor's 
own personal staff worked together in the early stages to 
draw up alternative plans suggesting how the city should 
allocate its general Revenue Sharing funds. A descrip-
tion of how the Executive Branch in Seattle's city gov-
ernment proceeded to deal with the revenue sharing issue 
is summarized in a document from the Office of Management 
and Budget entitled "History of Revenue Sharing". The 
document tells us something of Mayor Wes Uhlman's feelings 
on revenue sharing which he communicated to the City 
Council in an October, 1972, budget message: 
One portion of this money is needed to simply 
balance our present budget and maintain present 
services levels in critical areas. Another por-
tion, however, should be set aside for special 
projects that could not be undertaken without 
revenue sharing. 
Citizens should join with us in determining how 
this money should be spent •••• l will send to the 
Council a proposal on the citizen mechanism to make 
revenue sh~ring the real innovation it can and 
should be. 
5 Ibid., p. 2. 
6"History of Revenue Sharing: Position Taken by the 
Executives to Date.", 25 May 1973, Office of Management 
and Budget, City of Seattle, Seattle, Washington, p. 1. 
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The "histor),'document also tells us that the Mayor 
offered three plans from October, 1972, to February, 1973, 
recommending what the City Council should ultimately do 
with revenue sharing funds. There were certain consis-
tencies evident in these plans: 
First, the established criteria were developed 
(enumerated in the points that follow) to address 
the very real problem of future 1974-5 General 
Fund deficits. To raise operating levels by allo-
cations to projects which expand services by ex-
panding management and operation and labor costs 
would further aggravate an already serious matter. 
This line of reasoning is equally relevant today. 
(That is, considering 1972-3). 
Second, there was the need for an eventual 
approval of 1972 Budget Balancing dollars of 
$5.4 million. 
Third, there were the department requests which 
constituted an attempt by existing service agen-
cies to evaluate their needs. 
Fourth, from 1974 on, all revenue sharing is re-
quired to balance the budget. By 1975, we will 
need an addit;onal revenue source on top of rev-
enue sharing. 
As we shall see, these guidelines offered by the Mayor 
had real impact on what the Seattle City Council finally 
decided to do with its revenue sharing funds. These 
guidelines or "plans" offered by the Mayor were only one 
source of data furnished the City Council as the main 
body that has the final say in the city's allocation of 
funds. Other data was submitted by the Office of Manage-
ment and Budget. That office told the Council how city 
departments wanted to deal with revenue sharing funds. 
7 Ibid., p. 3. 
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The wishes of non-government groups such as social ser-
vice agencies were also communicated to the Council by 
the Office of Management and Budget. Naturally, the 
Council was lobbied by these and other groups as well. 
Alan Barrie, Legislative Auditor for the City Council has 
also made suggestions to the Council as to how revenue 
sharing funds should be allocated and the criteria the 
Council might use in making its decisions. Therefore, 
from the earliest stages throughout the revenue sharing 
decision-making process in Seattle, the executive and 
legislative branches were both very active, with the exe-
cutive branch making the first moves. 
The Mayor'S guidelines mentioned above were un-
official ones in that they were only suggestions to the 
Council. The City Council decided it needed a formal set 
of guidelines to consult in debating the revenue sharing 
issue so the Mayor and the Office of Management and Budget 
drew up guidelines for both the Council and city depart-
ments to consult in deciding how to allocate revenue shar-
ing monies. Although the Council did not formally adopt 
these guidelines until June, 1973, they were widely known 
among the members throughout the decision-making process. 
This included knowledge of the important meeting of 
February 7, 1973, that we will examine in detail as this 
chapter proceeds. The first three of these guidelines 
r f ~ .. 
~' 
were suggested by the Office of Management and Budget 
and the fourth guideline was drawn up by the Council 
itself: 
(1) To be funded with General Revenue Sharing 
funds the activity is to be ·necessary for the con-
tinued performance of city services. 
(2) The project requested is to be of a one time 
nature and not to require continued support. 
142 
(3) Recommended projects should induce efficiency 
through labor saving and cost reductions. 
(4) It would be wise to provide a one time tide 
over funding for some social programs if there was 
a very strong indication there was going to be con-
tinued funding from otfter sources, Special Revenue 
Sharing, or the State. 
As will become clear later, the fourth point has real sig-
nificance in that it is a more "liberal" statement than 
the other guidelines and represents the liberal power 
balance on the City Council that prevailed throughout the 
revenue sharing debates. 
AS Seattle's city government went through its var-
ious plans and debated and adopted working guidelines, it 
was agreed by all that the revenue sharing funds would be 
considered as a separate package of money. General Rev-
enue Sharing funds were not automatically included in the 
city's general fund. The General Revenue Sharing money 
was dealt with by itself. 
As we have seen, the Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 
1972 does not require that any receiving governmental unit 
8Interview with Allan Barrie, Legislative Auditor 
for the City Council, Seattle, Washington, 22 June 1973. 
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set up special procedures for deciding how the local area 
is to spend its money. In fact, the Act suggests that 
regular budget processes be used. This is exactly what 
was done in Seattle. The public participated in the de-
cision-making process to the extent that they could. As 
individuals and as interest groups, they petitioned the 
Office of Management and Budget for the allocation of 
funds to the programs they wanted funded. Citizens and 
representatives of special interests could also attend and 
speak at the three public hearings held by the City Coun-
cil on the revenue sharing issue. But Seattle did not go 
out of its way to enlist citizen participation in rev-
enue sharing deliberations. There was, however, an in-
direct input to the decision-making process by a group 
called the Commission on Seattle 2000. This group was 
organized by the Mayor to be a task force to study prob-
lems and suggest programs to deal with them so Seattle 
could plan its future to the year 2000. 
Mayor Uhlman suggested to the Council that this 
Commission should also recommend to the Council what 
should be done with revenue sharing funds. This was to 
be the citizen participation mechanism he suggested in 
October, 1972, which was to be what was needed to "make 
revenue sharing the real innovation which it can and 
should become." The Council turned down the Mayor's 
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suggestion, however. The Council felt that Seattle 2000 
had enough to do in dealing with Seattle's problems and 
plans that might occur between now and the year 2000. The 
Council simply felt the revenue sharing job was outside 
the spectrum of the original purpose of the Seattle 2000 
concept. The Council did not set up an alternate mechan-
ism either. As we shall see, Councilman Miller will 
indicate some of the reasons why. The point here is that 
although Seattle 2000 did not make specific input into the 
Council's deliberations on revenue sharing, the Commis~ 
sion's report is now finished and its suggestion about 
current needs of the city may have impact on how Seattle 
allocates its remaining 1973 revenue sharing funds, and 
perhaps on how the city deals with its revenue sharing 
monies in future years. And although the Seattle 2000 
participants were widely representative citizens from all 
types of groups in the city, it is clear their input into 
the revenue sharing process is of the most indirect sort. 
Citizen involvement was perhaps at its lowest level 
when Seattle made its first revenue sharing allocation. 
As can be seen from Mr. Doolittle's figures in Table IV, 
$5.4 million in revenue sharing money was used to help 
balance the 1973 budget. It became obvious to the Office 
Management and Budget and the Council that these new 
federal funds offered a way to balance the 1973 budget 
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without cutting city employees or cutting back services. 
The Mayor, however, had proposed that the budget be 
balanced with a continuation of the city's business and 
occupation tax surcharge. But for some time the Council 
had been anxious to fulfill its earlier promise to the 
business community to remove the unpopular surcharge. So 
the Council refused the Mayor's suggestion and instead 
decided to use $5.4 million of General Revenue Sharing to 
balance the budget. The money went to the 1973 budget for 
police patrol and firefighters salaries. With that allo-
cation the 1973 budget was balanced. This was strictly 
an "in-house" decision' and no hearings were held and the 
public was not actively involved except to the extent local 
elites in the business community were lobbying for the 
repeal of the business and occupation surtax. 
With the "budget balancing" allocation, Seattle 
still had about twelve million dollars in General Revenue 
Sharing funds to allocate from federal checks received in 
1972 and 1973. The Mayor at this point suggested that a 
large part of this money should go for property tax relief 
and another large portion should go to; the various city 
departments. He was not suggesting, in other words, that 
revenue sharing should go for new city programs. Along 
with the Mayor's suggestions, the Council also heard from 
the city departments themselves through the Office of 
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Management and Budget. Citizens made their will known by 
lobbying the Council in three public hearings held to 
discuss revenue sharing allocations. By February, 1973, 
the Seattle City Council had decided it was ready to make 
its revenue sharing decisions. As we shall soon see, that 
meeting was a controversial one indeed. By a five to four 
decision, the Council decided to allocate a portion of the 
remaining revenue sharing funds, it resolved to reserve 
a portion and left an amount unexpended. As of this 
writing, the unexpended as well as the reserved funds have 
yet to receive final Council action. The table on the 
following page summarizes the current status of Seattle 
General Revenue Sharing funds in terms of amounts of money 
and expense areas. 
An analysis of that table shows that those monies 
so far expended, including those budgeted for balancing 
the 1973 budget, are monies for traditional city services. 
In the "reserved" area, however, a sizeable amount of money 
has been suggested for social programs only narrowly or 
not at all funded by the city previously. So, as of 
September, 1973, the Seattle City Council still had to 
make a final determination on the "reserved" items to see 
whether and to what extent they would be finally funded. 
Also, the Council had to decide what to do with the re-
maining $3.2 million. 
TABLE IV 
GENERAL REVENUE SHARING FUNDS 
ALLOCATIONS AND RESERVES 
1972 AND 1973 
1972 Retroactive Revenue 
1973 Anticipated Revenue 
Total Two Year Receipts 
1973 Budget Balancing for Police 
Patrol and Firefighters Salaries 
Supplementary Department Expenditures 
Building 
Park Department 
Seattle Center 
Engineering Department 
Library 
Animal Control 
Police 
Comptroller 
Community Development 
Total Supplementary (Expended) 
Council Proposals (Reserved) 
Housing Rehabilitation 
Historic Preservation 
Indian Culture Center 
Asian Culture Center 
Seattle Center 
Total 1972 and 1973 Revenues 
Total Allocations and Reserves 
Remaining Funds for City Council Action 
11.:47 
$ 8,136,004 
9,279,700 
$17,415,704 
$ 5,408,175 
$ 35,000 
457,000 
475,000 
390,000 
797,000 
300,000 
12,000 
470,000 
31.000 $ 2,967,000 
$ 4,500,000 
600,000 
500,000 
200,000 
50.000 
$ 5,850,000 
$17,415,704 
14 1 225.175 
$ 3,190,529 
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In terms of the Mayor's proposals for the alloca-
tions of revenue sharing funds, the Council largely turned 
down his request to use a big chunk of the money for a tax 
cut and they also, through the reserved and left-over 
funds, failed to fund city departments to the extent the 
Mayor had suggested. The Mayor, however, did sign:and 
approve the Council's actions as decided by the 5 to 4 
Council vote. 
What will happen to the $3.2 million not yet dealt 
with? Several of those interviewed feel the money should 
not be appropriated until the city knows what will happen 
to federal funding of social programs in the city. If 
federal funds dry up and are not replaced to some degree 
by Special Revenue Sharing funds, then the city should 
think about temporary funding of some social services 
until federal funds arrive. To help the Council decide 
what to do with these funds, now classified as "reserved", 
and future revenue sharing monies, Councilwoman Jeanette 
Williams asked Allan Barrie, Legislative Auditor for the 
City Council, to prepare a statement of what he and his 
staff considered the "goals and policies for the City of 
Seattle" to be at that time. Mrs. Williams evidently felt 
the previously developed guidelines, along with the Mayor's 
suggestions and the report of Seattle 2000, were not 
enough to guide the Council in its revenue sharing 
deliberations. 
In his ,statement, Barrie indicated that Seattle 
will have a very difficult time between 1973 and 1976 
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avoiding a budget deficit without taking serious action. 
A reduction in city employees through attrition and the 
use of all General Revenue Sharing funds to help balance 
the budget seem called for, he feels. The memo says the 
Council is faced with deciding its role with respect to 
how to allocate incoming state and federal funds in the 
most prudent manner possible given the circumstances. 
To aid the Council in these decisions, Barrie has offered 
as the city's objectives the following: 
(1) Provide protection of life and property: 
police, fire,public health, municipal courts, 
animal control. 
(2) Provide basic services: electricity, 
water, sewer, storm drains, streets, bridges, 
and sidewalks (transportation), recreational 
facilities. 
(3) Encourage economic development: promote 
business activity, regulations to encourage 
business development. 
(4) Assure a habitable environment: air 
quality, noise pollution, visual pollution, 
quality of housing. 
(5) Assure a basic array of social services: 
social development, cultural identity, handi-
capped, older Americans, equality. 
(6) Plan and manage to assure attainment of 
goals in the most efficient manner. 9 
9Allan Barrie, "Goals and Policies for the City of 
Seattle," Memo to Councilwoman Nilliams, 22 June 1973. 
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As of this writing the Council has not formally 
adopted these goals, but they have them at their disposal 
to aid in arriving at final allocation determinations. 
It seems clear, however, that if the Council should use 
Barrie's goals to guide them the programs now in the re-
served category would have a difficult time receiving much, 
if any, revenue sharing funding. The large amount of mon-
ey now "reserved" for housing rehabilitation and the other 
"reserved" monies for social services are clearly low pri-
orities in Barrie's analysis of current city needs in 
light of budget constraints. 
At this time, then, Seattle has made few "final" de-
cisions on the revenue sharing money it has received so 
far. Ironically, the most definitive decision so far on 
revenue sharing in the city may be the one dealing with 
what is to be done with future federal checks. We have 
seen that the Executive Office as well as Allan Barrie 
of the Legislative branch agree that all future revenue 
sharing monies are going to have to go inta the general 
fund to balance the budget. As we shall see, there is 
little disagreement among those interviewed with regard 
to that decision. 
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II. THE POLITICS OF REVENUE SHARING IN SEATTLE: 
HOW CITY OFFICIALS VIEW REVENUE SHARING 
If money is power, then the large amounts of fed-
eral money coming into cities with few strings attached 
is bound to invoke political struggles. In Seattle, the 
politics of revenue sharing was more evident than in the 
other cities studied. The political dimension was clear 
not only in the overt political actions of City Council 
members and the Mayor, but also in the political opin-
ions of those interviewed on a broad range of revenue 
sharing related topics. This section of the study of 
Seattle will look at both the po~itical actions and opin-
ions of some City Hall officials. The emphasis will be 
on how they interpret the original intention of Federal 
Revenue Sharing, how they feel about what Seattle has so 
far done with its revenue sharing funds, their feelings 
about Seattle's revenue sharing decision-making process, 
and how they view the entire question of federal aid to 
cities. At the conclusion of this chapter, certain pre-
liminary conclusions will be offered on Seattle's revenue 
sharing experience and how it addresses itself to the 
goals and fears raised by the New Federalism outlined in 
Chapter III. 
Views of City Officials on the Original Intention of 
Federal Revenue Sharing 
As we have seen, the State and Local Fiscal Assist-
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ance Act of 1972 establishes only very broad guidelines 
as to how revenue sharing funds can be spent at the local 
level. We have also found that the intentions of Congress 
and the Administration are either varied or so broad as to 
leave much room open for interpretation. Therefore, it is 
not surprising that city officials in Seattle had differ-
ent ideas as to what they considered to be the intention 
of General Revenue Sharing_ 
Frank Doolittle, Finance Director for the Office of 
Management and Budget, and City Councilman George Cooley 
held similar opinions on what they felt the purpose of 
revenue sharing might be. Doolittle felt that the initial 
federal money should be used largely for tax relief. He 
simply did not believe the City Council could intelligent-
ly allocate such a large sum of money in a short time and 
therefore Seattle's citizens would be helped most through 
a reduction in taxes. Doolittle says this proposal, which 
was prepared by his staff and the Mayor, was turned down 
by the Council as too politically motivated. Revenue 
sharing monies were seen by Doolittle as a means "whereby 
the city can control taxes at the present level." He 
would further argue that the revenue sharing money not 
spent to stabilize taxes should be spent only for capital 
and labor-saving types of projects. As a man intimately 
concerned with Seattle's financial situation, it is not 
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surprising that Doolittle felt that the first two years 
of revenue sharing funds could be seen as a windfall, some 
of which should be used to balance the budget with the 
rest available for other things. The last three years of 
federal allotments, however, should be used for the purpose 
of balancing the city budget. 
Mr. Doolittle saw the intention of revenue sharing 
as being money returned to the city to aid the city in a 
severe financial crunch. Because Seattle's financial dif-
ficulties are not as severe this year as he anticipates 
they will be in the next few years he would see it as all 
right to spend part of the money on tax relief and labor-
saving or capital projects. As the fiscal situation gets 
tighter, however, revenue sharing should go to help the 
city meet its most basic traditional service needs and to 
. ill . 10 pay mun1C pa sa ar1es. 
Councilman Cooley sees the intent of federal revenue 
sharing in similar terms. He feels strongly about the de-
sirability of using reY~nue sharing for tax relief. He 
feels the money should also be used for traditional city 
services and to pay city employees. Councilman Cooley 
further believes that the city is on "shaky grounds" in 
using the money for non-traditional types of social ser-
10Interview with Frank Doolittle, Financial Director 
of the Office of Management and Budget, City of Seattle, 
Seattle, Washington, 26 July 1973. 
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v~ces. 
Allan Barrie, Budget Advisor for the City Council, 
also feels that revenue sharing funds ought to go first 
for the service and security of persons and property in 
Seattle. Only if there is an acute need to use the money 
for social services does he perceive its intent as justi-
fying such an expenditure. The essential point, accord-
ing to Barrie, is that the city simply does not have an 
excess of money and if revenue sharing or any other funds 
are spent for social services or other "non-traditional" 
city expenses, it then follows that the money will not be 
·labl f b··t ·b·l·t· 12 ava~ e or more as~c c~ y respons~ ~ ~ ~es. 
Not surprisingly, Rick Painter, of the city's De-
partment of Human Resources, would not agree with the 
above three men. Mr. Painter feels the social needs of 
Seattle are so great and have been so long neglected by 
all levels of government that the revenue sharing monies 
can be very justly spent in trying to deal with social 
needs. He specifically notes that Model Cities, Head 
Start and other programs that have clearly helped citi-
zens and also face federal cutbacks could and should be 
funded with General Revenue Sharing money. He admits 
llInterview with George Cooley, Seattle City Coun-
cilman, Seattle, Washington, 30 July 1973. 
l2Barrie, Interview. 
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that Special Revenue Sharing is supposed to be doing that 
job, but he also feels that the guidelines of General Rev-
enue Sharing are broad enough that it can justifiably be 
used for social services as well. 13 
At least one man on the City Council would agree. 
Councilman John Miller felt revenue sharing was designed 
to allow cities to do things they were financially unable 
to do before. He saw the money as giving the city an op-
portunity to "change its spending priorities." Specific-
ally, Miller felt the revenue sharing money should go for 
programs to improve the quality of neighborhood living 
and for creating lively, exciting events and institutions 
for the city. All things considered, he feels the intent 
of revenue sharing is to offer an opportunity to the city 
to meet the twin needs of making the neighborhoods pleas-
ant places in which to live and making the whole city more 
exciting to live in by developing attractions that people 
will want to remain near. The funds are a way the city 
can combat the fleeing of citizens to the suburbs. 14 
Those interviewed can clearly be classified into two 
groups. One group saw the maintenance or improvement of 
city services as the intention of revenue sharing funds. 
l3Interview with Rick Painter, Department of Human 
Resources, City of Seattle, Seattle, Washington, 
31 July 1973. 
l4Interview with John Miller, Seattle City Council-
man, Seattle, Washington, 27 July 1973. 
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The other group saw the money as an opportunity to expand 
city services and programs into areas previously neglected 
but deserving of attention. 
Views of City Officials on How Seattle Has Allocated Its 
Revenue Sharing Funds 
The philosophical difference we see regarding the 
real intention of revenue sharing in the opinions of city 
officials is carried over to their feelings on how the 
city ultimately allocated General Revenue Sharing funds. 
While all seem to agree that the $5.4 million spent to 
balance the 1973 budget was necessary, there is consider-
able controversy over the money now in the "reserved" 
category. Again, Doolittle, Cooley and Barrie represent 
one point of view while Miller and Painter represent 
another. 
Mr, Doolittle is not at all sure the City Council 
was capable of making decisions on windfall grants such as 
revenue sharing because they are used to making tlalloca-
tions at the margin only and only on basic services." He 
maintains that the tlthinking" process, budget process and 
planning processes of the city are not geared to deal with 
windfall gains. Consequently, he and the Mayor recom-
mended that the Council use a large part of the revenue 
sharing money to give Seattle citizens a tax break. Be-
cause this was not done, he is displeased with much of 
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what the Council did do. He feels that "in future deci-
sions (on revenue sharing) the Council will show concern 
for whether the city should or is financially able to fi-
nance a high level of social programs that have always 
been the responsibility of state and federal government." 
Doolittle is especially concerned over the "re-
served" $4.5 million for housing rehabilitation. Not 
only is this a great deal of money, he says, but it is 
being spent in an area where the city has had no direct 
dealing before. The city has helped the federal govern-
ment administer housing programs before, but never before 
has the city itself been "in the housing business." He 
stated that he was not sure that this and other projects 
in the "reserved" category were legal and he was not sure 
they would ultimately be funded at present suggested lev-
els. He rather hoped they would not. 
Whereas housing rehabilitation would be a new ac-
tivity for the city, Doolittle feels that the "reserved" 
monies for Black, Indian and Asian cultural centers are in 
line with previous city expenditures in these areas. The 
difference now, however, is that the city has never before 
expended as much as the Council now recommends. 
As we saw earlier, Doolittle and others agree that 
the last three years of Seattle's revenue sharing money 
will have to go to balance the budget and cannot be spent 
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for "new programs." Doolittle feels, however, that if the 
city should again get into funding social programs, it 
should fund only those programs that have proved them-
selves successful and only those in areas where the city 
has already assumed some responsibility in the past. As 
an example, he cited health clinics. However, if federal 
monies dry up, he would not be opposed to using the re-
maining $3.2 million for social programs to tide them over 
for one year. lS 
Councilman Cooley would agree with Mr. Doolittle 
and he had an interesting political story to tell as well. 
Cooley suggests that although the Council is officially 
nonpartisan, it is "split philosophically on approaches 
to things." In what he calls a "closed meeting," five 
members of the nine member Council (he was not one of the 
five) got together and assembled an $8 million package of 
General Revenue Sharing proposals. Cooley feels a deal 
might have been made between the five and the Mayor as 
some of the Mayor's supplemental budget proposals were 
among the items in the package. The five launched into 
some programs he did not agree with. He disputed the al-
location for historical preservation because it was not 
clear how it would be administered and would almost cer-
tainly create ongoing costs -- a violation of the Office 
lSDoolittle, Interview. 
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of Management and Budget guidelines. The "huge reserva-
tion" for housing rehabilitation was unwise, he felt, 
because the five had only worked on it for a month and 
they had changed their minds several times already on 
how it was going to be administered. Cooley simply does 
not believe the city should be in the housing business. 
He acknowledges that the city does administer some feder-
al grants in the public housing area and feels that is all 
right, but it is not right for the city to spend its own 
money on such projects. Essentially, Councilman Cooley 
is of the opinion that social services are state and fed-
eral responsibilities largely because cities do not have 
the revenue to deal with these types of services and also 
do a good job maintaining traditional services. 
Spending part of the remaining $3.2 million for 
some social services until federal aid to those programs 
resumes would be all right with Cooley. But in the main 
he clearly believes revenue sharing funds should go to 
improve efficiency in government and develop only a few 
one-time programs that are in traditional city responsi-
bility areas. He agrees with Doolittle and others that 
the last three years of revenue sharing must go to bal-
ance the budget and maintain basic city services. There-
fore, Cooley is not pleased with how the majority of the 
Council has so far dominated the revenue sharing alloca-
tion process. He is',philosophic:a11y opposed to the 
16 thrust of their proposals. 
Allan Barrie is largely of the viewpoint held by 
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Doolittle and Cooley. As financial expert for the Coun-
cil, he feels the city just does not have the money to 
spend on projects such as housing rehabilitation when so 
many traditional services are underfunded. He goes so far 
as to say that the revenue sharing money is really only 
enough to keep some city employees on the payroll and it 
is certainly not enough to go into new service areas. 17 
At least one member of the City Council would not 
agree with Barrie, Cooley and Doolittle. Councilman John 
Miller was one of the five Councilmen who sponsored and 
put through the Council the "expended," "reserved," and 
"remaining" allocations itemized in Table IV. It is not 
surprising, then, that he is very much in favor of how the 
Council dealt with revenue sharing. Miller explains that 
he and the others on the majority side of the Council 
vote had two themes in mind in allocating the money the 
way they did. As briefly mentioned earlier, they wanted 
to improve the quality of life in the city's neighbor-
hoods and they wanted to refurbish downtown and other 
facilities that would bring exciting programs and areas 
16coo1ey, Interview. 
17B . It· arr~e, n erv~ew. 
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of interest to the citizens. 
The quality of life in Seattle's neighborhoods, ac-
cording to Miller, can be greatly improved if housing is 
rehabilitated. The sum of $4.5 million was thus put into 
"reserve" for that purpose by the Council. He says that 
housing rehabilitation has been a long neglected local 
problem. Federal programs in the housing area have large-
ly been failures in Seattle. He says that Seattle probab-
ly has a higher percentage of single family owner occu-
pied homes than any city in the United States of compara-
ble size. In his view, about half of them are aging bad-
ly. The question then becomes: "In five or ten years is 
the city going to tear down these homes and hope for ade-
quate new housing or is it going to try to rehabilitate 
what is there now?" He feels it has become the city's 
responsibility to go into this area because the private 
sector has shown little willingness to do the job alone. 
"The financial community isn't interested in financing 
rehabilitation. The banks won't loan the money for it." 
In spite of Mr. Cooley's contention that the "five" 
had not thought out the housing rehabilitation program 
very well, Mr. r-a1ler was fairly specific on what the 
Council majority had in mind. If the plan were finally 
adopted by the Council, the city would seek help from 
previously reluctant banks to go into the housing rehab-
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ilitation business together. The city would bank its 
$4.5 million and seek matching funds from banks. The 
earned interest from this combined amount (about $500,000) 
would be offered to poorer people in no-interest loans to 
help them rehabilitate their homes. Also, Miller hopes 
the city will develop a program where banks would loan to 
the Seattle Housing Authority (a private corporation) 
funds for moderate income persons to borrow for housing 
rehabilitation. In this case persons would pay one-half 
the regular interest rate. Also, he hopes to develop a 
scheme for upper and middle income people to have access 
to money for housing rehabilitation purposes. 
Miller also hopes the city could spend more revenue 
sharing money to improve neighborhoods by improving their 
streets, parks and libraries. 
Theme one, uniting the Council majority, was a real 
desire to make neighborhoods pleasant places in which to 
live. It was also a desire to create or enhance attrac-
tions in the downtown area or other places that were of 
were of such high quality that people would want to stay 
in the city to enjoy them. Hence, there was "reserved" 
money for preservation of historical attractions and the 
development of cultural centers. Also, the allotment for 
aiding the Seattle Center is in the same vein. All of 
these ideas are aimed at keeping people in Seattle by 
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making it a pleasant and more exciting place to live in 
than a suburb. 
Miller was quite proud of the fact that fewer than 
ten percent of the programs approved by the Council and 
endorsed by the five councilmen as useful ways to spend 
revenue sharing money were programs not under the two 
themes outlined above. He was anxious to mention that, 
in accord with Office of Management and Budget guide-
lines, the projects are investments. The money for hous-
ing rehabilitation, for example, will be put in a trust 
fund and the principal kept in tact. Only the earned 
interest will be loaned. 
It is clear that the five councilmen who share 
Miller's philosophy about the needs of the city hold a 
slim majority on the Council and only slick political 
maneuvering got them what they wanted. They believe the 
revenue sharing money is "new" money to do needed tasks 
regardless of how "non-traditional" those tasks might be. 
Miller reinforced this point by saying he was glad the 
Council did not do as the Mayor wanted and just divide 
General Revenue Sharing funds between city departments and 
use the rest for a tax cut. He also argues that a very 
good use of the remaining money would be for social ser-
vices until Special Revenue Sharing becomes a reality.lS 
18Mi11er, Interview. 
164 
Only very recently, Seattle has developed a Depart-
ment of Human Resources. Seattle, along with other com-
munities which realize the city must get increasingly in-
volved in the social service area, has created a depart-
ment with far-sighted goals but not much money. Rick 
Painter of Seattle's new department indicated that as 
long as the federal government gives social service re-
sponsibilities to cities either through cutting funds to 
federal programs and thus "forcing" the cities to pick up 
the slack, or through Special Revenue Sharing types of 
programs, the cities must "gear up" for the huge task be-
fore them. We have already seen that the city's problems 
in taking on such responsibilities may be more than a lack 
of experience and money. Another problem will be city 
officials who honestly feel social service responsibili-
ties are either for federal, state or county governments 
or for the private sector to handle. Painter feels that 
as his department grows and gains experience it may be 
able to lobby effectively before the City Council and the 
Office of Management and Budget and gain support for its 
programs. As of now, he is pleased with what the "liber-
al" majority on the Council has accomplished for social 
services in their allocation of revenue sharing monies. 
He feels that if the department had been better estab-
lished when revenue sharing came along, it could have 
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influenced the Council. At this time, however, Painter 
is very happy with the "reserved" programs, especially 
the housing rehabilitation program. He agrees that the 
$5.4 million spent to balance the 1973 budget was prob-
ably necessary. He is also happy with the many social 
service proposals now being suggested for funding with 
the remaining revenue sharing funds. 19 
Views of City Officials on the Seattle Revenue Sharing 
Decision-Making Process 
\ve now turn to an examination of the opinions of 
those interviewed in Seattle with regard to the decision-
making process employed to decide what was to be done with 
revenue sharing funds. It will be remembered that the 
revenue sharing act itself only implied that normal bud-
get procedures be used. It did not require that the city 
go out of its way to include a cross-section of citizen 
participation in decisions on revenue sharing. In this 
way, as we have seen, it was very different from some 
"War on Poverty" legislation requiring the "maximum feas-
ib1e participation" of local citizens in deciding how the 
local application of the program and its funding would 
affect them. Seattle officials differed as to their 
opinions regarding the effectiveness of "maximum feasible 
participation" in their city and its effect on the 
19p . tIt . a1n er, n erV1ew. 
po1iticization of Seattle's citizens. They also differ 
as to how satisfactory they feel Seattle's decision-
making process was in dealing with revenue sharing. 
166 
It was pointed out at the beginning of this chapter 
that Seattle dealt with its revenue sharing money as a 
separate sum from the monies in its budget's general fund. 
It was also pointed out that Seattle did not set up any 
decision-making mechanism especially for revenue sharing 
processes. The money was handled, pursuant to the im-
plications of the law, in terms of the normal budget de-
cision-making process. Mr. Doolittle of the Office of 
Management and Budget feels this was the best process to 
use. He said that citizen recommendations were not soli-
cited or wanted because the Office of Management and Bud-
get had already decided where the money should go, and 
must go, in the future. Doolittle was specifically re-
ferring to the undesirability of setting up some special 
mechanism for citizen inclusion into the decision-making 
process beyond that usually involved in the regular bud-
get processes. He simply felt that a large scale citizen 
involvement process might force the Council to allocate 
revenue sharing funds for social programs and some capi-
tal programs that the city could not maintain without 
raising up to $10 million in new taxes. To him it was a 
straightforward fiscal question. He felt the revenue 
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sharing money alone was only enough to balance the budget 
this year and delay a tax increase for a while. 
Mr. Doolittle is careful to point out that the 
overall decision-making process is not over. Final de-
cisions on the "reserved" programs and the $3.2 million 
yet to be allocated have to be made. Also, public hear-
ings on the housing rehabilitation programs have yet to 
be held. It is still possible for citizens to give their 
views and even for the city to develop mechanisms for 
citizen inclusion beyond the open hearing process. 
Especially he feels, the finished report of the Seattle 
2000 Commission will have an effect on the Mayor's recom-
mendations on spending the remaining money and on the 
Council's final decision on the same subject. The Commi-
sion was established with the widest possible inclusion 
of citizens from all segments of the city and thus its 
indirect input may have some significance. 
Representatives from Model Cities seem to have made 
an impression on the Council and Office of Management 
and Budget in lobbying for revenue sharing funds. 
Doolittle specifically mentioned that Model Cities task 
force personnel have been effective in making the program 
work in Seattle and want revenue sharing funds to keep 
the program going as federal categorical support is cut 
back. The group was not successful in getting any revenue 
sharing money in the first go round, but they are now 
trying for part of the remaining funds. 20 
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Councilman Cooley was concerned with citizen parti-
cipation as an issue, but he was most concerned with the 
conduct of some Councilmen in deciding what to do with 
revenue sharing funds. Specifically, he was upset about 
the clandestine way the five Councilmen got together and 
drew up their $8 million package, as they did not openly 
arrive at the decision. 
The Seattle Municipal League has also been sin-
gling out Cooley for criticism, he says, on the overall 
city process for deciding how to allocate revenue sharing 
funds. The League feels the city should have set up a 
special mechanism for including the citizens in making 
decisions. But Cooley feels citizens were adequately 
involved in the sense that the city took all their 
recommendations into account. Also the Office of Manage-
ment and Budget priorities and recommendations given the 
Council were in part based upon citizen and group inputs. 
As far as Mr. Cooley is concerned, what happened 
at the hearings is a basis for feeling that even broader 
citizen participation would not do the city any real good. 
In the first place, he feels the people who came to the 
20Doolittle, Interview. 
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hearings were asking the city to get into "non-essential" 
areas of social service (mental health, public health, 
etc.>; non-essential, that is, for the city. Also, very 
large numbers of paid professional social workers came 
to the hearings essentially, in Cooley's opinion, to get 
money from revenue sharing to maintain their jobs because 
the federal government was cutting back its support. In 
other words, were these activists "representative" of 
anyone but their own narrow, special interest? Cooley 
saw them as basically trying to "rip-off" the city.2l 
From his position as auditor for the City Council, 
Allan Barrie views the revenue sharing decision-making 
process similarly to Councilman Cooley. He agrees that 
the behind the scenes coordinating of the five Councilmen, 
before they met with the whole Council to make revenue 
sharing decisions, was very controversial behavior. There 
have been charges of railroading and also, that the five 
had no real criteria of judgment in drawing up their 
program. 
Mr. Barrie also feels that the Council needs to 
beware of special interests that tend to flock to open 
hearings in that they may not be representative of wide 
constituencies. He suggests it is a tough job for a 
21Coo1ey, Interview. 
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Councilman to wade through all the special interests' 
requests and "figure out what is best for the city -- he's 
up against it." 
Most of the social agencies seeking revenue sharing 
funds were working against the tight budget situation of 
Seattle and the expectation on the part of the Council 
that Special Revenue Sharing, not General Revenue Sharing 
was the part of the New Federalism program that was 
to transfer financial aid to social programs of the local 
government from federal categorical grants. As Special 
Revenue Sharing was not yet a reality, both the city and 
the social agencies found themselves in a kind of limbo. 
As Barrie suggests, however, the city was willing to 
give some money to the legal aid program, for example, 
in anticipation of federal funds arriving to maintain the 
22 program. 
As might be expected, Councilman Miller looks at 
things a bit differently, but not entirely. First, he is 
clearly proud of being one of the "five" in the Council 
majority who put through a revenue sharing package. The 
interviewer got the impression that Miller simply saw this 
as another political battle that, in this case, he and his 
coalition won. He hopes the coalition can stay together 
22B . It· arr1e, n erV1ew. 
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in the face of "political pressures and fiscal realities." 
Somewhat ironically, Miller sees the Seattle 2000 
Commission as being in the way of the creation of a 
genuine citizen participation mechanism for helping to 
decide revenue sharing questions. Seattle 2000 was a 
massive effort, he says, to get citizens involved in meet-
ing together to set goals for the year 2000. The purpose 
was to get ideas upon which to build a comprehensive plan 
for the city for development to the year 2000. Miller 
feels that getting these people in the first place was a 
great city-wide effort, and the energy they expended in 
their task was also very great. The whole effort "drained 
the city's activist resources." To come along and develop 
another open ended process for General Revenue Sharing was 
not feasible. He continued: "There is only so much you 
can do in terms of broad citizen participation at one time 
••• there are only so many activists in the city to go 
around. " 
Miller differs sharply with Doolittle in his opinion 
of the capability of the City Council to deal with wind-
fall monies like revenue sharing. Miller feels there was 
no question in the minds of many Councilmen as to where 
the money could be usefully spent. Citizens, he argues, 
had petitioned and lobbied for some time for programs the 
city could not previously afford to fund. Many of the 
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programs in the "reserved" category were programs that 
citizens had wanted for some time and at lease five 
Councilmen must have agreed they were important. Miller 
agrees that some lengthening of the decision-making 
process might have been a good idea. and perhaps, even with 
Seattle 2000, more citizen participation could have been 
sought. He seems to feel, however, that a majority on the 
Council knew what the people wanted through previous 
communications from them and voted their revenue sharing 
allocations accordingly. 
In all of the cities studied for this paper, a men-
tion of neighborhoods as important social and political 
entities was made by one or more city officials inter-
viewed. Miller spoke strongly about his opposition to 
Mayor Uhlman's plan to set up "little city halls" in 
Seattle's neighborhoods. These would be places where 
citizens could go and ask questions or complain about 
city government. To Miller this would be just another 
level of government that, in fact, might just keep 
citizens from coming directly to City Hall when they 
sought to petition government. He could support the con-
cept if the neighborhood offices were places where citi-
zens could go and talk with an advocate who would take 
their complaints to City Hall. Actually, Miller said, 
Seattle's neighborhoods are doing quite well without 
r 
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little city halls, from rich ones to poor ones, in letting 
city government know how they, as communities, feel about 
issues. Residents of the Model Cities neighborhoods are 
particularly effective and active, he says. 
Model cities, more than any other War on Poverty 
entity, has done a great deal to politicize citizens. 
The ordinary citizen in these neighborhoods is likely to 
show up at City Hall hearings. On the other hand, it is 
only those politicos from Office of Economic Opportunity 
agencies, rather than clients of those agencies, that come 
to hearings. Said Miller: "The average citizen (in an 
Office of Economic Opportunity program) probably doesn't 
even feel Nixon's cutbacks are so bad because he has 
never gotten the fruits of the program anyway ••• "23 
Rick Painter perceives the situation similarly. He 
indicated that while some Office of Economic Opportunity 
programs, especially Head Start, seem to have politicized 
previously nonparticipating citizens, the work of Model 
Cities has clearly been the most effective in getting 
citizens active in community affairs. Seattle's Model 
Cities area has a citizen participation mechanism whereby 
the citizens of the area give advice to the formal Model 
Cities staff. Painter says that often the staff will make 
23Mi11er, Interview. 
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changes in their programs due to citizen input. "It is 
very encouragjngto see Model Cities people, who have nev-
er before been involved in politics, get involved." rv1r. 
Painter feels strongly that people within the Model Cities 
area see the program as useful and responsive to them. 
This po1iticization has brought both common citizens and 
Model Cities administrators to the revenue sharing public 
hearings. 
On the whole, however, Painter does not believe 
there was adequate citizen participation in the decision-
making process on General Revenue Sharing. He feels the 
reason was a lack of a mechanism for community involve-
mente He indicates that this is a serious shortcoming in 
Seattle's policy-making process, not only with respect to 
revenue sharing policy, but all policy making that goes on 
at City Hall. The Seattle 2000 Commission, he says, is 
working out a participation mechanism for the future; a 
systematic way to tap opinions of the population on mat-
ters before final decisions by government are made. It is 
not clear as yet what form this mechanism will take. Mr. 
Painter's own Department of Human Resources is also work-
ing out a similar mechanism in conjunction with their 
Comprehensive Human Resources Plan. 24 Model Cities thus 
has a participation mechanism. Planning groups and agen-
24p . tIt . a1n er, n erV1ew. 
r G 
f· 
r 
f 
175 
cies of city government talk about such mechanisms, but 
none was used in revenue sharing deliberations. 
Views of City Officials on Federal Aid to Cities 
As we saw early in this paper, federal aid to cities 
has been public policy for some time. We have also seen 
that the form of aid can vary, General Revenue Sharing 
being a block grant type. All City Hall officials in-
terviewed had strong opinions on the desirability of fed-
eral aid to cities and the form that aid should take. 
There was an amazing similarity in their views. Their 
opinions on this subject are very important, of course, 
in evaluating the New Federalism philosophy's impact on 
the minds and actions of city officials. 
Generally speaking, economist Doolittle dislikes 
categorical grants and favors block grants to cities from 
the federal government. As the federal government con-
tinues to cut back in categorical grants, as he sees it 
doing, an increasingly difficult task for cities will be 
deciding which of those categorical programs are worth-
while enough to warrant continued operation by the city. 
For example, in his opinion many programs under Model 
Cities have been worthwhile, especially the health clinics. 
They (the health clinics) have provided a real service to 
the community and, if Model Cities finally folds, those 
clinics ought to be put under the city/county health 
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department. He feels the city should analyze which cate-
gorical grants have been most effective and place them 
under appropriate city departments as their federal fund-
ing expires. He is of the opinion, however, that if the 
city is to pick up social service from the federal pro-
grams as federal funding expires, they ought to be only 
those in areas of responsibility the city has assumed for 
some time. Hopefully, of course, block grants from the 
federal government would help the city pick up this bur-
den. 
Although some categorical grants have been success-
ful, Doolittle believes that by and large they have been 
difficult for the city government to deal with. "They 
take too large a bureaucratic load and expense." He joins 
with many others interviewed in all four cities in con-
sternation over the cutting back or elimination of many 
categorical grants by the Nixon Administration before 
Congress has finally passed Special Revenue Sharing leg-
islation. He is sympathetic with the idea that eventually 
all categorical grants might be replaced with block grants, 
but he says the burden is now too heavy on the city to 
make possible the funding of federally discontinued cat-
egorical grants in the social service area. The city sim-
ply does not have the money even with the receipt of Gen-
eral Revenue Sharing funds. Although he feels the total 
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elimination of categorical grants might not be a bad idea, 
he had no idea Nixon planned on doing so, especially 
before Special Revenue Sharing was a reality. Doolittle 
agrees with the philosophy that the federal government is 
too highly centralized, but feels it needs an organized 
and coherent policy of decentralization; if one type of 
aid is to be discontinued, it should only be done when 
substitute aid has been established. 
Although he favors the concept of block grants, 
two other significant problems have developed with re-
spect to revenue sharing in the Seattle experience. 
First, the city staff is not prepared to deal with the 
funds. As we saw earlier, Doolittle feels the City 
Council was not prepared to make careful decisions on this 
wind fall grant. But he also feels the city bureaucracy 
is understaffed to adequately administer these new funds 
that take more local discretion in their administration. 
Second, the state legislature seems to feel the city is 
now quite well off financially with the receipt of General 
Revenue Sharing funds and has consequently cut Seattle's 
property tax millage by 10% starting in 1975 -- just the 
year when Seattle expects its worst deficit problem. As 
we will see, those interviewed in Tacoma are also very 
upset over the Washington State legislature's response to 
revenue sharing aid going to the cities. City officials 
are insistent that the revenue sharing aid is far too 
small to warrant cutbacks in state aid to cities and 
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that the legislature's reaction is not responsive to the 
fiscal realities of the cities in washington. 25 
Councilman Cooley feels that the concept of block 
grants such as General Revenue Sharing is very good. 
But in terms of current realities it can be seen as a 
mixed blessing. Cooley is proud to point out that Seattle 
has gotten very good at grantsmanship. In 1972, for 
example, Seattle received over $82 million in federal 
categorical grants while the city's general fund stood 
at $72 million. So while favoring the concept of revenue 
sharing, he feels that Seattle is going to receive much 
less federal aid from that type of federal grant program. 
Cooley maintains that he predicted at the outset that 
revenue sharing would be a "rip off" to major central 
cities. He predicted they would get 50 cents on the 
dollar with revenue sharing compared to what they got in 
categorical grants. As he sees it, suburbia ("the 
President knows where the Republican votes are") is get-
ting a better formula interpretation. This will es-
pecially manifest itself with Special Revenue Sharing. 
For example, in 1972, Seattle received $25 million in urban 
25Doolitt1e, Interview. 
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improvement grants of various sorts. As it looks now, 
with the Community Development and Better Cities Acts 
as part of Special Revenue Sharing, Seattle by fiscal 
year 1974 will receive only $12.1 million for these same 
types of urban programs as were funded by categorical 
grant monies. His information says this amount should be 
reduced by another $5.8 million by 1976. The city is 
supposed to take care of HUD programs, Model Cities, 
Open Space and other previous categorical grant programs 
with the lesser Special Revenue Sharing allocation. 
Seattle, then, will have to deal with many social programs 
previously funded with $25 million with only $12~1 mil-
lion. The battle between social agencies for these 
monies should be fierce, he feels. Cooley maintains it 
is a clear political move by Nixon to solidify suburban 
and rural constituencies at the expense of the non-
Republican central cities. 26 As we have seen, Miller and 
Cooley often disagree on the revenue sharing question, 
but in this case they share some feelings. 
Councilman Miller is concerned with the political 
reality in Washington, D.C. that seems to have crippled 
Nixon's efforts to get his whole New Federalism program 
through Congress. He feels the revenue sharing situation 
26Cooley, Interview. 
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is confusing now. Special Revenue Sharing was supposed 
to replace cutback categorical grants but they do not 
know when or if they will get Special Revenue Sharing. 
So, perhaps the General Revenue Sharing funds Seattle has 
yet to allocate will have to go for social programs. He 
is in favor of city funding of those programs but essen-
tially those programs were supposed to be funded with 
Special Revenue Sharing funds. He adds, "Watergate has 
jeopardized the whole revenue sharing approach." 
Although Miller may agree with Cooley that the 
revenue sharing situation is not working as it should at 
the moment, he clearly believes block grants of this sort 
are best for Seattle, if not best for all cities. He 
believes this to be so even if Seattle won't get as much 
money from the federal government. He feels Seattle can 
make better decisions than the federal government on how 
best to spend funds in local problem areas. 
Housing is a good example in the Councilman's 
opinion. There have been a few federal housing programs 
in the rehabilitation area. He feels, though, that the 
federal programs were drawn up with eastern cities in 
mind, not Seattle with its large number of single family 
owner-occupied homes that are aging badly. The federal 
programs were written with the idea of meeting the Harlem 
slum problem where people live in very dense multiple 
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dwelling accommodations. Seattle has its own slum area 
where about one-half of the people live in single family 
dwellings. In his opinion, the poor Blacks and Chicanos 
in Seattle have never wanted to live in multiple dwelling 
public housing projects; their relatives live in single 
family dwellings so other poor citizens want to live there 
too. The old federal programs were thus out of touch 
with the "Seattle mentality." Categorical housing grants 
were too inflexible to deal with Seattle's housing reali-
ties. The advantage of a block grant program like 
revenue sharing is that a city can define its own par-
ticular problems and then design programs to deal with 
them that are locally tailored to deal with the local 
problem. The "reserved" housing rehabilitation program 
passed by the City Council is such a program in Miller's 
opinion and it would not have been possible without 
General Revenue Sharing. 
Rick Painter in the Department of Human Resources 
sees a real irony in the current revenue sharing block 
grant situation that ot~ interviewed implied. The 
New Federalism in theory says local government is better 
able to decide where money should be spent in addressing 
their problems than the federal government. But cutbacks 
27Miller, Interview. 
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in categorical grants, with no replacement for the loss 
through Special Revenue Sharing, plus inflation and rising 
labor costs, mean that local governments may be forced to 
put money from General Revenue Sharing into general 
services only and also do some shoring up of cutback 
federal categorical grants. This precludes the city from 
using the General Revenue Sharing money as "new money" 
to be used over and above other federal grants and other 
local monies to assess local needs and money spent on 
them. 28 
III. SEATTLE: SUB-CONCLUSIONS 
In this section of every case study chapter an 
effort will be made to assess the data reported in the 
case study in terms of the theoretical framework dis-
cussed in Chapter III. In Chapter VIII we will draw 
together the "sub-conclusions" from each case study and 
arrive at general conclusions on revenue sharing. 
In terms of the philosophy behind the New Federalism, 
it is clear that its major goal was to give more power 
and responsibility through the allocation of block grant 
monies to the "states, localities and the people." It is 
simply too early to reach any real conclusion as to 
28p . tIt . a~n er, n erv~ew. 
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whether the City of Seattle and its people have appre-
ciably more "power" as a result of less than two years of 
receiving General Revenue Sharing funds. If power can 
be defined as the command over the allocation of resources, 
then the fact that the Seattle City Council has exercised 
the allocation of revenue sharing funds suggests they 
possess an increased measure of power that they would not 
have been able to exercise either without the block grant 
money or with more restrictive categorical grants. 
Certainly the city does have more responsibility than it 
would have had under categorical grants in that General 
Revenue Sharing allows considerable discretion on the 
part of the officials as to where the money should go. 
The fact that city officials felt the weight of that 
responsibility is reflected in controversies reported 
above as to whether the Council was really able to make 
such decisions in the time span they used, and in the 
controversy surrounding what was done with the funds as 
of this writing. On the basis of the short time frame 
in which Seattle has dealt with General Revenue Sharing, 
it can be suggested that a small amount of power has been 
gained by the city and more new responsibility seems to 
be felt by those dealing with the issue in City Hall. It 
is very important to add, however, that whatever new 
power the city may have with General Revenue Sharing, it 
seems to have been largely compromised by the fiscal 
realities of decreased federal aid in the form of cate-
gorical grants and the huge cost of maintaining city 
services and labor expenses. The financial constraints 
on the city are so real that whatever "increased 'power" 
officials might have felt due to the receipt of General 
Revenue Sharing funds was clouded by strict demands on 
all their fiscal resources. 
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The New Federalism also suggests that States and 
localities should be able to establish their own priori-
ties and determine the best methods for meeting their 
social needs through their use of revenue sharing funds 
and this should lead to a more decentralized American 
system. As we have seen, there is considerable contro-
versy among those interviewed in Seattle as to whether 
fiscal realities can allow for the establishment of spend-
ing priorities in any areas other than traditional city 
service and responsibility areas. A major priority in 
Seattle is simply maintaining services through the use of 
General Revenue Sharing funds. Again, this is exacer-
bated by inflation, demands by city employees for higher 
wages and federal cutbacks in categorical grants. In 
Seattle, however, a "liberal" majority on the City Council 
did exercise their option under the New Federalism and 
established in the "reserved" category certain new pro-
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grams that, in their opinion, do meet the priority needs 
of Seattle that may be quite different from the needs of 
other cities. Because the amount of revenue sharing money 
received so far is relatively small, it is hard to sug-
gest that the work of the City Council has in any way 
decentralized the structure of American government. It 
is true, though, that the housing rehabilitation program 
and other parts of the "majority package" were not federal 
dictates. The City Council determined the priority and 
spent what it could. Perhaps that is a step toward de-
centralization of the establishment of priorities to meet 
social needs. 
In Chapter III, Mr. Richard Nathan, who worked close-
ly with the Nixon Administration on revenue sharing and 
the whole concept of the New Federalism, suggested that 
part of the decentralization aspect of the New Federalism 
was that the states and localities would now be expected 
to assume functional responsibility for human and com-
munity service programs. In Seattle, we have found sub-
stantial disagreement as to whether these areas of respon-
sibility justly belong to the city at all. Some argued 
that it was the responsibility of the city to deal in hu-
man services far more than it had before, while others 
argued that only the most basic and traditional sorts of 
city responsibilities should be maintained even with 
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revenue sharing. It seemed clear, however, that federal 
cutbacks in categorical grants and the delay in creation 
of Special Revenue Sharing were the main reasons the city 
could not move boldly into new or relatively unfamiliar 
service areas. Fiscal realities moderated or prohibited 
those interviewed from being as expansive in the assump-
tion of human and community programs as they may have 
wanted to be. In truth, of course, the liberal majority 
on the Council did get through some programs that were 
new in the community development areas, housing rehabili-
tation being an example. Councilman Miller, however, 
suggested that he would like to have spent much more on 
that area and on other programs to make the neighborhoods 
more pleasant and keep people in the core of Seattle. 
Thus, some of those interviewed saw revenue sharing as an 
opportunity for the city to assume responsibilities where 
the federal government was viewed as having been negli-
gent in the past. Again, this applies specifically in 
the housing area. 
Considering the fact that Special Revenue Sharing 
is far from being a reality, it is quite significant that 
the Seattle City Council moved as boldly as it did into 
assuming new and expanded community service responsibili-
ties with their very limited General Revenue Sharing funds 
and the fiscal crisis the city faces. The ethnic cultural 
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centers are a further indication that Seattle is moving 
into the area of responsibility for human services, even 
though the "reserved" funds there are somewhat modest. 
Although some of those interviewed did not believe phil-
osophically, or in terms of fiscal realities, that the 
city should move into new human and community service 
areas, the majority of the Council did agree with the 
functional decentralization aspects of the New Federalism. 
Those who believed that it was the proper role of 
the city to take up certain social and community programs 
were fearful, however, that in this uncertain period, 
where many categorical grants in these functional areas 
have been cut back and Special Revenue Sharing is not a 
reality, many useful programs might get lost in the 
shuffle. Certainly, if the debate allover this nation 
is as strong as it is in Seattle, it is certain that many 
cities will simply opt not to assume responsibility for 
social and community service programs being cut back by 
the federal gevernment. If the guidelines of Special Rev-
enue Sharing are very broad, as it appears they will be, 
many federal programs can still be dropped by local gov-
ernment. In the case of Seattle, however, it appears 
that for the time being a majority on the Council see as 
a just responsibility of the city a duty to pick up pre-
viously funded categorical grant programs that have 
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"worked" and also the responsibility to expand city par-
ticipation in the social and community service areas. 
It must be noted, however, that these programs are only 
in the "reserved" category and are not yet final Council 
allocations. The political situation could change be-
tween the time of this study and the time of final allo-
cation. 
The New Federalism calls for bringing government 
closer to the people. We have seen, however, that it is 
not clear who the New Federalism considers the "people" 
to be. A basic part of each case study is to see who the 
people are that are participating in and benefitting from 
revenue sharing. Such an analysis will tell us who the 
people are who are gaining from the New Federalism. In 
this case, how has Seattle defined "the people"? 
Seattle dealt with its revenue sharing money as a 
special block sum. The decision-making process over dis-
bursement of the funds was exactly like the city's regu-
lar budget process. It is in this decision-making pro-
cess that we may see who the people are that are benefit-
ting from the New Federalism. In a strict sense, the 
decision-making process in Seattle was open. Those who 
knew Seattle had received the funds and who wanted to 
make requests to the Office of Management and Budget were 
able to do so. Interest groups could also petition the 
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City Council and the Mayor for consideration. City 
Counci1men.could ask their constituents, as could the 
Mayor, what they thought the city should do with its 
revenue sharing money. Indeed, the Mayor suggested that 
the Seattle 2000 Commission should take as part of its 
job the recommendation of priority spending for revenue 
sharing funds. As we have seen, that Commission was 
made up of a cross-section of all aspects of the city's 
population. But the Council felt the revenue sharing 
job would get in the way of the planning function that 
was the Commission's real responsibility. The Council 
did not set up an alternative decision-making mechanism. 
Certainly Councilman Miller realized that such a mecha-
nism would have been a good idea and that just holding 
three open hearings on revenue sharing was not really 
"opening" the process to the people. When Mr. Doolittle 
indicated that such a decision-making mechanism would 
complicate things by involving the public in the process, 
he was admitting that minimal public participation re-
sults from merely holding open hearings on any fiscal 
question. Councilman Cooley acknowledged that budget 
hearings are very sparsely attended as a rule, and in the 
case of the revenue sharing hearings they were monopolized 
by special interests in the social service area who were 
threatened with losing their jobs due to federal cut-
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backs in their social service areas. In other words, it 
can be argued that unless a city goes out of its way to 
get "John Q. Citizen" to participate in a decision-making 
process through creating a special mechanism to include 
him, the average citizen may well be left out. The 
elderly and the poor who often feel alienated or neglected 
by City Hall anyway, are unlikely or unable to come and 
be heard at regular open hearings. It would take a 
special mechanism of inclusion to bring the voices of 
these people, and others who feel government is closed to 
them, to the decision-making process on any issue including 
revenue sharing. Technically Seattle abided by the 
Revenue Sharing Act implication that the regular budget 
process could be used in deciding how to allocate 
General Revenue Sharing funds. But if the individual 
citizen is to be given the chance to petition the city 
regime, it can be suggested that this would only be a 
reality if the city went out of its routine way to in-
clude average citizens from all aspects of city life, as 
Seattle did in the creation of the Commission on Seattle 
2000. Recognizing this, Councilman Miller felt however, 
that Seattle was "all participated out" with the Commis-
sion and so no such mechanism was established for General 
Revenue Sharing. 
As we have seen, Seattle has also embarked on the 
establishment of "little City Halls" in the community 
neighborhoods. But these little City Halls have not 
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been used as devices to solicit the opinions of citizens 
on how to distribute revenue sharing funds. So far they 
are only a means whereby neighborhood residents can find 
out what sorts of services the city can provide for them 
and also register some complaints. But as Hr. Miller 
pointed out, the city staff in these neighborhood offices 
are not supposed to bring to City Hall the feelings of 
neighborhood residents on issues that bother them. The 
little City Halls are not instruments of communication 
from the citizen to the city official in any organized 
sense. 
The people who actually benefit from revenue sharing 
in Seattle will not be clear until final Council action 
on the "reserved" and remaining revenue sharing funds. 
If those who are to benefit from the reserved monies 
actually get these funds, many of Seattle's less fortunate 
will be served. This suggests that the people helped by 
revenue sharing may be quite a broad cr.oss-section of 
Seattle's population. But Seattle's decision-making 
process was very traditional and in no way fostered the 
participation of individuals or groups who were not likely 
to participate, i.e. the poor, minorities and aged. In 
this case the people who benefited from revenue sharing 
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and the New Federalism were those in city government and 
the influential interest groups who regularly help set 
city policy priorities. The Seattle experience tells us 
that it is up to the city government to decide who the 
people are who will benefit from revenue sharing. In 
Seattle there was no Jeffersonian individualism in evi-
dence. The collectivities of city government and 
traditionally influential interest groups seem to have 
been the people most benefited by General Revenue Sharing. 
We have seen that a major goal of the New Federalism 
is the decentralization of the American System. This 
implies some measure of "independence" of each layer of 
the federal system from the other. In the case of cities 
it should mean that they may be strong enough to avoid 
being totally dominated by their state and the federal 
government. Although Seattle has been given revenue 
sharing funds and the discretion to use them as the local 
political system allows, the dominance of the national 
government and the State are still clear. The potential 
for added independence and strength to Seattle has been 
largely negated by the inability of the Nixon Administra-
tion to complete the revenue sharing package and its cut-
backs in categorical grants. These two factors, as we 
have seen, substantially limit the latitude of the city's 
discretion in spending revenue sharing funds. Certainly 
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Seattle has done some bold things with the money this 
year, but all agree this is a "one-time" thing and that 
the rest of the General Revenue Sharing funds will have 
to be used to balance the budget. 'I;~a State has also 
shown its influence by cutting back its aid to the city 
in certain areas because they feel the city is now quite 
rich with its revenue sharing funds. Even with revenue 
sharing, the city is still at the mercy of the state, as 
it always has been. Thus, it is difficult to suggest that 
revenue sharing has made the City of Seattle very inde-
pendent vis-a-vis either the federal government or the 
State of Washington. Our federal system divided powers 
between the national government and the states. The cit-
ies were to be creatures of the states. From looking at 
Seattle, revenue sharing seems to have done nothing to 
~lter the power balance in any measurable degree. 
What revenue sharing has done, however, is offer a 
means whereby those affected by federal cutbacks in cate-
gorical grants can seek a replacement for those funds. In 
this sense, revenue sharing has provided a means whereby 
a citizen frustrated by the response from one level of 
government can appeal to another level, in this case the 
city. We have seen that representatives from Head Start, 
Model Cities and other interest groups which see their 
federal funds in jeopardy have petitioned the city for 
i 
i 
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replacement funds. Seattle's limited funds may only fur-
ther frustrate the members of these groups, but at least 
there now is a level of government to appeal to beyond the 
national level. 
'de have seen in Seattle that the War on Poverty pro-
grams, particularly Model Cities, had an effect in polit-
icizing people who were previously not at all politically 
active. Many of those interviewed pointed out how repre-
sentatives from Model Cities, not only administrators but 
neighborhood residents as well, came to City Hall to peti-
tion for revenue sharing funds. It is in this area that 
we could say that revenue sharing has afforded a further 
development of the participation of groups in government 
decision-making. This did not occur because the city de-
signed mechanisms to make it so, but rather because of the 
politicization of citizens caused by previous government 
programs. Revenue sharing has given us an opportunity to 
see to what extent the "maximum feasible participation" 
programs of the 1960's have caused continuing participa-
tion by those they were designed to politicize. In the 
case of Seattle, City Hall officials felt those programs 
have had a real effect in politicizing the citizens they 
were supposed to politicize. 
At this stage it is difficult to assess the degree 
to which Seattle will help fund federal programs which 
195 
have been cut back in the human and community services 
areas. As we have seen, virtually all of those inter-
viewed believed the revenue sharing money yet to be al-
located, about $3.2 million, could very well go to tide 
over cutback federal programs until Special Revenue Shar-
ing or other sources of funds can support these programs. 
It should be noted, however, that the debate was very 
strong as to whether the city could afford to support 
faltering national programs on its own, even with 
revenue sharing funds. 
The social programs fought for by national elites 
during the 1960's are in trouble in Seattle if the pri-
orities of local interests are represented in City Hall. 
To be fair, however, it must be emphasized that the main 
reason the city may not take up these programs is the fis-
cal inability of the city to handle them. It is true that 
some of those interviewed felt social programs like Model 
Ci ties and the ~'lar on Poverty programs are simply not the 
responsibility of city governments, no matter how wealthy 
they might be, but a majority sympathized with the social 
goals of recent national administrations and lamented 
their financial inability to do more in the human and com-
munity service areas. A look at the "reserved" revenue 
sharing allocation programs gives witness to this fact. 
The real test of the commitment of City Hall to the social 
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and community programs of the War on Poverty will come 
when the city finally allocates the remaining $3.2 million 
and finally decides whether and to what extent the "re-
served" programs will be funded. The majority on the 
Council is a majority by only one vote and if the minor-
ity on the Council can be seen as representing the wishes 
of some local elites, those local elites are close to 
achieving what they want. 
The Seattle study tells us something of whether 
there is a national consensus that there should be col-
lective action to solve social problems through public 
resources. It is fair to say that those interviewed be-
lieved there should be collective action in America to 
solve social problems but they would differ as to whether 
all levels of government should work on all social prob-
lem areas or whether the responsibility for social prob-
lems should be divided among the various levels of gov-
ernment. Those interviewed believed something must be 
done for the less fortunate and the minorities, but they 
did not all feel Seattle should be doing the job. We may 
find in the future that some interests in Seattle are able 
to influence City Hall enough to where the city only mar-
ginally participates in the social service area. This 
will not necessarily mean that City Hall or major local 
interests do not believe in social and community programs 
I r 
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for the poor and minorities. It may only mean they feel 
it is the responsibility of other levels of government to 
fund and administer these sorts of programs. If a nation-
a1 consensus means that officials at all levels must be-
lieve it is their duty to chip in and deal with the social 
questions of the day as a high priority of city government, 
then those interviewed in Seattle, as a whole, would E21 
indicate there is such a national consensus. But if it 
means that the social problems are there and different 
levels of government should take some aspect of the prob-
lem and deal with it as best they can, then there is a 
large consensus in Seattle. 
The liberal majority on the Seattle City Council 
seems to be striving to maintain a concern for minorities 
and the poor that typified the priorities of national 
elites in the 1960's. They would probably go even fur-
ther if they had the money. A strong minority on the 
Council felt that the goals of the War on Poverty and 
the Council majority may be valid, but they feel that the 
city should not assume a substantial responsibility for 
accomplishing them. 
Seattle's experience with revenue sharing also ad-
dresses itself to the themes of Lowi's The End of Liberal-
!!m. The question here is whether revenue sharing is the 
type of unconditional rebate aimed at those objects for 
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which no general rules are practicable or desirable, or 
whether it is simply another federal program without es-
tablished guidelines that further sets back the cause of 
planning and justice that has plagued federal programs 
for so: long. The Seattle experience seems to indicate 
that revenue sharing may be used for virtually anything. 
This means that the money may go for things that would 
not require federal guidelines in that they would be whol-
ly inappropriate. The money may, however, also go for 
social, community and civil rights projects that may re-
quire guidelines if they are to promote the rule of law 
and justice Lowi advocates. Those interviewed seemed to 
believe the city was capable of deciding what to do with 
the funds and that it could maintain justice for its citi-
zens and still determine better than the federal govern-
ment how to spend the money. 
There is no question that the Revenue Sharing Act 
has few guidelines and is virtually an unconditional re-
bate. General Revenue Sharing and Special Revenue Shar-
ing, however, seem to be aimed at more than those objects 
for which no general rules are either practicable or de-
sirable. Administration statements and the opinions of 
those interviewed suggest that the entire revenue sharing 
package is aimed at allowing states and localities to de-
termine their own policies and priorities in a very wide 
area of policy determination. We have seen that Mr. 
Nathan believes only the human and community service 
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areas are to be the functional concern of the States and 
localities under the New Federalism. The ambiguity of 
these terms suggests a wide range of local policy making, 
indeed. It especially leaves open the possibility that 
local government may have great latitude in the civil 
rights area without benefit of specific federal guide-
lines. The possibility is there, then that revenue 
sharing in Seattle and other cities and States could set 
back the progress that has been made in the previously 
established national priority area of civil rights. If 
the liberal majority stays in a dominant position in 
Seattle, it is less likely to happen there. It does mean, 
however, that the continuance of previously established 
national prioritY'policies is at the mercy of local 
politics under the New Federalism and revenue sharing. 
It is possible that after Congress evaluates the revenue 
sharing program in four years, it may see the erosion 
of certain policies such as civil rights programs and 
not renew revenue sharing. In the meantime, the latitude 
given cities under the legislation gives local elites and 
other local interest groups a great opportunity to com-
promise previously established national priority programs. 
This is most likely in areas, such as the War on Poverty 
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program, where continuance of the program will depend on 
localities funding them with their revenue sharing money. 
There is no question but that revenue sharing in 
Seattle has furthered the process of interest-group 
liberalism. The lack of guidelines in the legislation 
(or the broadness of them) allows interest groups of all 
types to determine what will be done with the money. 
But the purpose of the legislation was to promote just 
such local policy making; it was never intended to be a 
policy with strict rules and regulations to get the 
localities to conform to specific national priorities. 
In the case of Seattle, the liberal majority on the City 
Council seems to believe the lack of guidelines in the 
revenue sharing legislation to be its greatest strength. 
You will remember Mr. Miller saying how Seattle's housing 
situation was unique and it is best that Seattle decide 
how to deal with it. Yet, many of those interviewed did 
fear that some successful programs from the War on Poverty 
and Model Cities programs might be lost in the national 
shift from categorical grants to block grants. So, 
although there was an appreciation for the broadness of 
the revenue sharing guidelines, there was also the fear 
that certain national programs might be lost. 
CHAPTER V 
GENERAL REVENUE SHARING IN TACOMA 
I. CITY FINANCES AND REVENUE SHARING 
WHAT TACOMA HAS DONE 
As of the 1970 United States census, Tacoma, 
1 Washington, had a population of 154,600. Tacoma is 
located about thirty-five miles south of Seattle and is 
often over-shadowed by her larger and economically more 
prosperous sister city. Using Tacoma in this study is 
occasioned because the city's population is a different 
size from the other cities studied. At about 155,000, 
Tacoma stands at about twice the size of Eugene but less 
than one-third the size of Seattle. 
Unlike Seattle, Tacoma does not find itself in 
quite as severe a financial bind. As a matter of fact, 
Mr. William Donaldson, the City Manager, suggests that 
if the State Legislature had not cut back funds to the 
city and if the Nixon Administration had not severely 
cut back categorical grants to the city, Tacoma would 
be in a healthy financial situation. But the State Legis-
1The 1972 World Almanac and Book of Facts, 
(New York: Newspaper Enterprise Association, Inc., 1972), 
p. 193. 
lature figures the city is well off with its revenue 
sharing funds and has cut back its transit allocation 
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to Tacoma. Also, many social service agencies are 
clamoring for city funds due to federal support drying 
up. These factors, together with high inflation, mean 
Tacoma faces the possibility of a budget deficit of $1.5 
million this year. The fiscal picture is further compli-
cated by the fact that as city costs have increased 
dramatically in recent years (especially labor costs), 
the city is tied to a relatively inflexible tax receipt 
base made up of property taxes and business license 
taxes. These two revenue sources have suffered lately, 
as well, due to the recent economic recession in the 
Seattle-Tacoma area. The Manager reports that although 
revenue has gone up about 10% in recent years, costs have 
gone up about 14%. Before the city knew how the State 
legislature and the Federal Administration were going to 
ultimately deal with the revenue issue, it appeared that 
General Revenue Sharing and Special Revenue Sharing would 
be the financial lift the city needed. 
Tacoma has dealt with its General Revenue Sharing 
funds as a separate package. This was the case wib'l 
both the 1972 and 1973-4 General Revenue Sharing funds. 
The money was not automatically included in the city's 
general fund budget and allocated as just another munic-
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ipal revenue would be. 
Tacoma received a total of $3.3 million in General 
Revenue Sharing funds in 1972. The city allocated $1.4 
million of that sum in late 1972 and combined the re-
mainder with its 1973 allocation. The $1.4 million was 
looked at by city officials as essential money to carry 
out important city functions on an emergency basis. 2 
The Federal Projects Team, made up of the City Manager 
and City Department heads, came up with a list of 
policies and priorities on how to spend the money. They 
suggested that all the money go for capital expenditures 
and projects, such as equipment rental, local improve-
ment of neighborhoods and the improvement of interdepart-
mental communication systems that were felt to be very 
outdated. These projects were suggested to the City 
Council for funding with the revenue sharing money and 
the Council approved. The public was not involved in 
the decision-making process concerning the disbursement 
of these funds. 
For the 1973-4 fiscal year, Tacoma had $5.7 million 
in General Revenue Sharing funds to allocate. $3.8 
million of this money was the city's 1973 General Revenue 
2Interview with Stearns Wood, Assistant Program 
Management Systems Director, Tacoma Planning Office, 
Tacoma, Washington, 25 July 1973. 
Sharing allocation from the federal government. $1.9 
million was carried over from the 1972 allotment from 
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the federal government. Although Tacoma developed quite 
an elaborate decision-making process for deciding how to 
allocate the bulk of its revenue sharing money, this 
process was not used in deciding how to allocate a large 
portion of its 1972 funds and $477,000 of its 1973 funds. 
Before that process could be established, the Mayor, his 
administrative staff, and the Council decided there was 
a great need for the funding of certain programs on a high 
priority emergency basis. The $477,000 went primarily 
for summer youth employment and recreational programs. 
Summer jobs for 400 youths were created in one program. 
Some of the money went to .repair considerable damage 
to city property resulting from a recent storm. Another 
large sum went for the creation of a Department of Human 
Development that would administer and oversee social 
programs under Special Revenue Sharing. 3 
The Revenue Sharing Evaluation Process 
Although sizeable amounts of Tacoma's 1972 and 1973 
General Revenue Sharing funds were allocated without open 
public hearings, and consequently not in accord with the 
3Interview with Gordon Johnston, Mayor of Tacoma, 
Washington, 25 July 1973. 
r 
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city's regular budget process, by far the greatest amount 
of revenue sharing money received by the city was allo-
cated by a process that went beyond its regular budget 
process in terms of citizen involvement. The series of 
events that led to the development of Tacoma's "evalua-
tion process" for revenue sharing started in the summer 
of 1972. At that time the City Manager and the current 
Director of the Program Management System decided that 
Tacoma needed a new over-all city program for management 
and budget procedures. They also felt an evaluation and 
monitoring procedure for city programs should be devised. 
To get funds to develop such a system, Tacoma applied 
for a $106,000 Community Renewal Program grant from the 
federal Department of Housing and Urban Development. 
Tacoma received the grant and began to develop a Program 
Management System. Soon thereafter General Revenue 
Sharing came along and it was decided that an important 
part of the decision-making process for evaluating what 
should be done with General Revenue Sharing funds would 
come under the new Program Management System. The City 
Manager asked the Program Management System group to 
develop some type of means to evaluate all the programs 
that were to come in asking for General Revenue Sharing 
funds. The Program Management System then contracted a 
consultant firm to make recommendations as to a process 
F" 
I 
1 
for evaluating revenue sharing project proposals. 
On January 15, 1973 the consultant submitted a 
report to the Program Management System group. This 
report was very significant in guiding the group in the 
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drawing up of the final evaluation process. As time went 
on, those interviewed suggested, the community and city 
government became more and more enthusiastic about this 
evaluation process. There was also considerable national 
attention paid to the Tacoma effort. And, by July, 1973, 
a Policy Advisory Team was set up to see if a similar 
technique could be worked out for evaluating the whole 
city budget in the future. 
The Program Management System staff has printed a 
booklet entitled "An Evaluation Process for the Selection 
of General Revenue Sharing Programs.!' It tells the com-
plete story of Tacoma's evaluation process for General 
Revenue Sharing. At one point in the booklet a general 
overview of the evaluation, selection and monitoring 
process is given. It is: 
In an effort to fairly and equitably judge pro-. 
gram proposals, a systematic evaluation process 
has been developed. Very generally, the process 
acts like this: 
1. The information on the application is 
reviewed by a Technical Evaluation Team utilizing 
a formal set of evaluation criteria in accordance 
with City Council policies. A numerical rating 
of each proposal will result. 
2. A Management Team will review the ratings 
and rankings and develop a recommended 'package' 
of programs to the City Manager. Individual 
program funding levels will be included as a 
part of this package. 
3. Subject to adjustments by the City Manager, 
the program recommendations will be submitted to 
the City Council for their action. All proposals, 
regardless of whether or not they are a part of 
the recommended package, will be submitted to the 
City Council. 
In addition to se1ecting.programs for revenue 
sharing funds, the City must hold itself re-
sponsible for monitoring the efforts of the 
operational programs. This monitoring effort 
includes a continuing awareness of the status 
of the program as it relates to achievement of 
objectives, compliance with work schedules, and 
fiscal management. While the City will assume 
a general or overall responsibility for monitor-
ing and evaluating all operational programs, 
the funded agencies must provide similar effort 4 
to keep track of and control their own programs. 
Because the Tacoma evaluation process is unique 
among the cities studied in this paper and perhaps 
unique in the nation, some further discussion of the 
details of the evaluation process would be valuable. 
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A great many details, however, need not be included in 
the text of this case study. Therefore, in Appendix A, 
there are a number of important explanatory documents 
which accurately detail the evaluation process. S A 
segment from the booklet describing the "Composition and 
Responsibilities of Principle Functioning Units" in the 
4Staff of the Program Management System, Tacoma, 
Washington, "An Evaluation Process for the Selection 
of General Revenue Sharing Programs," Tacoma, Washing-
ton, July, 1973, p. 3. 
SSpecifica11y, the reader should refer to "Details 
of Evaluation Process for Revenue Sharing Proposals," 
in Appendix A. 
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evaluation process and a chart from the booklet entitled 
"General Revenue Sharing Evaluation Process," are pre-
sented on the following pages as they help explain the 
basics of the evaluation process. 
The Tacoma City Council passed certain "Revenue 
Sharing Policies" that were to aid those involved in the 
evaluation process. They are as follows: 
1. Policy: Emphasize the importance of non-
recurring programs or expenditures in view of 
the presently established expiration date for 
the Revenue Sharing Program, and in recognition 
of the long term or permanent encumbrances 
associated with recurring programs. 
2. Policy: Recognize the value of expanding 
or improving already existing programs where 
such programs are recognized and accepted as 
necessary and effective. 
3. Policy: Strive to select programs which 
will result in maximum benefits from the invest-
ment dollar. 
4. Policy: Maintain a concern for citizen 
desires and opinions by selecting programs with 
which a maximum number of persons can identify 
and support. 
S. Policy: Consider programs which increase 
the level of operational efficiency of Tacoma 
government through improved management techniques, 
job skills and material. 
6. Policy: Expand the capabilities of the 
general fund for future program opportunities 
by meeting commitments to outstanding loans and 
encumbrances. 
7. Policy: Realize the importance of pro-
viding for new services and programs of recognized 
need or demonstrated value. 
8. Policy: Recognize that a fair and objective 
evaluation of all programs will aid the Council 
in making equitable decisions regarding potential 
programs and will enhance support of such decisions 
by participating agencies and the general public. 
9. Policy: In recognition of the concern for 
social and economic problems, strive to provide 
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1. Technical Evaluation Team -
a. Composition: 15 community representatives and 
15 city department staff members. The community 
representatives are appointed by the Mayor. City 
staff members are appointed by their respective 
department heads. 
b. Responsibilities: Review, evaluate and rate pro-
gram and. project proposals and make recommendations. 
2. Technical Evaluation Team Executive Committee -
a. Composition: Two city staff members and three 
community representatives selected by the technical 
evaluation team. 
b. Responsibilities: Serve with PMS staff to prepare 
recommended budget package for submission to pro-
gram management team. 
3. Program Management Team -
a. Composition: Department Directors. 
b. Responsibilities: Review PMS staff and technical 
evaluation team executive committee recommendations. 
Revise as required and submit to City Manager. 
4. City Manager -
a. Composition: Not applicable. 
b. Responsibilities: Review ranked program and pro-
ject proposals and recommendations and modify if 
appropriate. Make recommendations and submit as bud-
get package to the City Council for final action. 
5. City Council -
a. Composition: Not applicable. 
b. Responsibilities: Review ranked programs and pro-
ject proposals and recommendations and make final 
decisions regarding revenue sharing program funding. 
6. Program Management System Staff -
a. Composition: City staff under the Director of Pro-
gram Management System reporting to City Manager. 
b. Responsibilities: Review and summarize incoming 
project proposals. Prepare information packets for 
evaluation process. Summarize ratings with the as-
sistance of the technical evaluation executive com-
mittee and prepare budget package for program man-
agement team review. Perform other duties as re-
quired. 
Figure 2. Assignment of Responsibilities for Revenue 
Sharing. SOURCE: Stearns Wood, Program Management System, 
Tacoma, Washington, 1973. 
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Figure 3. Flow Chart Showing Revenue Sharing Evaluation Process in Tacoma, 
SOURCE: Stearns Wood, Program Management System, Tacoma, Washington, 1973. 
N 
t-' 
o 
for a cross-section of citizen needs through a 
mixture of p~ysical, social and economic pro-
grams. 
10. Policy: Provide for a contingency fund 
in recognition of emergency needs and future 
desirable programs, as well as for encumbrances 
resulting from possigle changes in State and 
Federal legislation. 
211 
Policy statements one through seven are used by the 
Technical Evaluation Team. Each of these statements has 
been assigned a weighted value in terms of their relative 
importance to each other, and are thusly used by the 
Technical Evaluation Team in the numerical ranking process 
of evaluating project proposals for the use of revenue 
sharing money. The booklet further explains that policy 
statements eight through ten do not apply to specific 
programs and are used to provide a general overview for 
all programs. 
Also in Appendix A is a "General Revenue Sharing 
Program Proposal Evaluation For~." This is the form used 
by the Technical Evaluation Team in the evaluation and 
rating of programs and project proposals. It can be seen 
by examining the document that the "Revenue Sharing Poli-
cies" just outlined are on the right hand side of the 
form. On the left hand side are certain "Program Eval-
uation Criteria". These, too were adopted by the City 
Council to aid those doing the evaluating. The reader 
6System Staff, "Evaluation Process", pp. 13-16. 
· I 
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is invited to review these statements in Appendix A, as 
they give a further dimension to the thoroughness of the 
Tacoma evaluation process as well as an indication of its 
complexity. 
Also included in Appendix A is a document indica-
ting the "Scoring Process for Revenue Sharing Proposal 
Evaluation." This document gives a further explanation 
of the numerical weighting aspect of the evaluation pro-
cess. 
Although we will discuss the point more fully later 
in the chapter, it is important to note that the Technical 
Evaluation Team was made up of fifteen Tacoma community 
representatives and fifteen city department members. The 
Mayor appointed the fifteen community representatives and 
was very careful that they were representative of the 
city in terms of socioeconomic status, occupation, race, 
ethnic group, sex and other such criteria. Another docu-
ment in Appendix A is entitled "Technical Team Evaluation 
Process Scores by Individual Program for Revenue Sharing." 
This document is the final compilation of program pro-
posals and the ratings and rankings given them by the 
Technical Evaluation Team. Numbers one through fifteen 
at the top of the chart are the fifteen community repre-
sentatives and numbers sixteen through thirty are the 
city department staff members. 
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The result of Tacoma's elaborate evaluation pro-
cess is the Appendix A item entitled, "Revenue Sharing 
Entitlement Period 3 and 4, Program Management Team, Rec-
ommended Budget, June 15, 1973". As you can see, the 
programs were finally ranked from one to sixty-three. 
Before this final document was drawn up it was clear to 
the Technical Evaluation Team Executive Committee that 
all sixty-three programs could not be funded at the sug-
gested funding level within the existing General Revenue 
funds. The Executive Committee went through all the 
program proposals again and looked for (1) program dupli-
cations, (2) what they considered to be non-budgetary 
requests, and (3) legal problems. They went over the 
original applications and talked to applicants as well. 
They finally made three recommendations to the Program 
Management Team and later, in process, to the City Council. 
The Program Management Team could choose one of these 
recommendations as a means of deciding how many and which 
of the evaluated and ranked programs could be funded with 
General Revenue Sharing monies. The Technical Evaluation 
Team Executive Council suggested: 
(1) Taking and funding programs until they run 
out, about through program number 40. 
(2) Making cuts and adjustments in the first 
40 programs based on the above three points and 
take the extra approximately $600,000 and use it 
so the overall list of programs funded would 
more correctly match the Council's earlier guide-
line that they equally distribute funds among 
physical, social and economic priorities. The 
original ranking showed that the first 40 pro-
grams were mainly physical and economic and only 
a few social programs. Also, funding 50 rather 
than 40 programs is thus possible and is suggest-
ed. 
(3) Going with the first 40 programs as ranked, 
reviewed and revised, and give the extra $600,000 
that has been developed to the Department of Hu-
man Development and let th,m decide which social 
programs are to be funded. 
The Program Management Team carefully evaluated 
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these recommendations and decided to adopt number three. 
They also decided that some money should be left in re-
serve in case the State does not come through with needed 
funds for the City next year. Their final recommendation 
is embodied in the Revenue Sharing Entitlement Period 
3 and 4 document referred to above which is located in 
Appendix A. 
In September of 1973 this final document was pre-
sented to the Tacoma City Council. The Council accept-
ed the document "generally." That is, they accepted 
the evaluation and ranking "process" but decided they 
would fund the programs one at a time on a "first ready" 
basis. According to Stearns Wood, Assistant Program 
Management Systems Director, this means that the programs 
that are in the first fifty ranks will be funded as soon 
as they are taken under the umbrella of a city department 
and their program is finally drawn up in accord with the 
7 Wood, Interview. 
~ . 
guidelines of that department (environmental impact 
studies and so forth). The program will then go to the 
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Program Management Team, to the City Manager, and finally 
to the City Council for final approval. In essence, the 
Council decided to reserve the right to adjust the rank-
ings and funding levels of programs as it saw fit. 8 Ex-
act1y what this says about Tacoma's evaluation process 
is difficult to assess until the Council is finished pass-
ing judgment. It is clear, however, that the first fifty 
programs are in the order they are in because of the input 
of a wide range of citizens as well as city staff person-
ne1. Tacoma did include its citizens in the revenue shar-
ing decision-making process, going out of its way to de-
ve10p a special mechanism for this purpose. No matter 
what the Council finally decides, their range of choices 
and alternatives has been determined by that mechanism. 
II. THE POLITICS OF REVENUE SHARING IN TACOMA: 
HOW CITY OFFICIALS VIEW REVENUE SHARING 
As with each case study, we will now examine how 
city officials interpret the original intention of fed-
eral revenue sharing, how they feel about what their city 
has done with its revenue sharing funds, what their feel-
ings are about they city's revenue sharing decision-making 
process, and how they view the entire question of fed-
eral aid to cities. At the end of this, and each case 
study chapter, certain preliminary conclusions will be 
offered on that city's revenue sharing experience and 
how it addresses itself to the goals and fears raised 
by the New Federalism outlined in Chapter Ill. 
Views of City Officials on the Original Intention 
of Federal Revenue Sharing 
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Those interviewed in Tacoma generally agree that the 
intention of General Revenue Sharing was that the funds 
were to be used by the city as "new money." The new money 
was to go for programs and services the city could not 
previously afford to fund, but which city officials felt 
needed to be provided. 
Regina Glenn is Manpower Planning Director in 
Tacoma's Mayor's Office. She has spent a great deal of 
time studying the effect of revenue sharing on manpower 
programs already established by various levels of govern-
ment. She has been particularly active in drawing up 
Tacoma's evaluation process. She feels that General Rev-
enue Sharing funds offer an opportunity for Tacoma to do 
some new things, but she agrees with city staff and City 
Council recommendations that funds should not go for re-
curring expenses. The difficulty is, however, that recent 
cutbacks in federal social service programs have made her 
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and others in Tacoma government feel that General Revenue 
Sharing funds might have to go to shore up those cutback 
programs. She reads the guidelines of the Act as suggest-
ing that some General Revenue Sharing funds should go for 
a "maintenance of efforts" which can be interpreted to 
mean that the federal government wants the cities to pick 
up programs it is cutting back as they wait for Special 
Revenue Sharing. Mrs. Glenn argues that this may be nec-
essary but that it would certainly get in the way of the 
city being able to do much "new" with the funds. Mrs. 
Glenn feels that General Revenue Sharing funds should 
not go for property tax relief. If the revenue sharing 
program is dropped in a few years, the taxpayers would 
have their property taxes upped again and, of course, 
they would not like it. She believes that if the city is 
to spend the money mainly on programs of its own design 
or many previously established federal programs that have 
been cut off, there should be a balance of spending on 
physical, economic and social programs. 9 
Mrs. Glenn's sentiments on the intention of rev-
enue sharing are largely reflected by Stearns Wood, 
Assistant Director of the Office of Management and Bud-
get in Tacoma. Mr. Wood is at the heart of the Program 
9Interview with Regina Glenn, Manpower Planning 
Director, Office of the Mayor, Tacoma, Washington, 
24 July 1973. 
Management System and as such has worked for some time 
on the whole revenue sharing issue for the city. He 
felt strongly that Tacoma had no preconceived notions 
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about what should be done with its revenue sharing money, 
but hoped it could be used to benefit areas of city con-
cern previously financially neglected. City officials 
did not want the money to go for recurring expenses or 
into the budget's general fund. On the other hand, Wood 
agreed with others interviewed that Tacoma did not want 
to become too dependent upon General Revenue Sharing 
funds, either. The innovative programs were to be such 
that they would not put too much drain on city funds if 
revenue sharing should stop. 
Unlike Mrs. Glenn, who felt the Revenue Sharing Act 
implied a justified and even expected use of General 
Revenue Sharing funds was to pick up cutback federal 
programs, Mr. Wood suggested that it was the purpose of 
Special Revenue Sharing to fund those cutback categorical 
grant programs, not General Revenue Sharing funds. The 
intense pressure being put on the city to spend General 
Revenue Sharing funds on cutback federal programs is 
really an encroachment on the "freedom" to use General 
Revenue Sharing funds as new city money for new progra~s. 
Tacoma's evaluation process, however, allows for any 
program supported by any interested individual or group 
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to apply for General Revenue Sharing funds and to be 
evaluated by the criteria and persons described in the 
first part of this chapter. Mr. Wood was careful to point 
out that although the intent of General Revenue Sharing 
was, in his opinion, to be new money for the city and not 
to be a substitute for reduced federal funds, Tacoma's 
evaluation process allows those evaluating and ultimately 
the City Council to decide where the money should go. He 
points out further that many previously funded categorical 
grant programs are in the top half of the rankings result-
ing from the evaluation process. IO This sense of city 
responsibility for social services was widespread among 
those interviewed. Mayor Gordon Johnson agreed with Mr. 
Wood that even if General Revenue Sharing was not intended 
as substitute money for cutback federal social programs, 
if the programs are dOing some good in the city, they 
should be funded from whatever sources of funds the city 
can find - including General Revenue Sharing funds. 
Mayor Johnson was quite outspoken in his criticism 
of federal cutbacks in Office of Economic Opportunity 
and Model Cities programs. He feels that American society 
has too long been negligent in aiding the less fortunate 
in a way that might substantially change their lives, and 
he particularly resents having to use General Revenue 
IOwoOd, Interview. 
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Sharing money as replacement money for the cutback federal 
programs. The Mayor clearly believed those programs were 
not to be cut back until Special Revenue Sharing was en-
acted. He feels, however, that the city has a definite 
responsibility to go beyond its traditional services into 
the social service field, and if General Revenue Sharing 
funds have to be used for this purpose, then he believes 
it is justified. He originally saw General Revenue Shar-
ing as new money that "was not intended to be substitute 
money for anything."ll 
The Tacoma City Manager would largely agree with his 
colleagues but he had a slightly different slant on why 
the original intention of General Revenue Sharing would 
not be realized in Tacoma and elsewhere, also. William 
Donaldson is the Tacoma City Manager and he, too, believes 
General Revenue Sharing was supposed to be new money for 
the city to deal with problems it could not afford to 
deal with before. From his administrative point of view, 
he blames "politics" for getting in the way of his city 
perhaps not being able to do with revenue sharing what was 
intended. "Two things," he argues, "beyond Tacoma's con-
trol have gotten in the way." 'l'he first is the State Leg-
islature's attitude. The State Legislature seems to feel 
the city is well off financially now that it has General 
IlJohnson, Interview. 
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Revenue Sharing funds. He points out that the legislature 
has cut in half its subsidy to the city's transit system 
(about $475,000). They have also changed the reassess-
ment of property valuation that severely cuts back city 
revenue from the property tax. He further points out 
that the legislature has changed the firemen's and police-
men's pension situation to where they want the city to pay 
the unfunded liability of $400 million. "Now, when in-
flation is worst, the legislature is renigging on some of 
its aid. This is exactly what is not supposed to happen 
in the use of General Revenue Sharing funds." Donaldson 
says that this situation means that Tacoma now faces a 
budget deficit of about $1.5 million and an easy way to 
balance the budget would be with General Revenue Sharinq 
funds, "but Tacoma is not doing this." Like the others 
interviewed, the City Hanager wants to use the money, if 
at all possible, for non-traditional budget expenses or 
to take up the slack from state and federal aid cutbacks. 
Secondly, Mr. Donaldson blames the Nixon Administra-
tion. "With Watergate and the shape of the economy, the 
Nixon Administration is in so much trouble now that alot 
of people are forgetting now that General Revenue Sharing 
is just part of a total program." Part One of the program 
is going great guns, that is, cutting out all the cate-
gorical grants. "The 'cut off' part is working but the 
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'come on' part is not." For example, look at Special Rev-
enue Sharing. "General Revenue Sharing is caught in the 
middle and it puts the city in the bind of being pushed 
to use General Revenue Sharing for the purposes for which 
categorical grants and Special Revenue Sharing were intend-
ed.,,12 
Although it is important to know what city officials 
in Tacoma interpret the original intention of General Rev-
enue Sharing to be, it is necessary to emphasize that 
those officials created an evaluation mechanism for decid-
ing where the General Revenue Sharing money should go that 
was mainly guided by the City Council statement that there 
should be a balance between economic, physical and social 
programs funded. This guideline and the whole evaluation 
process imply that the money can go for virtually anything 
put high in the ranks by the evaluation process. The eval-
uation process itself seems to conform most to Mrs. Glenn's 
opinion that General Revenue Sharing funds should go for 
new programs but money can also go for maintaining cut-
back federal programs. Such an expenditure would clear-
ly be within the guidelines of the Act itself and is not 
the abrogation of the Act that so many of those inter-
viewed suggested. Of course, Mrs. Glenn was reacting to 
l2Interview with William Donaldson, Tacoma City 
Manager, Tacoma, Washington, 25 July 1973. 
the letter of the Act while those who felt differently 
seemed to be reacting to its spirit. 
Views of City Officials on How Tacoma Allocated 
Its General Revenue Sharing Funds 
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As we have seen, the City Council has not made any 
final decisions on which of the fifty top-ranked programs 
it will fund. The Council has said it will fund the first 
fifty programs on a "first ready" basis. All of those 
interviewed agreed that the Council guideline of a mix 
between social, economic and physical programs was a good 
mix and they assumed the final appropriations would be so 
mixed. It was further assumed that the Department of Hu-
man Resources would make "ready" its decisions to the 
Council on which of the social programs ranked should be 
funded to bring the social programs into equivalency with 
the economic and physical programs. 
As we have seen, some revenue sharing money was a1-
located before the evaluation process was put into effect. 
Those interviewed said that the money needed to be allo-
cated as it was and they felt the amount going for crea-
tion of the Department of Human Development was an es-
pecially useful expenditure. Mrs Glenn states that "that 
project would not have been possible with adequate staff 
without revenue sharing funds.,,13 The City Manager said 
13 Glenn, Interview. 
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the Department was created in order to prepare the city 
for the administration of Special Revenue Sharing, which 
they thought would be fast arriving. The hope was not to 
let the city get trapped the way Model Cities did by 
giving money "to the guy who yelled the most." The city 
also wanted to make sure it did a better job of adminis-
tering social programs than did the Community Action Pro-
gram. At this stage, the Department is evaluating social 
service programs going on in the city to see which should 
be funded with Special Revenue Sharing funds and admin-
istered by the city. While Mr. Donaldson did not feel 
General Revenue Sharing funds should go for support of 
cutback federal programs unless absolutely necessary, he 
does feel the creation of this department was a worth-
while use of General Revenue Sharing funds. 
As we have seen, Mr. Donaldson did not want to use 
General Revenue Sharing money for balancing Tacoma's bud-
get, but he worried that a fiscal emergency might arise 
and General Revenue Sharing funds might be so needed. He 
therefore hoped the City Council would adopt a priority 
system in terms of the ranked p~ograms instead of speci-
fically funding any program in case the city finds it 
needs General Revenue Sharing to balance the budget. 
This would only mean the city would not be able to provide 
funding as far down the list of rankings as it might 
r 
~, 
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otherwise want to do. As of September, 1973, the City 
Manager was saying the city faced a deficit of from 
$1.7 to $2.7 million and he wanted the Council to start 
thinking about using revenue sharing funds to deal with 
it. stearns Wood, however, reported at the end of 
September that the Council has not decided to use rev-
enue sharing funds to balance the budget and will fund 
the top fifty ranked programs on the "first ready" basis 
explained earlier. 
Views of City Officials on the Tacoma Revenue 
Sharing Decision-Making Process 
Those interviewed in Tacoma were very proud of the 
decision-making process used in their city for the allo-
cation of revenue sharing funds. They felt confident that 
the guidelines of the Revenue Sharing Act and of the City 
Council were broad enough that those engaged in the pro-
gram evaluation process could use considerable discretion 
in deciding how Tacoma should use the federal aid. Mr. 
Donaldson, the City Manager, mentioned that in a recent 
meeting he had with Mr. Graham Watt, Director of the Of-
fice of Revenue Sharing, United States Department of the 
Treasury, Watt said he felt Tacoma's evaluation process 
was a very good idea and that it was the only one of its 
type in the United States, to his knowledge. 
Mayor Johnston felt the evaluation process was cer-
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tainly the most sophisticated in the State. He goes 
along with others interviewed in considering himself the 
prime mover behind development of.the citizen participa-
tion scheme. The Mayor explains that he had a previous 
experience with citizen participation in local decision-
making with the Manpower Area Planning Council funded 
through the United States Department of Labor. In this 
experience, he noted how capable citizens on the Council 
were in making hard decisions and confronting special 
interests. He therefore became confident of the ability 
of ordinary citizens and decided they should play a sig-
nificant role in the revenue sharing decision-making pro-
cess. He is careful to point out that those participating 
were not local politicos, but average citizens who had 
not previously spent much, if any, time in politics or 
government. For example, he said he called the Superin-
tendent of the Tacoma Public Schools and asked for a rec-
ommendation on who could serve on the evaluation team 
and the Superintendent recommended a vice principal of a 
local high school. The Mayor did a similar thing in seek-
ing a representative from among the city's private 
schools. He also called the Central Labor Council and 
they suggested a local barber, which pleased the Mayor, 
because he felt persons in that profession had a feeling 
for what was on the people's minds. He called around, in 
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other words, and got persons from many walks of life in 
the city.14 As it turned out, the citizen component in 
the evaluation process came from all geographical areas 
of the city, from various age groups, races, occupations, 
both sexes and different income groups. There was a 
Chicano, an Indian and a Black from the citizen group, 
along with three people in the city staff group who were 
minorities. Mrs. Glenn, herself black, said she felt 
there was "an adequate minority representation" in the 
evaluation process. She said this in light of the fact 
that about six percent of Tacoma's population is minority:5 
In the opinions of those interviewed, the openness of the 
system is further evidenced by the fact that any individ-
ual, organization or group could present a program to the 
evaluation team for consideration for revenue sharing 
funding. 
The Mayor was particularly interested in the fact 
that, although social programs were in the minority in 
the top forty rankings, the citizen component in the eval-
uation process did rank social programs higher than econ-
omic and physical programs fairly consistently. To the 
Mayor this meant that the city staff may not have a feel-
ing for what the people of Tacoma really want. In order 
14Johnston, Interview. 
lSGlenn, Interview. 
228 
to see to it that the citizens in the evaluation process 
truly represent the wishes of the city's citizens, 
Johnston believes the citizen component in the evaluation 
process should change every year. He believes this is 
also a good idea because " ••• over time a large number of 
people will have become involved in the decision-making 
process and will have sympathy with the complexities and 
efforts of city government." Tacoma, then, intends on 
using this or a similar citizen involvement evaluation 
for the allocation of each year's revenue sharing money. 
This will apply to Special Revenue Sharing as well. l6 
Both Mayor Johnston and Regina Glenn believed that 
the War on Poverty programs of the Johnson Administra-
tion and the Hodel Cities program have had considerable 
effect in politicizing Tacoma's citizens, particularly 
the disadvantaged and the minorities. Mrs. Glenn points 
out, however, that Community Action Program representa-' 
tives were deliberately excluded from representation on 
the Technical 5valuation Team because they are already 
very active on their Community Action Program boards and 
they are heard at all levels of city government so much 
already. She re-emphasized the Mayor's wish that the cit-
izen component in the evaluation process be average citi-
zens and not representatives from any special interest. 
16JOhnston, Interview. 
--
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She further pointed out, however, that Community Action 
Program representatives have been at all the Council 
hearings on revenue sharing and, of course, they made pro-
gram suggestions for the dispursement of revenue sharing 
funds to be considered by the Technical Evaluation Team 
and finally by the City Council. A member of the Board 
of Trustees of the local Community Action Program organ-
ization herself, Mrs. Glenn feels that "CAP clients may 
be better off if CAP's stay quiet because, although they 
have been proponents for their clients, they have been 
poor administrators; ~odel Cities, too. Actually, ~ 
spite of CAP's, they city is using some of its money and 
General Revenue Sharing funds for social services."l? 
She goes on to say that many of the social programs pro-
posed for funding in the evaluation process were proposed 
by other than Office of Economic Opportunity or Model 
Cities groups and that neither of these programs had any-
thing to do with setting up the evaluation process. "It 
was the Mayor's initiative that did it. He did not want 
the turmoil of OEO. He wanted citizens to participate and 
develop specific programs.,,18 
The Mayor added that another reason he did not feel 
it appropriate for Office of Economic Opportunity repre-
l?Glenn, Interview. 
18Ibid • 
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sentatives to sit on the Technical Evaluation Team is 
that many of their programs go outside city limits and 
there is virtually no communication between Tacoma and 
Pierce County on social service matters:"(The) city has 
consistent trouble with the county because the Commis-
sioners are very conservative and only inteLested in leg-
islation that will increase their power and not so inter-
ested in people's welfare and new social programs."l9 
It is clear that those interviewed in Tacoma were 
very enthusiastic about the evaluation process that was 
developed for revenue sharing. Mrs. Glenn points out 
that the Revenue Sharing Act itself only requires the 
city's regular budget process be used for the allocation 
of revenue sharing funds, but Tacoma went beyond and this 
has now caused the city and many of its citizens to want 
to modify Tacoma's regular budget process. Mrs. Glenn 
is now Chairman of a team that is reviewing the whole 
budget process of the city with a notion to use the Gen-
eral Revenue Sharing decision-making process, or some-
thing like it, in regular budget process in the future. 
The main point, she feels, is that there ought to be a 
citizen component in the budget process that goes beyond 
the open hearing process. As of now, the City Manager and 
the department heads review the department budgets and 
19Johnston, Interview. 
approve or disapprove those budgets and present that 
package to the City Council. However, because of the 
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impact of the General Revenue Sharing evaluation process, 
the citizens have asked why they cannot participate in 
the whole budget process, rather than just revenue shar-
ing. So the General Revenue Sharing evaluation process 
has had great impact on the overall decision-making pro-
cess for the city's budget. As Head of the Budget Pro-
cess Review Committee, Mrs. Glenn is recommending to 
the City Council the following: 
(1) That fifteen citizens be chosen from the com-
munity at large by geographical area, occupation, 
education, civil organization, social service de-
livery agencies, industry, and citizens at large, 
to serve on the budget review staff. 
(2) That they should rotate with and be equal 
to the number of department directors sitting in 
review of the city's budget plus the finance dir-
ector; e.g. three department directors, three 
citizens plus the finance director. Thus, seven 
people would look at each department budget and 
make final recommendations to the City Council. 
(3) That Citizens are to be appointed by the 
Mayor and Council according to the above criteria. 
Also, the 2btizen component should be changed 
each year. 
As of this writing, this proposal is still under discus-
sion by the City Council, and Mrs. Glenn expects a pro-
posal exactly like, or similar to, the Budget Process Re-
view Committee's to be adopted. 
Although those interviewed were enthusiastic about 
20Glenn, Interview. 
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the revenue sharing evaluation process, they did not think 
it perfect. Stearns Wood was careful to point out that 
the Council could abolish the entire mechanism if it want-
ed to, but he thought that unlikely. He did feel, however, 
that some modifications of the process were likely for 
next year, that is, for the revenue sharing deliberations 
whether for General Revenue Sharing or Special Revenue 
Sharing. For example, he feels some changes are needed 
in the evaluation form itself because some questions 
asked of the evaluation team required the expertise of a 
budget specialist which the citizens were not. Also, for 
those applying for revenue sharing funds, he feels that 
perhaps there should have been a pre-application seminar 
to clear up legal difficulties that might arise in some 
applications~ The seminar would be helpful in aiding ap-
plicants on how to fill out their application correctly, 
21 too. 
Views of City Officials on Federal Aid to Cities 
In terms of federal aid to cities generally, those 
interviewed in Tacoma were enthusiastic about block grants. 
The primary categorical grant that Mayor Johnston cited 
as beneficial to Tacoma in recent years was Model Cities: 
"(I)t is tragic that Nixon cut back this program before it 
really had a chance to get going." Whether Model Cities 
2lwood , Interview. 
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is a block grant or a categorical grant is open to inter-
pretation, with most federal aid experts feeling it is a 
block grant. The Mayor is correct, however, in suggest-
ing that Model Cities is a more directed form of federal 
aid than the sum of General Revenue Sharing. Johnston 
feels that categorical grants, as a whole, are drawn up 
to satisfy the needs of big eastern cities and not cities 
like Tacoma with different needs. Thus, block grants and 
their flexibility are better. The Mayor feels that with 
categorical grants the city has to deal with "rip-off 
artists" but with block grants like General Revenue Shar-
ing that allow for the creation of a broad-based citizen 
group along with city staff doing the evaluation of pro-
grams, "you have the people making decisions ••• with such 
a process it means that one element of the city is not 
deciding all.,,22 
City Manager Donaldson agrees that the needs of one 
city are often not the needs of another and that the flex-
ibility of block grants is good. He would even take less 
federal aid in order to get the discretion of a block 
grant like General Revenue Sharing. He adds that although 
some cities are probably more able than others to deal 
with block grants, he feels Tacoma is very able to handle 
the responsibility. He sees no danger to civil rights or 
22Johnston, Interview. 
~-. 
I 
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other "well-established" national programs by giving dis-
cretion to the cities that General Revenue Sharing gives. 
Donaldson did fear two potential eventualities, however. 
First, he fears that the Nixon Administration will con-
tinue to develop· formula interpretations that will favor 
suburbs. He fears the President may come to use revenue 
sharing as a political tool to shore up Republican 
strength in those areas. A.lready, he feels, as former 
City Manager of Scottsdale, Arizona, that suburban com-
munities have money from General Revenue Sharing "coming 
out their ears." Secondly, he fears that too many cities 
may use the General Revenue Sharing funds unwisely, in-
efficiently, or illegally. If they do, it will certainly 
23 doom the program. 
Mrs. Glenn echoed the City Manager's opinion on 
this matter and added that although block grants may not 
be best for all cities, they should continue to those 
"that have shown a real ability and success with them. 
Politics may not work that way, but ideally the federal 
government should give to those who prove they know how to 
deal with it. As in any business, you should receive ac-
cording to your performance.,,24 Mrs. Glenn shared with the 
others interviewed the consensus that Tacoma has done a 
23Donaldson, Interview. 
24Glenn, Interview. 
r··· 
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particularly outstanding job with its General Revenue 
Sharing responsibilities. 
III. TACOMA: SUB-CONCLUSIONS 
The New Federalism stated that "power, funds and 
responsibility" would flow from Washington, D.C., to the 
"states, localities and the people." In the case of 
Tacoma, there is no question but that money and responsi-
bility have come to the city with General Revenue Sharing. 
As time goes on, the amount of money may be less than the 
city has received in categorical grants, but as we saw, 
some city officials still prefer the added responsibility. 
Tacoma has taken the responsibility very seriously and 
has developed an elaborate evaluation process for deciding 
how to distribute its General Revenue Sharing funds. Of 
all the cities examined in this study, it is the author's 
opinion that Tacoma has gone the farthest in recognizing 
the added responsibility of the General Revenue Sharing 
block grant and has planned thoughtfully for how to deal 
with it for the maximum benefit of the entire community. 
But does the city have more power? Again, if we 
define power as the command over the allocation of re-
sources (money as a fundamental resource), then Tacoma 
has power in the sense it has the "new" General Revenue 
Sharing money and can decide, by whatever means it wants 
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pursuant at least to regular budget processes, how to al-
locate that money. But, as we saw in Seattle, that power 
is compromised by increased fiscal demands from inflation, 
rising labor costs, state aid cutbacks and the cutbacks in 
federal categorical grants. Therefore, the "net gain in 
power" may be quite small. 
The New Federalism also suggests that American gov-
ernment will become more decentralized as cities start de-
veloping their own priorities and start determining the 
best methods for meeting their social needs. The Tacoma 
City Council guidelines of the State and Local Fiscal 
Assistance Act of 1972 leave wide discretion to the Tacoma 
evaluation process to do just that. The Council wanted 
the final rankings to include equal numbers of social, 
economic and physical programs and it appears the Council 
will remain true to its own guideline in its final appro-
vals. But the extent to which the city can really set 
its own priorities and meet its social needs, even if it 
has taken the responsibility of stating them, depends ul-
timately on the funds available. Tacoma's total General 
Revenue Sharing funds are not large and, again, what can 
be done with them is largely determined by the factors 
mentioned above that are beyond the city's control. But 
Tacoma seems to welcome the opportunity to establish its 
priorities and its social needs. Those in authority only 
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wish they had more money, especially Special Revenue Shar-
ing, and fewer "outside" restrictions that compromise the 
"liberating" -effect of General Revenue Sharing. 
It should be remembered that Mr. Nathan of the 
Nixon Administration specifically suggested that human 
service programs and community service programs were to 
be local responsibilities as part of the "sorting out" 
process in the decentralization aspect of the New Federal-
ism. The Tacoma City Council seems to recognize this 
responsibility in its guidelines to the Technical Evalua-
tion Team calling for the balance in social, economic 
and physical programs. It is only implied here, however. 
Those interviewed clearly believed that the funds for the 
bulk of human and community programs are to come from 
Special Revenue Sharing. The city does, however, seem to 
accept the responsibility for funding such programs on a 
temporary basis with General Revenue Sharing money until 
Special Revenue Sharing or some other federal or state 
funds become available. 
Tacoma seems to be taking special precautions to 
see to it that certain responsibilities for citizens, 
assumed by various levels of government, are not lost in 
the shuffle as we move from categorical grants to a reli-
ance on block grants. As we have seen, those interviewed 
feel that worthwhile federal programs should be maintained 
by the city if the federal government will no longer 
fund them. But which programs are worthwhile? To be 
sure, this has become a local responsibility with all 
238 
the accompanying hazards. In the case of Tacoma, however, 
a serious effort has been made to set up a Department of 
Human Development to evaluate federal categorical pro-
grams in the social services area to see which should 
be funded and to what extent under Special Revenue Shar-
ing. Without Special Revenue Sharing, or an alternate 
source of funds, many programs would certainly be lost 
in the shuffle because the city could simply not afford 
to fund them no matter how committed its officials might 
be to the liberal goals of national elites. 
Has General Revenue Sharing brought government 
closer to people in Tacoma? In any political system, 
"the few" ultimately decide and "the many" make what 
input they can. Tacoma went out of its way to augment 
the regular input devices (open hearings, lobbying, 
elected representatives in the City Council) to bring 
the city's decision-making process on revenue sharing 
closer to the people. The City Council will ultimately 
decide what is to be done with the city's General Revenue 
Sharing funds', but the fifteen "John Q. Public" citizens, 
deliberately chosen because they were not political acti-
vists, have had an impact on the ranking of programs 
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the Council has decided to choose from in making its 
final decisions. As suggested in other places in this 
study, if a governmental unit does not go out of its 
way to include citizens in its decision-making processes, 
many citizens will be left out because they are apathetic, 
alienated, or unable to participate for various reasons. 
The Tacoma decision-making process with respect to 
revenue sharing was "open" in more than the traditional 
input sense. 
There was an important element of Jeffersonian 
individualism in the Tacoma experience. "The people" 
who benefitted in Tacoma from General Revenue Sharing 
were individuals who participated in the evaluation pro-
cess. The city government as a collectivity and various 
interest groups also participated, of course, but to a 
far greater extent than any other city studied, Tacoma 
went a long way toward bringing government closer to the 
people as individual citizens. It is particularly signi-
ficant that these individuals were representative of a 
broad cross section of the community. Tacoma, therefore, 
has defined "the people" as both individuals and groups 
of individuals that participated in, and benefitted from 
General Revenue Sharing. 
A goal of the New Federalism is that various levels 
of government should have responsibility for certain 
governmental functions. As we have seen, those inter-
viewed in Tacoma, and the results of their revenue 
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sharing process so far, indicate that the city is willing 
to take over human and community service responsibilities. 
However, to really do so, the city needs more money. 
This means that the responsibilities will never be the 
city's alone, because it will always be dependent upon 
federal funding to do the job. By setting up its 
Department of Human Development, however, Tacoma sees 
its administrative and evaluative responsibilities in 
that area, but acknowledges its financial dependence on 
the federal government to do a meaningful job of provid-
ing services. 
There was no indication in the Tacoma study that 
City Officials feel the city will gain a measure of 
strength from revenue sharing through the New Federalism 
to where it could develop any real independence from 
either State or Federal governments. As we have seen 
the "power" gained by the money and added responsibili.:.. 
ties of revenue sharing are partly, even largely, 
negated by other fiscal and political realities. The 
amount of money so far is also too small to give the 
city the "independence." Revenue sharing or no, the city 
is still the legal creature of the state and the state 
retains many options that can negate any possible challenge 
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the city may render to the power of the state. As we 
have seen in the case of Tacoma, part of the reason it 
feels so little new power from its revenue sharing money 
is the possible need to have to use those monies to shore 
up programs the State Legislature has cut from Tacoma 
thinking the city was now '!fat" with revenue sharing 
money. 
There is considerable evidence that Tacoma citizens 
are using both the traditional input mechanisms and the 
new evaluation process to gain revenue sharing funding 
at the city level because of the frustration they now 
find from federal cutbacks in categorical grants. As 
we have seen, the citizen component in the evaluation 
process ranked social programs high in terms of priority 
for revenue sharing funds. It can be assumed that they 
were certainly aware of federal cutbacks in categorical 
programs if only because of the programs submitted to 
them in those categories by social agencies for evaluation., 
Those interviewed repeatedly pointed out how politicized 
many citizens had become due to War on Poverty and Model 
Cities programs and indicated officials from those pro-
grams submitted program proposals for evaluation and 
attended open hearings on revenue sharing. 
Those interviewed in Tacoma were unanimous in say-
ing the revenue sharing evaluation process was set up 
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using nonpolitical activist citizens as half the Technical 
Evaluation Team in a deliberate effort to avoid the in-
fluence of local elites in that aspect of the decision-
making process. Mayor Johnston was particularly cogni-
zant of the need to get average citizens to serve on the 
Team. He genuinely wanted the average man's input. Cer-
tainly local power interests will have their chance to 
influence final revenue sharing decisions by whatever in-
fluence they exercise over the City Council, but in terms 
of national priorities versus local priorities, Tacoma 
went out of its way to see that the influence of local 
power interests can be balanced by the input of average 
"representative" citizens. \ve have seen that those in 
City Hall are willing to use General Revenue Sharing 
funds to support War on Poverty and r'lodel Cities programs 
although all do not agree this was the intention of Gen-
eral Revenue Sharing. They also felt the support should 
be temporary until other funds for social and community 
programs arrived for the city. It does not sound as if 
Tacoma is abandoning national priorities as they mani-
fested themselves in the late 1960's in categorical grants 
for the poor and minorities. This conclusion may be a 
bit premature, however, because a1tho~gh the City Council 
has called for social programs to be funded at the same 
level as economic and physical programs, we must wait 
and see which programs the Council ultimately does fund 
to reach any final conclusions. 
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Another national priority in recent years has been 
trying to politicize the poor and the minorities into 
permanent activist groups. In Tacoma, we have seen that 
Office of Economic Opportunity and Model Cities groups 
are active in the revenue sharing decision-making pro-
cess and the Tacoma evaluation process seems a further 
commitment to the national elite goal of political in-
clusion of the disadvantaged. 
The guidelines established by the Tacoma City 
Council seem an effort to maintain a governmental re-
sponsibility for worthwhile programs no matter what level 
of government might once have sponsored the program. The 
establishment of a Department of Human Development seems 
to say the city recognizes collective action to solve 
social problems is part of the responsibility of govern-
ment in America today. The need to solve social problems 
through public resources has been a goal of government 
for many years, as explained and examined in Chapter III. 
There is no indication that local power interests in 
Tacoma are trying to subvert that national goal. Again, 
final Council action is needed to verify that statement, 
but at this point the opinions and actions of City Hall 
officials support it. The thing that seems to be holding 
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back Tacoma from further collective action to help its 
disadvantaged citizens is not a lack of commitment, but 
a lack of funds. It should be noted, however, that in the 
programs now ranked one through fifty, the programs in the 
"bottom twenty-five" are those most related to social ser-
vices. It is still up to the Department of Human Develop-
ment to suggest to the Council more of the lower ranked 
social programs for higher ranking and thus funding. 
Tacoma city officials interpret the guidelines to 
General Revenue Sharing as very broad. Mrs. Glenn even 
felt the Revenue Sharing Act provided that General Revenue 
Sharing Funds could be used, and even should be used, to 
continue federal programs that might be cut back. There 
was no indication that those interviewed felt General 
Revenue Sharing needed more guidelines to preserve what 
progress had been made in this country for the poor and 
disadvantaged. They did not feel the cause of civil 
rights was jeopardized by giving block grants with few 
guidelines to the city to allocate. As was the case in 
Seattle, city officials seem to feel those in power in 
their city CQuld not use the new federal money to set 
back what progress has been made in civil rights and re-
lated areas. It is true, however, that interest .. group 
liberalism was not weakened in Tacoma with the arrival of 
General Revenue Sharing. Interest groups lobbied the city 
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bureaucracy, the Mayor's Office and the City Council for 
part of the General Revenue Sharing pie. The city, how-
ever, took the special precaution of establishing the 
evaluation process that was intended to make sure special 
interests did not dominate the decision-making process 
and that the "little man" was heard. It is interesting 
that the elaborate guidelines discussed in the early part 
of this chapter which were established by the City Council 
to direct the Technical Evaluation Team were intended to 
give a measure of planning and purpose to the use of the 
General Revenue Sharing funds. Lowi's fear that block 
grants and categorical grants tend to encumber the causes 
of planning and justice in this country because of the 
interplay of interest groups and government after legis-
lation has been passed may have been dealt with in Tpcoma 
because of the direction the City Council has given, after 
the federal legislation was passed, to the use of General 
Revenue Sharing money. 
Lowi points to the "autonomous city" and suggests 
it is a further handicap to achieving the rule of law in 
America because it is a decentralization of the political 
system beyond the original federal structure. On the face 
of it, General-Revenue Sharing monies going to Tacoma 
would seem to strengthen its "autonomy", but as we have 
seen, there are many factors, fiscal and political, that 
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take away substantially from that autonomy. Yet whatever 
measure of increased power and discretion is given the 
city through revenue sharing is a further decentraliza-
tion of the American political system and the Tacoma ex-
perience does not suggest that city has not been somewhat 
"strengthened" by the new funds. As would be expected, 
those interviewed felt the city, more than the state or 
federal governments, best knew how to handle urban prob-
lems and did not see decentralization as a handicap to 
achieving justice in America. Tacoma city officials seem 
to recognize the political encumbrances to solving prob-
lems but mainly see financial limitations as keeping them 
from getting the job done. 
CHAPTER VI 
GENERAL REVENUE SHARING IN PORTLAND 
I. CITY FINANCES AND REVENUE SHARING 
WHAT PORTLAND HAS DONE 
Portland, Oregon, is the largest urban center in 
the State of Oregon. As of the 1970 U.S. census, the pop-
ulation of Portland was 380,620 persons. l Unlike Seattle, 
which is a city dominated by one major industry, Portland 
is considered to be a center of diversified commercial 
and industrial enterprises. The city has witnessed an 
unemployment rate of about six percent in recent years 
due to a regional recession affecting the Pacific North-
west, but it is predicted that that rate should soon re-
turn to the three and one-half to four and one-half per-
cent rate that is average for Portland. 2 
General Revenue Sharing funds have been handled 
differently in Portland than in the other cities con-
tained in this study. Portland has taken its General 
Revenue Sharing funds and included them in the city's 
IThe 1972 World Almanac and Book of Facts, 
(New York: Newspaper Enterprise Association, Inc., 1972), 
p. 193. 
2"The City of Portland, Oregon, 1973-74, Approved 
Budget", 16 May 1973, p. 119. 
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General Fund. Because of this, in order to understand the 
general fiscal situation in Portland and the role played 
by General Revenue Sharing, it would be useful to examine 
the resources and expenditures for the City of Portland's 
General Fund for 1973-74, which is contained on the follow-
ing page in Table V. 
General Revenue Sharing, therefore, accounts for 
12.3 percent of the total resources for Portland's Gen-
eral Fund for 1973-4. While not an extremely large amount 
of revenue, those interviewed in the city along with the 
Budget itself indicate that General Revenue Sharing has 
been an important factor both in the fiscal and policy 
making activities of the city this year. 
The story of General Revenue Sharing in Portland 
starts in 1972 when the City Council became aware of the 
need to prepare for the arrival of revenue sharing funds. 
The Council asked the Office of Management Services to 
survey the city bureaus soliciting what each felt its 
needs might be for revenue sharing funds. Those requests 
were then to be considered for funding either through the 
Accelerated Supplemental General Revenue Sharing Budget 
of Fiscal Year 1972-73 or through the City of Portland 
Budget of Fiscal Year 1973-74 where General Revenue Shar-
ing funds are to be considered as part of the General 
Fund. 
.. ,::t 
TABLE V 
SUMMARY OF TOTAL GENERAL FUND 
RESOURCES AND EXPENDITURES 
PORTLAND, OREGON 
1973-74 
Summary of Total Resources for the General Fund: 
Beginning Cash Balance 
Revenues (taxes, fees, etc.) 
Transfers from Federal Grants 
Transfers from Revenue Sharinga 
Transfers from Revenue Funds 
Transfers from Operating Funds 
Total General Fund Resources 
$ 3,131,979 
45,427,104 
10,885,028 
9,769,000 
6,927,054 
3.039,212 
$ 79,179,377 
Summary of Total Expenditures for the General Fund: 
Police 
Fire 
Parks 
Streets, Sidewalks, Structures, 
Sewer Maintenance 
Traffic Maintenance 
Streets, Sidewalks, Structures, 
Construction 
Building Safety 
Human Resources 
Administrative, Legislative and 
General Transport SerBices 
Transfer to Other Funds b 
General Operating Contingencies 
Other 
Total General Fund Expenditures 
and Requirements 
$ 15,500,000 
12,900,000 
7,400,000 
7,000,000 
2,500,000 
6,400,000 
1,600,000 
1,300,000 
17,200,000 
227,243 
7,140,000 
12.134 
$ 79,179,377 
SOURCE: "The City of Portland, Oregon, 1973-74, 
Approved Budget," 16 May 1973, pp. 122 and 124-5. 
aRevenue Sharing Funds account for 12.3 percent 
of General Fund revenues. 
bThe Portland City Budget Classifies these items 
as "requirements" rather than "expenditures" for the 
General Fund. 
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Near the end of 1972, the bureau requests were sub-
mitted to the Office of Management Services and they pre-
pared for the City Council a document entitled "Revenue 
Sharing Summary, December 1, 1972." In the report, the 
Office of Management Services tried to acquaint the 
Council with the probable effect of revenue sharing on 
the normal operations of the city and its probable impact 
on further fiscal allocations by the city. Also, they 
suggested the Council develop a strategy for the allo-
cation of revenue sharing funds over time. Pursuant to 
this, the Office made certain alternative strategy sug-
gestions. 
The report included the requests by bureaus for 
revenue sharing funds. These were classified as being 
mainly for capital expenditures and deferred maintenance 
projects. A number of requests were classified as con-
tinuing programs. 
In the section of the report entitled "Summary and 
Recommendations", the Office of Management Services set 
forth their guidelines and alternative strategies by 
which the Council could identify how best to deal with 
General Revenue Sharing funds. Specifically, they rec-
ommended that the Council consider: 
Integrating revenue sharing funds within the 
normal budgetary process to the fullest extent 
possible. 
Distributing the revenue sharing funds over 
a seven year time period. 
Providing for the expenditure of revenue shar-
ing funds on an increasing schedule of payments, 
rather than according to the manner in which 
they are received. 
Investing the check received in December (1972) 
for the remainder of the 1972-3 fiscal year. 
This would generate over $100,000 in additional 
funds to be appli~d at a later date for revenue 
sharing purposes. 
The Office of Management Services went into many 
251 
reasons why they thought the Council should adopt their 
recommendations. They pointed out that the Revenue Shar-
ing Act gave full responsibility to the city to deal with 
revenue sharing funds with few guidelines. Specifically, 
revenue sharing funds are to be treated as any other 
source of general fund revenues, i.e. "any project or 
program which is an ordinary and necessary expenditure" 
can be funded with revenue sharing funds. The Office 
thus recommended that revenue sharing funds be integrated 
with the normal budget process keeping in mind that they 
must be accounted for separately. In early 1973, the 
Portland City Council adopted this recommendation. 
The Office of Management Services felt the Council 
should spread the revenue sharing funds over a seven year 
period and spend the money on an increasing schedule of 
payments "rather than according to the manner in which 
3"Revenue Sharing Summary, December 1, 1972", 
Office of Management Services, Harold Johnson, Manage-
ment Service Director, Portland, Oregon, pp. 1-2. 
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they are received," largely because Portland is under-
going at this time "some very critical changes" in its 
bUdget process and adoption of all the recommendations 
would foster the development of these new budget proce-
dures. The report explained the Office of Management Ser-
vices position by stating: 
In general, we eventually hope to be able to 
divide services and activities into broad program 
areas. Having allocated needs within this pro-
gram structure, goal statements can be developed 
which explain what is to be accomplished. Goal 
statements are accompanied by objective state-
ments which explain how a given goal is to be ac-
complished. Planning and implementation become a 
continuous process, one providing feedback for 
the other. The most critical stages to be con-
cerned with in this decision-making process are 
identifying needs, converting them into goal 
statements, determining expenditure lev~ls, and 
finally prioritizing the list of goals. 
The report goes on to explain that the Office is 
just beginning to move into such a program and dealing 
with revenue sharing funds in conjunction with the regu-
lar budget process will reinforce their efforts. The 
Office was certain that if the Council treated General 
Revenue Sharing funds as windfall funds and did not in-
tegrate both the money and the decision-making process 
for allocating it into this new program of budgeting, the 
new "fiscal management system" would be compromised. 5 
4Ibid ., p. 5. 
5Ibid., p. 6. 
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The report goes on to suggest how important revenue 
sharing monies are to Portland in the 1972-73 fiscal year 
and how important those funds will continue to be. It is 
pointed out that the property tax is the basic source of 
general revenue for the city. That source of revenue is 
not expected to expand any more in the future than in the 
past and with increasing expenditures the significance of 
revenue sharing becomes obvious. "Revenue sharing will 
now become the second leading source of funds among 'gen-
eral revenues'. In 1972-73 alone, it will increase rev-
enues to a new level of nearly $62 million. Revenue shar-
ing will represent twenty percent of this total, the prop-
erty tax forty percent.,,6 
Although revenue sharing will continue to be an im-
portant source of city revenue as long as the program 
lasts, the Office of Management Services report points out 
that revenue sharing funds will decline in Portland dur-
ing the five year period of the program. "This is because 
revenue sharing is on a calendar year basis and our bud-
geting falls within fiscal years." So the largest payment 
will be in the first "year" (eighteen month period from 
January, 1972, to July, 1973) and the smallest payment 
will be in the last year. The report continues: 
6 Ibid ., p. 8. 
Because of the declining payment schedule, the 
revenue sharing funds take on less importance rel-
ative to the rest of the general funds over time. 
By 1975-76, the $10.3 million of revenue sharing 
will represent only 15.8% of all general revenues. 
This is based on projections of the other revenue 
elemen;s of the general fund at various growth 
rates. 
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The Office of Management Services predicts that be-
tween 1972 and 1980 general revenues for the city will 
reach a peak in fiscal year 1976. By 1977 revenues 
should drop about 3.8 percent or $3 million. In 1978, 
the first full year without revenue sharing, the drop 
is expected to be another $2 million. To cushion the 
reduction in city revenue, the Office suggests drawing 
the revenue sharing funds out over a seven year period. 
Such an accomodation is not forbidden by the Act. The 
report further suggests: 
To account for annual rises in costs and the 
increase in demand for future services and goods, 
it would be advantageous to expend general rev-
enue sharing funds on an increasing scale. This 
would better enable revenue sharing funds to be-
come part of the normal budget process, allow-
ing them to grow8in like manner with other gen- . 
eral revenues ••• 
In a short time, after considering this report from 
the Office of Management Services, the Portland City Coun-
7Ibid., p. 8. This 15.8% fig~re would probably be 
reduced considerably by the Office of Management Services 
at this time because as of the 1973-74 budget General 
Revenue Sharing accounted for only 12.3% of general fund 
revenues, as we have seen. 
8Ibide, p •. 14. See "Revised Expenditure for Rev-
enue Sharing" in Appendix B. 
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cil adopted all of those recommendations regarding rev-
enue sharing. The Council decided to expand the fourth 
recommendation regaring the investment of the 1972-73 
check and to invest all federal revenue sharing checks 
that had come to Portland as of September, 1973. It is 
expected that will earn the city from five to seven hun-
dred thousand dollars per year in interest. 91 
With respect to the bureau requests submitted to 
the Office of Kanagement 3ervices for revenue sharing 
funds, the Office decided the projects were not complete 
enough; they contained "insufficient information." It 
appears the requests were sent back to the bureaus and 
were asked to be resubmitted for consideration for fund-
ing under a later supplemental or regular budget. It was 
assumed, of course, that the resubmitted projects would 
be thought out in terms of Office of Management Services 
recommendations and adopted City Council guidelines (which 
are one and the same). 
Early in 1973, the City of Portland saw the need 
for a supplemental budget to the Annual Budget of the 
City of Portland which began July 1, 1972. City Ordin-
ance Number 136302 authorized the supplemental budget 
saying: 
9Interview with Mike Kaeil, Office of Management 
Services, Portland, Oregon, 5 September 1973. 
Inasmuch as this Ordinance is necessary for the 
immediate preservation of the public health, peace 
and safety of the City of Portland in this: That 
it is necessary to proceed with the projects and 
services set forth in Supplement No. 1 to the 
1972-73 Budget without undue delay; therefore, an 
emergency is hereby declared to exist, and this 
Ordinance shall be in full force and iofect from 
and after its passage by the Council. 
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Because an "emergency" situation was found to exist, 
Portland did not hold public hearings or use other as-
pects of its developing new budget process in allocating 
these funds. The bureaus were asked to submit requests 
for the funds on the basis of their most urgent needs. 
By April, 1973, the Supplemental Budget had been submit-
ted to the State Tax Supervision and Conservation Commis-
sion and after their approval adopted by the City Council 
and signed by the Mayor. While the funds were actually 
waiting to be spent, they were invested to gain interest 
for the city. 
The Supplemental Budget used $2,379,105 of General 
Revenue Sharing funds then held by the city. By the end 
of the 1972-73 fiscal year, $1,769,000 of this General 
Revenue Sharing money was not spent and was thus reallo-
cated to supplement the 1973-74 General Revenue Sharing 
funds and consequently included in the city's General 
Fund for that fiscal year. The Supplemental Budget rev-
100rdinance No. 136302, City of Portland, Oregon, 
signed by Mayor Neil Goldschmidt, 4 April 1973, p. 5. 
enue sharing funds were allocated as follows: 
TABLE VI 
PORTLAND REVENUE SHARING ALLOCATIONS 
1972-3 
Bureau of City Engineer (services reimburse) 
Bureau of Maintenance (reimburse) 
Bureau of Fire (reimburse) 
Bureau of Parks (reimburse) 
Bureau of Communications & Electronics (reimb.) 
Bureau of Building Maintenance (reimburse) 
Office of Commissioner of Public Utilities 
Non-Departmental (reimburse) 
$ 
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15,871 
94,822 
661,000 
860,782 
110,364 
53,000 
19,559 
10,839 
General Operating Contingencies 
TOTAL REVENUE SHARING FUND ALLOCATIONS 
200,000 
$ 2,379,105 
SOURCE: Ordinance No. 136302, City of Portland, 
Oregon, April 4, 1973, p. 5. 
For the fiscal year 1973-4 Portland had $9,769,000 
in General Revenue Sharing funds. $8 million was in "new" 
revenue sharing money from the federal government, and 
$1,769,000 was General Revenue Sharing money rebudgeted 
from the 1972-3 allocation. ll Pursuant to the advice of 
the Office of Management Services which was now City Coun-
cil policy, these General Revenue Sharing funds were in-
corporated into Portland's General Fund in the amount and 
proportion suggested at the beginning of this chapter. 
Consequently, the decision-making process with regard to 
the allocation of these funds was the regular city bud-
get process for the fiscal year 1973-4. The actual de-
lineation of funded General Revenue Sharing projects and 
the final approval by the Council of that delineation, 
llCity of Portland, "Approved Budget," 1973-4. 
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however, were in addition to the regular budget process, 
as we shall see. 
The first stage of the Portland budget process is 
the Office of Management Services asking the city bureaus 
to develop their own budgets for the 1973-74 fiscal year. 
They were asked to take into consider~tion the guidelines 
established earlier with respect to the use of General 
Revenue Sharing funds. 
In working out their 1973-74 fiscal needs, five of 
Portland's bureaus worked with a task force assigned to 
each bureau. Citizens made up these task forces.~They 
were appointed by the Office of Management Services and 
the Mayor's Office. There were usually two or three citi-
zens on each task force. Their job was to help develop 
goals and objectives for those bureaus. Their role is to 
be expanded next year as Portland further develops its 
neighborhood concept that is to evolve into more represen-
tation from neighborhoods into City Hall. Several of 
those interviewed in Portland commented on the neighbor-
hood concept and how revenue sharing relates to it. The 
next section of this chapter will look at that in some 
detail. 
After the bureaus, with their task forces, develop 
budgets they submit them to the Office of Management Ser-
vices for review. Analysts there review the bureau bud-
259 
gets and make recommendations and send this information 
to the Budget Review Hearing Committee. 
The Budget Rev~ew Hearing Committee is made up of 
two citizens (a housewife and a worker for the Port of 
Portland), the Management Services Director, a member of 
the Mayqr's staff, and the Commissioner's assistant re-
sponsible for the budget under review at a particular 
time. Open hearings are held while this Committee exam-
ines each budget request. At one time or another all 
Commissioner's assistants attend to make the case for 
their bureau to the Committee. 
After these hearings, the budgets go back to the 
Office of Management Services, where its analysts make 
adjustments when necessary. At this stage, the Office is 
working closely with the Office of the Mayor to try to 
develop a balanced budget. After the Mayor has had time 
to look over the city budget developed so far, it is sent 
to the City Council for approval. This year, the Mayor 
and the Office of Management Services suggested that $3 
million be set aside in municipal funds as a mid-year con-
tingency fund. It was suggested that all bureaus will 
have a chance to vie for the funds at mid-fiscal year on 
the basis of performance in terms of efficiency and effect-
iveness in the use of regularly budgeted funds. As we 
will see, those interviewed felt the contingency fund 
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might have to be used, however, for programs cut back by 
the state and federal governments. Exactly what will be 
done with the money will not be known until the Council 
decides on its allocation, of course. At this stage of 
approving the 1973-74 City Budget, however, the Council 
did agree to establish the contingency fund. 
Before the Council could give final approval to it, 
however, it had to hold public hearings. Representatives 
from many social service groups attended these hearings 
and asked the city to fund their programs because the 
federal government was either ending its support, cutting 
it back, or would end it soon. 
Also, before the Council could give final approval 
to the budget, it had to submit it to the State Tax Super-
vision and Conservation Commission for approval. The 
Commission approved the budget. The budget was then ap~ 
proved by the City Council and signed by Mayor Goldschmidt. 
Before revenue sharing, the Portland budget process 
would end at this stage. However, two additional steps 
were taken for the 1973-74 budget process because revenue 
sharing funds were included in the general fund. The Rev-
enue Sharing Act requires that programs and their funding 
levels where revenue sharing is used must be specifically 
identified for auditing purposes and to see to it that the 
Act's guidelines are followed. Therefore, because of 
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Portland's procedure of not dealing with revenue sharing 
funds separately but instead incorporating them into the 
city's general fund, it became necessary after setting up 
and approving the budget to go back through those pro-
grams approved by the Council and delineate those that 
will now be considered funded with General Revenue Shar-
ing monies. The Department of Finance and Administration 
of the Office of Management Services drew up a document 
indicating those programs Portland will now consider 
funded with General Revenue Sharing funds. They were 
careful to try and balance the programs between capital 
and social programs. This document, specifying revenue 
sharing funded programs and their funding levels is en-
titled "Revenue Sharing Allocations" and is in Appendix B 
to this paper. A representative from the Office of Man-
agement Services talked with representativesof the Revenue 
Sharing Office of the United States Treasury about the 
Portland procedure for dealing with revenue sharing funds 
and they felt the procedure not to be in violation of any 
T 'd l' 12 reasury gU1 e 1nes. 
The "Revenue Sharing Allocations" document was sub-
mitted to the City Council for approval and was approved 
by the Council. They also stipulated that $1,893,700 of 
General Revenue Sharing funds will contribu~e to the 
l2Kaeil, Interview. 
$3 million the Council would budget after the mid-year 
review in January. 
Portland dealt with General Revenue Sharing in a 
very different manner from the other cities studied in 
this paper. As we shall see in the following section, 
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those interviewed in City Hall all agreed it was the best 
process for Portland. 
II. THE POLITICS OF REVENUE SHARING IN PORTLAND 
HOW CITY OFFICIALS VIEW REVENUE SHARING 
Portland's experience with General Revenue Sharing 
is given fuller meaning through an examination of how 
city officials feel about the original intention of fed-
eral revenue sharing, how they feel about what their city 
has done with its revenue sharing funds, what their feel-
ings are about the city's revenue sharing decision-making 
process, and how they view the entire question of federal 
aid to cities. At the end of this chapter, the Portland 
experience with General Revenue Sharing will be briefly 
analyzed in terms of the goals and ideas of the New 
Federalism outlined in Chapter III. 
Views of City Officials on the Original Intention 
of Federal Revenue Sharing 
City officials interviewed in Portland feel that the 
original intention of revenue sharing was to give funds 
to the states and localities to reduce their fiscal bur-
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den. Mike Kaeil, of the Office of Management Services, 
points out that local governments do not have the kind of 
elasticity in their revenues that the federal government 
has and therefore the federal government is a better ta~ 
collector. He points out that Portland is in a "tight" 
financial situation at the moment and that revenue sharing 
dollars have enabled the city to fund some traditional 
city services like the Park Department and the Fire De-
partment that have long been in need of additional funds 
for essentials. He further points out, however, that 
revenue sharing has been real "opportunity" money for 
Portland, also. It has "freed up" money to be used for 
certain projects. Altho~gh it will not be found in the 
"Revenue Sharing Allocations" sheet in Appendix B to this 
paper, revenue sharing money is responsible for Portland 
getting its neighborhood concept off the ground. The ac-
tual money came from"'other general fund sources, but it 
was available only because revenue sharing financed other 
programs to make the neighborhood project money available. 
Kaeil explains that Portland's current fiscal situation is 
such that without revenue sharing it would even be diffi-
cult to balance the budget and retain current service 
levels and current city staff: "Without the total receipt 
of revenue sharing funds we wouldn't have had any money 
available for any new programs or services, period." 
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There is probably no one in Portland who has worked 
more closely on revenue sharing than Mike Kaeil. There-
fore, it is significant that he should feel that revenue 
sharing should not go for tax relief purposes. He won-
ders if using it for such purposes is even within the 
guidelines of the Act. "And besides," he adds, "it would 
win no friends for revenue sharing." Mr. Kaeil's position 
differs from many of those interviewed in other cities, 
particularly Mr. Doolittle in Seattle. It may be remem-
bered that Doolittle not only thought that tax relief was 
within the guidelines of the Revenue Sharing Act, but that 
it would be the best use of funds for Seattle. He is 
Seattle's revenue sharing expert. 
In his position at the Office of Management Ser-
vices, Kaeil felt it was important that revenue sharing 
funds not be used for recurring expenses and that the 
money mainly go for capital expenses. Remembering, how-
ever, that revenue sharing has not been allocated as a 
separate package, Kaeil believes that the $3 million left 
from the budget for mid-year allocation, some of which is 
revenue sharing money, could justifiably go for social 
projects, such as cutback federal programs. l3 
Making up for cutback federal categorical grants is 
an unfortunate use of General Revenue Sharing funds in 
l3Kaeil, Interview. 
the opinion of Bill Scott, assistant to Portland's 
Mayor Goldschmidt. He too sees the original intention 
of revenue sharing money as being funds for the city 
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to use to meet needs ignored or underfunded before due 
to lack of money from other city sources. Scott 
suggested, "the threat of now having to use General 
Revenue Sharing funds for replacement money for dis-
continued categorical grants is in flat contradiction to 
the promise of the Administration." Scott said that the 
Nixon Administration got cities to support the Act in 
the first place through the National League of Cities 
and the U.S. Congress of Mayors by indicating this money 
was not going to be substitute money for presently 
running categorical grants. 
Mr. Scott also sees the revenue sharing funds as 
being opportunity dollars for Portland. He does not see 
it as enough money to solve all of the city's problems, 
of course, but as need money to get some new things going. 
Significantly, Scott feels the receipt of these federal 
funds may have postponed the need for a city income tax 
in Portland. What is unfortunate, he adds, is that the 
money may be eaten up by the need to use parts of it as 
substitute money for cutback federal categorical grants. 
Also, if inflation continues at the current rate, and the 
size of revenue sharing money does not dramatically in-
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crease, the money will all be "eaten up" by the end of 
th f · 14 e 1ve year program. 
A somewhat different opinion about the intent of 
General Revenue Sharing was offered by Frank Ivancie, 
City Commissioner. Mr. Ivancie is of the firm opinion 
that·"revenue sharing funds should go for capital items 
long neglected in the city. He does not really see as 
justified spending the money for creating "new layers 
of bureaucracy" such as the neighborhood development 
concept. Ivancie is responsible for city parks and the 
Fire Department and it is understandable that he feels 
the neglected needs of these departments should be 
attended to now that money is available. He quotes the 
guidelines of the Act where it says the General Revenue 
Sharing funds should go for the "necessary and ordinary 
expenditures of government." To him this does not in-
clude funding programs that belong as the responsibility 
of other units of government. In this vein he points 
to Day Care Centers which he feels should be funded by 
the State as they are not a city responsibility.15 
l4Interview with Bill Scott, Assistant to the Mayor 
of Portland, Oregon, Portland, Oregon, 16 July 1973. 
l5Interview with Frank Ivancie, City Commissioner, 
Portland, Oregon, 17 July 1973. 
Views of City Officials on How Portland Allocated Its 
General Revenue Sharing Funds 
Those interviewed in Portland could not really 
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comment on how General Revenue Sharing funds were ulti-
mately allocated because revenue sharing money was pooled 
with other city revenues and made part of the General 
Fund. Therefore, City Officials commented on the pro-
grams revenue sharing money supported indirectly. That 
is, these new federal funds freed up General Fund money 
to develop new city programs. They also commented on 
whether the city should have dealt with revenue sharing 
in the way it did. 
Bill Scott joins all others interviewed in feeling 
there was really no better way for the city to deal with 
General Revenue Sharing monies than to integrate them into 
the General Fund. He said that then the money would not 
be treated by the City Council as "mad money." Scott 
emphasized that the revenue sharing money allowed Portland 
to try to fundamentally improve city government itself. 
It freed up money so that the city could develop institu-
tional changes that "can effect the way the current city 
bureaucracy deals with its problems ••• " He felt that 
the wisest use of the money was to try to make Portland 
government more efficient rather than spending the money 
on "new services that we aren't sure \'Ie can continue to 
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fund after five years." Specifically Scott pointed to 
funding certain management planning programs that should 
save money in the long run for the city. They could not 
be funded before because of the lack of money for this 
purpose -- the money had to go for essential city ser-
vices alone. 
Money freed for use by the receipt of revenue 
sharing is now going into development of the neighborhood 
concept should also make Portland city government more 
responsive to its citizens, and thus, more effective 
government in the opinion of Mr. Scott. There is an 
effort here to set up neighborhood planning councils 
to help coordinate city services with neighborhood needs. 
"Neighborhoods were given money, seed money, to try and 
aid them in developing programs to help themselves." 
Scott also points to the Bureau of Human Develop-
ment which he feels would not have gotten off the ground 
without the indirect aid of revenue sharing. As we can 
see from looking at the Portland Revenue Allocations 
document, some revenue sharing money was specifically 
allocated to social services under this Department. The 
amount was not too much, but Scott would maintain, as 
stated above, that the prime use of General Revenue 
Sharing funds was not create new programs but to make 
government more efficient and effective in an administra-
tive and structural sense. He suggests that the real 
benefit of the Bureau of Human Resources will come with 
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the receipt of Special Revenue Sharing funds. When those 
monies arrive, the Bureau will hopefully have finished 
examining the city's social service needs and will.know 
how best to meet them. Scott counts this as a consider-
able accomplishment in itself and a very worthwhile ~se 
of revenue sharing money. He also suggests that a large 
part of the midyear allocation should go to the Bureau 
of Human Resources. In sum, Scott says that the city's 
whole planning and management program got a boost from 
General Revenue Sharing money.16 
Jim Setterberg is also with the Office of Management 
Services and he feels that the fact that not much money 
on the Portland Revenue Allocations sheet seems to have 
gone to social services does not mean that those ser-
vices have been ignored. He joined with others inter-
viewed in believing the city is not now clear as to which 
social services it should handle and which belong to other 
levels of government. Hence, he endorses the funding of 
the Bureau of Human Resources that enables it to make stud-
ies to determine where the city's obligations are in this 
area. Also, he agrees with Scott and Kaeil that a large 
l6Scott, Interview. 
portion of the midyear allotment will probably go to 
social services as a result of federal cutbacks in that 
17 
area. 
Those who mentioned it defended the early a110ca-
tion of the 1972 revenue sharing money on an "emergency 
basis." Mike Kaeil, for example, said that the money 
went for expenses that were very necessary. Certain 
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equipment and park needs had long been neglected and this 
new source of revenue was wisely spent in helping out 
those areas of need. The 1972 General Revenue Sharing 
money was the only General Revenue Sharing money allocated 
by the Council as a separate block of money from the 
General Fund. In terms of the overall use of General 
Revenue Sharing, Kaeil is certain that Portland would not 
have been able to make any capital improvements or make 
government more efficient through developing better 
management techniques without the revenue sharing money. 
He is satisfied with how the money was handled. 
Mr. Kaeil has run into one aspect of General Revenue 
Sharing that no one else in any of the cities studied 
has confronted so far. A team of advisors from the 
Treasury Department have recently come to Portland and 
questioned how cities are allocating their revenue sharing 
l7Interview with Jim Setterberg, Office of Manage-
ment Services, Portland, Oregon, 16 July 1973. ' 
money. They are especially careful to examine whether 
the money seems to be being spent to the advantage of 
one segment of the city as opposed to another. The 
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team indicated to Kaeil that this would be a form of dis-
crimination forbidden by the Act. Also the team ques-
tions, as Kaeil has done himself, whether revenue sharing 
money can legally be used for tax relief purposes. 
Because the Act is so broad in its guidelines, the team 
from ~ashington, D.C. told Kaeil that much of what can 
be allowed and what cannot will have to be decided in the 
courts. They indicated that several cases are now pend-
ing in the courts contesting whether some form of tax 
relief is a legitimate use of General Revenue Sharing 
funds. But as we have seen, whereas revenue sharing 
may have postponed the need for Portland to raise taxes 
or impose new ones, there has been no intention to use 
General Revenue Sharing money as an excuse to cut taxes. 18 
Commissioner Ivancie is of the opinion that using 
revenue sharing money to "free up" other monies to be 
used to create new layers of city government was not a 
wise use of the money. He specifically points out the 
creation of the Office of Community Development which 
"is just more support services and coordinators." The 
18Kaeil, Interview. 
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city needs to use all the money it can to better perform 
its traditional services, he feels. The revenue sharing 
money has helped the city perform many of those basic 
services better, especially in police, parks and fire, 
but he considers it a waste simply to create more govern-
ment with the money. It is clear that Mr. Ivancie does 
not agree with some of his colleagues on how the General 
19 Revenue Sharing money was allocated. 
Views of City Officials on the Portland General Revenue 
Sharing Decision-Making Process 
Because Portland integrated all but its 1973 
General Revenue Sharing funds into its General Fund, 
there was no specifically designed decision-making pro-
cess for the allocation of General Revenue Sharing funds. 
The revenue sharing decision-making process was the 
decision-making process used in developing and finalizing 
Portland's fiscal year budget. Mike Kaei1 mentioned 
that there are no plans whatsoever to allocate revenue 
sharing funds separately from the General Fund and set 
up a special citizen involvement mechanism for such a 
d "" k" 20 eC1Sl0n-ma lng process. Bill Scott reiterated this 
point and said the reason no special mechanism has been 
or will be set up for the allocation of revenue sharing 
191 . It" vancle," n erVlew. 
20Kaei1, Interview. 
funds is because the city has for some time now been 
developing a citizen involvement process to be part of 
the regular budget decision-making process. 
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Scott explains that the city budget process has 
been changing dramatically in recent years. The effort 
is to involve the public to a greater degree in that 
process. In the past, says Scott, the Council has been 
bogged down in detail and has not had time to look at 
the "macro" aspect of city problems. Now the hope is 
that the Council can make more decisions on the major 
services the city should perform and how they should 
be performed. There has been a real effort, he adds, 
to involve citizens in the budget process too, in terms 
of reviewing budgets of bureaus and their programs and 
solicitation of citizen's views of those programs. "The 
budget process has opened up." 
This citizen involvement in the budget process is 
tied to the neighborhood concept mentioned earlier in 
this chapter. Scott explains that the city is working 
on a District Planning Organization process that recog-
nizes representatives of certain neighborhoods for cer-
tain purposes. The process is not worked out in detail 
yet, he adds, but the city hopes to have the whole 
process developed for next year's budget process. As 
we saw in the first part of this chapter, the Mayor did 
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seek some citizen involvement in this year's budget pro-
cess. He asked citizens to help form task forces to work 
with some bureaus and Scott believes they had real im-
pact as they caused changes in some bureau proposals. 
Exactly how representatives will be chosen in the future 
is still uncertain in Scott's opinion. So far it looks 
as if several task forces will be created and involved 
in the budget process and they will be made up of repre-
sentatives from neighborhoods and some selected by the 
Mayor and Commissioners to represent special interests 
such as environmental groups, the League of Women Voters 
and so forth. "Minorities will certainly be involved.,,2l 
For quite a period of time, Paul ~pker was Techni-
cal Planner for the District Planning Organization Task 
Force which was formally under the Portland Planning 
Commission. HQpker believes that so far there has been 
only minimal citizen participation in the budget pro-
cesses of the city. A few citizens on the task forces, 
a few on the budget committee and those representatives 
of special interests who attend public hearings have so 
far been the extent of public participation. He believes, 
however, that this is an important start and that Portland 
is moving toward a viable citizen participation mechanism 
2lScott, Interview. 
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for all its city government. He believes it is not so 
much what has been done 50 far in the formal budget 
process as it is the work to this point on the District 
Planning Organization concept that foreshadows a citizen 
involvement apparatus for Portland city government. 
Hopker recounts that when ~odel Cities function-
aries saw that federal money was going to be cut back or 
eliminated, they began to view the Bureau of Human 
Resources and the District Planning Organizations as 
agencies through which they might get some new federal 
funds in the form of revenue sharing. In September, 
1972, Hapker says that Mr. Charlie Jordan, then acting 
head of the Bureau of Human Resources, saw that revenue 
sharing was coming and made a strong bid to the City 
Council to get them to involve the public, through com-
munity organizations, in budget matters. Jordan found 
others in City Hall agreed a start in this direction 
should be made. The Mayor was on record as believing 
in such a concept. 
Hapker would agree with Scott that the District 
Planning Organizations: concept is still in its formative 
stages but he believes it should be operational by the 
time the city has to decide how to allocate Special 
Revenue Sharing funds or the next year's allocation of 
General Revenue Sharing funds as part of the regular 
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budget process. Hopker said the proposed design of the 
District Planning Organization is as follows: At the 
bottom·. are the neighborhood organizations, on the next 
level up are the district organizations, and at the top 
is the Bureau of Neighborhood Organizations. This last 
body is to be made up of representatives of the other 
tiers and will advise the City Council on budget matters. 
In the case of Special Revenue Sharing, for example, the 
lower levels of the neighborhood organization would write 
up proposals for Special Revenue Sharing money and these 
would be scrutinized by the Bureau of Neighborhood I~ •• 
Organizations who would then make recommendations to the 
City Council. Many details have yet to be worked out; 
in fact, the whole project may not become reality. But 
Mr. Hopker feels the District Planning Organizations con-
cept is favored by many citizens groups and by many city 
hall officials and should be finally realized. Also, we 
saw earlier in this chapter that General Revenue Sharing 
has played a significant role in "freeing up" the money 
to get the District Planning Organizations concept off the 
ground. 
Paul Hopker was definately of the opinion that 
Model Cities and Office of Economic Opportunity groups 
have had a strong impact in politicizing the citizens 
affected by these programs. He points, also, to the 
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presently organized task forces that worked on this year's 
budget as being the result of the "Office of Economic 
Opportunity era." He feels that some neighborhoods are 
clearly dominated by a few political professionals who 
may only coincidentally represent their neighborhood's 
citizens. In both cases the leaders of these neighbor-
hoods have seen federal cutbacks as endangering either 
their own jobs or the worthwhile accomplishments of the 
federal programs, or both, and have sought city aid as 
a replacement. In his research in working on the 
District Planning Organizations concept, H~ker found 
that some Community Action Program neighborhoods are not 
as aggressive as they once were. They have become "fat" 
with federal money and thus lackadaisical. Threatened 
cutbacks in federal funds have begun to reawaken these 
neighborhoods such as the Corbett-Terwilliger neighbor-
hood and the Northwest District Association area have 
pulled themselves together without any Community Action 
Program organization as predecessor. The Corbett-
Terwilliger and Northwest areas are very aggressive in 
city politics as Hepker sees it. For the most part, 
however, only a few political functionaries from city 
neighborhoods lobby city hall, but H~ker firmly believes 
that the social service organizations developed and/or 
inspired by the War on Poverty programs have gone a long 
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way toward involving more common citizens in city politics 
and have created a new era where city government now ' 
assumes more citizen participation must take place in 
public policy making. 22 
Commissioner Ivancie agreed that the citizen task 
force groups that worked in helping to develop the 1973-4 
city budget were the result of citizen participation in 
War on Poverty prganizations. "Such participation in 
government is now expected as a matter of course ••• ,,23 
Mike Kaei1 commented on the Portland decision-
making process in terms of his being glad the Council 
adopted the Office of Management Services guidelines, 
especially the suggestions of spreading the General 
Revenue Sharing funds into the General Fund. He also 
agrees with his colleagues that the role of the citizen 
in the decision-making process will be expanded next year. 
If the District Planning Organizations concept is not 
worked out completely by then, more citizens will probably 
be used in the task force program developed for the 
t b d t . K '1' .. 24 curren u ge , ~n ae~ s op~n~on. 
22Interview with Paul H~pker, Formerly Technical 
Planner for the District Planning Organization Task Force, 
Portland, Oregon, 18 July 1973. 
23Ivancie, Interview. 
24Kaei1, Interview. 
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Views of City Officials on Federal Aid to Cities 
Bill Scott of the Portland'Mayor's Office was phil-
osophical in the categorical versus block grant system 
of federal aid to cities. He suggests that among Portland 
city officials there is disagreement as to which form of 
federal aid is best for the city. Some feel that the city 
is best able to determine policies for itself and others 
believe policies should be largely directed by the federal 
government. Scott feels that Portland is very able to 
compete successfully for categorical grants and has done 
so in recent years. His data tells him, too, that Port-
land will get less money under the two revenue sharing 
acts than it is getting now under categorical grants, as-
suming that most, if not all, categorical grants will be 
discontinued when Special Revenue Sharing becomes a real-
ity. He feels, however, that the leverage and discretion 
given cities under the block grant system speaks in its 
favor. Categorical grant monies intended for a specific 
purpose and modeled after the problems of one region of 
the country are often not appropriate for attacking Port-
land's problems. Scott seems to feel the discretion given 
local policy makers with block grants is worth the loss in 
funds that will result from losing categorical grants. 
Mr. Scott believes that national priorities en-
forced by categorical grants with strings attached have 
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been very useful on many occasions. That is, the cities 
and states have been very reluctant to move on some issues 
and the federal push was what was necessary. At the same 
time, he says, n ••• programs that are locally initiated and 
led are much more successful than federal programs. Fed-
eral programs create an endless hassle with guidelines and 
restrictions that are serving some federal objective that 
is not always clear or applicable to the local situation, 
or it may be an objective local officials do not share." 
The question is whether the additional expense and hassle 
that is involved in alot of federal programs is worth the 
benefits. 25 One gets the impression that Mr. Scott does 
not feel categorical grants are worth the hassle. 
Bill Scott's favoring of a block grant system is in-
dicated in his enthusiasm for the governmental changes 
revenue sharing has enabled Portland to initiate. He says 
that General Revenue Sharing has " ••• given the city a ter-
rific opportunity to start new programs to effect insti-
tutional change in the city that will affect the way cur-
rent city bureaucracy deals with problems. It is best to 
spend the money on more efficient and effective govern-
ment.,,26 
We saw in the cases of Seattle and Tacoma that 
25scott, Interview 
26 Ibid • 
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there was little, if any, cooperation between those cit-
ies and their respective counties in planning for the use 
of their revenue sharing funds. Scott indicated that in 
Portland this was also largely the case. The receipt of 
revenue sharing funds has had some effect, however, on 
these two levels of government deciding which will have 
responsibility for which programs dealing with the aged. 
Although Portland and Multnomah County are working toward 
eventual consolidation, there has been only talk and no 
real action in coordinating their revenue sharing decision-
making and allocations efforts. As we shall see in the 
Eugene case study, counties in Oregon have often assumed 
many social service responsibilities that cities in the 
State now also feel they must deal with because local ser-
vice agencies are asking for their su~port due to federal 
cutbacks. Eugene and Lane County worked with this issue 
together, but this was not the case with Portland and 
Multnomah County. 
~r. Kaeil believes Portland will be better off if 
block grants are used by the federal government in its aid 
to cities than it is now with so many categorical grants. 
He believes the flexibility of the block grants make them 
more desirable. He also believes the increased responsi-
bility given to cities is good for them. Kaeil indicated 
that Portland is well on its way in preparing for Special 
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Revenue Sharing. Not only is the Bureau of Human Develop-
ment assessing the city's social programs and needs, the 
Portland Community Development Commission has been devel-
oping for some time now and has a budget of about $10 mi1-
lion. This Commission will be largely responsible for the 
community development money that would corne to Portland 
under one of the Special Revenue 3haring categories. A 
central problem, says Kaeil, is that under the categori-
cal grant that now largely funds the Commission, Portland 
is getting about $8.9 million. Under the proposed com-
munity development segment of Special Revenue Sharing, 
the ?ortland grant would be reduced to $4.05 million. 
This is a serious loss in funds and Kaeil goes on to point 
out that this year, federal grants (excluding revenue shar-
ing) account for about fifteen percent of the budget's 
General Fund. If the city loses that level of support and 
it is replaced only with the lesser revenue sharing funds, 
it will be "in serious trouble." Yet Kaeil joins Scott 
in preferring the increased leverage and policy making 
power given to cities under block grants. He says: "Rev-
enue gives a city more responsibility. It will test 10-
cal government to see if it is capable of managing its 
own resources well. If not, we'll go back to more cen-
27 tralized gov(;!rnment and that would not be good." 
27 . Kae1l, Interview. 
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Commissioner Ivancie was not at all equivocal as to 
whether he preferred block or categorical grants from the 
federal government. He preferred block grants because 
there has been too much of a tangle with categorical 
grants. He says that categorical grants are "a cumbers6me, 
unproductive method of assistance.,,28 
Portland city officials seem to prefer block grants 
because of the flexibility they offer the local policy 
maker in terms of reduced federal guidelines. Even the 
fact that federal aid may be cut in half seems to bother 
them little if, in return, they get the autonomy block 
grants are supposed to offer. 
III. PORTLAND: SUB-CONCLUSIONS 
As we have seen, one of the goals of the New Fed-
eralism was to give more power and responsibilities to 
localities by giving them federal aid with few restric-
tions. The localities could decide how to spend the mon-
ey. This responsibility would be another ingredient in 
their increased power. Do Portland city officials feel 
they have more power as a result of General Revenue Shar-
ing so far? It would be going too far to say yes. The 
other sections of this study seem to indicate that Port-
land neeaed most of its 1972 General Revenue Sharing allo-
281 . vanc1e, Interview. 
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cation just to meet certain emergency needs. The needs 
dictated the use of the funds, so there was little lati-
tude for deciding where the money should go. we have seen 
that Portland was committed to some form of citizen par-
ticipation in its budget process beyond open hearings 
even before revenue sharing money was received, but some 
measure of power can be said to have been given city of-
ficials in the moving ahead on the District Planning Or-
ganization project that revenue sharing funds allowed. 
Bill Scott, Mike Kaeil and Paul Hepker all were enthus-
iastic about the development of the neighborhood concept 
and all agreed it would have been impossible to move ef-
fectively forward without the money freed up by revenue 
sharing. So far in this study we have defined power as 
the command over the allocation of resources. When trad-
itional urban responsibilities are unmet or underfunded 
it is the requirement of meeting those responsibilities 
that dictates the use of funds. We see in Portland, as we 
have seen in the other cities studied, that whatever new 
power revenue sharing is supposed to give to these cities 
is compromised by underfunded traditional city responsi-
bilities, inflation and cutback federal programs. The de-
mands for the money are so great and so obvious that real 
flexibility in the use of the money may not exist. The 
fact that Portland included its General Revenue Sharing 
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funds directly into the General Fund acknowledges that 
fact. The Office of Management Services was fearful that 
if the bureaus and the Council saw this separate bundle 
of money standing by itself they might be tempted to spend 
it on "non-essential" projects. There was fear it would 
be used as "mad money.~' ~vhat power Portland can be said 
to have gained from General Revenue Sharing is the little 
extra money it did provide to get the Bureau of Human Re-
sources off the ground and to spur the neighborhood con-
cept. 
The New Federalism was to enable cities to establish 
their own priorities in social and community service areas 
and determine the best means of meeting responsibilities 
in those areas. In assuming the responsibility for set-
ting those priorities, cities were to be developing a 
measure of independence from federal control and the 
American system was to be moved toward decentralization. 
In the case of Portland we found that those interviewed 
believed in this goal of the New Pederalism. They felt 
strongly that Portland was capable of establishing its own 
priorities and determining the best ways of meeting its 
social and community needs. General Revenue Sharing, how-
ever, has not given them enough money to where they have 
the flexibility to do so meaningfully. Those interviewed 
agreed that decentralization of American government may 
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be a good idea but their fiscal needs are far greater 
than the funds supplied by General Revenue Sharing so far. 
The city is therefore no less dependent on the federal 
government for aid than before. Portland city officials 
do not question the ability of the city to work out its 
own problems with little or no federal guidance. At the 
same time they acknowledge that fiscal realities may not 
allow them to do any more than meet basic urban needs. 
It is not setting your own priorities simply to keep the 
police, fire and park departments going. More General 
Revenue Sharing and Special Revenue Sharing funds uncom-
promised by federal categorical cutbacks and runaway in-
flation are necessary if decentralization of American 
government is to be a reality. Otherwise, there is no 
independence in decision-making. 
Portland is taking seriously another goal of the 
New Federalism. It will be remembered that Mr. Nathan, a 
New Federalism architect of the Nixon Administration, sug-
gested that cities have to work out programs in the social 
and community service areas that best meet their own cit-
ies needs. Portland seems to be moving in just this di-
rection through the work of its Bureau of Human Resources 
and Community Development Commission. Both of these or-
ganizations are assessing Portland's needs in their re-
spective areas and will advise the Council on the allo-
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cation of General Revenue Sharing and Special Revenue 
Sharing funds in these areas. Portland, as the other cit-
ies studied, seems to be taking seriously the fact that 
urban governments are going to have to begin to assume 
more responsibility in the social and community services 
than ever before. At the same time, they are assuming 
that the categorical grant money that used to support 
these programs will be replaced with Special Revenue Shar-
ing money. If this is not done, there is no way the cit-
ies can assume their new responsibilities. So far, the 
outlook for Special Revenue Sharing is grim and the de-
mand on Portland and other cities by social service agen-
cies in their cities for funding is tremendous. It is 
the central paradox of revenue sharing today. 
The danger of some programs being lost in the shuf-
fle as we move from categorical grants to block grants to 
aid cities is very great. In Portland, there is a real 
effort, however, to assess all the social and community 
programs that have taken place in the city through fed-
eral funding and to determine which deserve continued 
funding. This, of course, gives a great deal of influence 
to local elites and local government officials in deter-
mining which programs will be continued. Their influence 
may be balanced, however, if Portland slJbstantially de-
velops its neighborhood concept and/or its task force 
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concept before the allocation of either Special Revenue 
Sharing funds~or next year's budget with its new allot-
ment of General Revenue Sharing funds. In other words, 
if Portland's average citizen plays a meaningful role in 
determining city priorities, fewer social and community 
programs developed for the poor and minorities may get 
lost in the shuffle between federal aid programs. Thus, 
a fear of the New Federalism may be avoided. 
General Revenue Sharing, as we have seen, has played 
a role in bringing government closer to the people of 
Portland. The process of developing task forces composed 
of average citizens and the Budget Review Hearing Commit-
tee are innovations developed and funded separately from 
General Revenue Sharing. Mayor 'Goldschmidt wanted citi-
zen involvement in the budget process, and, as Commissioner 
Ivancie has said, such a development was inevitable due to 
the politicization of citizens during the War on Poverty 
and related programs of the late 1960's. Those inter-
viewed, however, agreed it was General Revenue Sharing 
funds which freed up money to further develop the District 
Planning Organization concept. ~hereas it might be ar-
gued that the use of citizens on the task forces and on 
the Budget Review Hearing Committee went enough beyond 
the regular open hearing procedure to say thAt Portland 
is beinging government closer to the people, it is more 
:: 
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convincing to suggest that the neighborhood concept devel-
opment spurred by revenue sharing funds will probably do 
a significant job of giving access to government to the 
average individual citizens. Perhaps the task forces and 
Budget Review Hearing Committee can be said to be special 
mechanisms to include the individual citizen in the budget 
policy making process in Portland. Now, very few citizens 
participate. The District Planning Organization concept, 
on the other hand, will enable a very large segment of the 
city's population to deliberate major policy questions in 
their own neighborhoods. Their representatives will then 
let City Hall know what neighborhood citizens feel. In 
theory, such a mechanism should enable the individual to 
have considerable input into City Hall. This process is 
not in force at the moment, but as we have seen, many of 
those interviewed feel it is well on its way, thanks to 
the political activism spurred by the War on Poverty pro-
grams of the late 1960's and the money freed up by Gen-
eral Revenue Sharing. The mechanisms Portland has set up 
to include citizens in the budget process so far are an 
important step. It is farther than Seattle, but not as 
far as Tacoma has gone. If the District Planning Organ-
ization program goes into effect, Portland will have gone 
a long way toward establishing a process whereby the 
individual citizen will feel he can be heard by govern-
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mente If this mechanism is established, it will be import-
ant to study it carefully to see if it works equally well 
in all parts of the city and whether the average citizen 
is heard in his neighborhood and is not shut out by local 
elites. 
We have seen that it is essentially up to each indi-
vidual city to define for its own situation how the New 
Feueralism goal of returning funds, power and responsibil-
ity to "the people" will manifest itself in that city. 
In Portland it appears that there is an effort to build 
up an individual citizen participation program with the 
help of General Revenue Sharing funds. The Jeffersonian 
ideal of individual participation still prevalent in 
American thought combined with the participation of indi-
viduals in the war on Poverty have led to a realization 
on the part of Portland officials that individuals want 
to participate and must be allowed to do so. 
The New Federalism has as a major goal the decen-
tralization of the federal system. A measure of "inde-
pendent" strength among the units of the federal system 
should be developed so they can each work out for them-
selves areas of functional responsibility. Has General 
Revenue Sharing given such strength to Portland? The 
realities of Portland's fiscal situation dictate that the 
revenue sharing funds received so far and those expected 
r 
291 
to arrive in the next three years are only enough to help 
the city meet its most basic responsibilities and enable 
it to start some new programs. Mr. 3cott felt the General 
Revenue Sharing money should go to better government ad-
ministration rather than new programs at all. He would 
put development of the neighborhood concept into this cate-
gory. What this seems to mean is that Portland's receipt 
of revenue sharing fu~ds, even if forecasted levels of 
Special Revenue Sharing funds are included, is far too 
small to enable the city to be a self-sufficient unit of 
government whereby it could in any way be considered in-
dependent power-wise to either the State of Oregon or to 
the federal government. Even though Portland is the lar-
gest city in Oregon it is still the legal creature of the 
State. Although we have not seen in Oregon what we saw 
in Washington State, that is, the State Legislature cur-
tailing state aid to cities because the city's have re-
ceived revenue sharing funds, the potential power of the 
State of Oregon over the fiscal well-being of its cities 
is always there. A direct grant of federal aid to Port-
land in the form of revenue sharing would have to be in an 
astronomical amount to offset the power the State could 
exercise on the city's fiscal well-being. In the case of 
Portland, as in the other cities examined so far, it seems 
to be unrealistic to suggest that a city could ever be an 
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"independent power" vis-a-vis "higher" levels of govern-
ment in the federal structure. They simply do not have 
the constitutional status to give them the independence 
needed for such power. 
A fear of those opposed to the New Federalism was 
that citizens politicized under the War on Poverty pro-
grams might be shut out or lose their desire to partici-
pate with the demise of those programs. In Portland, we 
have found that minorities and the poor who were politi-
cized during the late 1960's through the War on Poverty 
programs and through Model Cities ~ very active in try-
ing to get the city to develop its neighborhood program 
and in petitioning the City Council for revenue sharing 
funds through appearance at various open hearings. Min-
orities have also served on the budget task forces. The 
federal cutbacks in categorical grants have activated the 
newly politicized to seek revenue sharing funds from the 
city. Frustrated by the federal level they are going to 
the city level for help. This politicization is also a 
goal of national elites as they worked to activate the 
disadvantaged during the Kennedy and Johnson Administra-
tions. 
How successful the minorities and the poor will be 
depends on how the $3 million midyear allocation is dis-
tributed by the City Council. It also depends on how the 
293 
District Planning Organizations work in representing their 
interests. To look merely at how revenue sharing monies 
have so far been distributed in Portland, one would not 
feel that social and community programs have benefitted 
much. Those interviewed said repeatedly, however, that 
social and community programs are probably going to get 
the bulk of the midyear allocation and these areas are the 
specific funding responsibility of Special Revenue Shar-
ing. Portland city officials said that it is too early 
to run head-long into funding social programs before the 
Bureau of Human Resources completes its work to determine 
which social programs deserve and really need city aid. 
They implied that the city does not lack commitment to 
social responsibilities but only funds and adequate know-
ledge about which programs are their responsibility and 
which are most worthwhile. 
It is difficult, therefore, to assess the status of 
the recent national goal of giving aid to minorities and 
the poor in the current revenue sharing situation. It is 
not fair to say that local interest groups have frus-
trated the national goal of recent years to provide ser-
vices for the disadvantaged at the government level be-
cause city officials have a good point in moving slowly to 
this responsibility. It is too early to decide the city's 
commitment to the disadvantaged in light of federal aid 
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cutbacks to them. Developing the Bureau of Human Re-
sources indicates a serious commitment to use some Gen-
eral Revenue Sharing funds and all of the Special Revenue 
Sharing funds for social and community service programs. 
Because the city is not used to dealing heavily in these 
areas by itself in terms of administration, caution in 
evaluating and developing programs is understandable. By 
the end of the five year General Revenue Sharing program, 
however, if Portland has not clearly and dramatically 
moved into the social service area, assuming federal cate-
gorical grants will continue to decline or end, then local 
interests will clearly have been able to defeat the na-
tional priority of establishing government as the prime 
vehicle in helping the disadvantaged. A major fear of 
New Federalism opponents will then have been realized. 
Assuming that local special interests in Portland 
have had some influence on the City Council in its deci-
sions to use some of the revenue sharing money so far for 
social services, and on the decision to allocate $3 mil-
lion at midyear when the federal cutbacks can be better 
measured, and in establishing the Bureau of Human Resour-
ces, it can be suggested that there may be a consensus in 
Portland, and perhaps in most other cities, that there 
should be collective action to solve social problems 
through public resources. Portland has not ignored the 
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social service area, it has just moved cautiously in that 
direction. It does not seem that local interests are try-
ing to get the city to abandon its social responsibilities 
to the disadvantaged, but a more meaningful answer to 
whether national priorities in this area have taken hold 
in Portland awaits the time when the city allocates 
Special Revenue Sharing and its midyear budget fund. It 
would also be fair to say that if Special Revenue Sharing 
does not become a reality or its funding level is very 
low, if Portland does not allocate a fairly large amount 
of its General Revenue Sharing funds to social programs 
it would have to make a strong fiscal case for why it had 
ignored the social service area. 
So far, it does not appear that revenue sharing is 
going to set back the progress made in recent years in 
civil rights in terms of the Portland case study. Indeed, 
it appears that the federal government may be especially 
wary of local government discriminating in the use of rev-
enue sharing funds. We saw that Mike Kaeil had talked 
with Treasury Department officials who were checking to 
see that Portland did not use its funds to the advantage 
of one group and the neglect of others in the city. In 
The End of Liberalism, Lowi feared that lack of guidelines 
in block grants might erase progress in this area made by 
national elites. So far it does not appear that those in 
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positions of influence in Portland, at least in the opin-
ions of City Hall officials, wish to erase or set back 
what has been won for minorities in the civil rights 
struggles of the 1950's and 1960's. Really, there were 
only two specific guidelines in the Revenue Sharing Act. 
One insisted that the funds could not be used as federal 
matching grant funds and the other said that funds could 
not be used in a discriminatory fashion. Lack of guide-
lines by the federal government invites local priority 
setting, but in the case of civil rights it appears that 
the Nixon Administration and the Congress want to main-
tain that national priority. Again, the extent of fed-
eral enforcement of that guideline over time will be the 
real test. If federal enforcement is weak, we will be 
able to see the extent to which local power groups are 
committed to the civil rights cause in Portland and else-
where. 
There was no indication that those interviewed in 
Portland felt more guidelines, to protect national prior-
ities, would beneficially add to future revenue sharing 
legislation. In all cases they felt the city was best 
able to deal with its own problems and establish its own 
priorities and that federal guidelin~s contained in past 
categorical grants were obstructionist in effect. General 
national rules that accompany so much categorical grant 
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legislation has hampered efficient government, and that 
is the perspective held by those interviewed. They did 
not seem concerned that Portland might retreat from so-
cial-governmental responsibilities in the social service 
and civil rights areas. They did not seem to have Lowils 
perspective that the rule of law was endangered and that 
justice was unlikely unless clear and specific direction 
existed for the carrying out of federal legislation. It 
is perhaps to be expected that those wrapped up in the 
affairs of a city would feel themselves capable of seeing 
the need for justice and carrying it out in their own 
town, and not see the dangers Lowi points out suggesting 
that some cities and states might very well not be so 
committed. 
The cause of interest group politics was certainly 
not set back by the way Portland dealt with its revenue 
sharing funds. Interest groups were able to petition the 
Office of Management Services through lobbying the var-
ious city bureaus. Interest groups were very evident in 
the open hearings held. Of course, General Revenue Shar-
ing was specifically supposed to be allocated the way lo-
cal units of government wanted it allocated and interest 
groups always play a role in the policy process. A par-
ticular sort of inte~est group was strengthened by the 
Portland experience: the neighborhood organization. By 
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freeing up funds for the further development of the Dis-
trict Planning Organizations, revenue sharing has streng-
thened the ability of each neighborhood to take its case 
to City Hall. 
Lowi would not object, of course, if such a block 
grant system was intended to affect only those areas of 
public policy where national rules had no place, but rev-
enue sharing seems to be so broad in terms of the areas 
it may finance and the policy areas it can touch that Lowi 
would probably fear the latitude given local power groups. 
He would probably see General Revenue Sharing and Special 
Revenue Sharing as just further examples of the failure 
of interest group liberalism to achieve justice for all 
Americans. 
Lowi especially feared the city as a political unit 
because it only compounded the opportunity of interest 
groups to compromise and bargain away whatever attempt 
toward achieving justice and problem-solving national leg-
islation might have had. The "autonomous" city was seen 
by Lowi as a further decentralization of this nation away 
from its original federal design. General Revenue Sharing 
in Portland may not have done much to strengthen the city 
at this point, but it certainly has not weakened the city 
either. If anything, those interviewed in Portland feel 
that revenue sharing plays and, throughout the length of 
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the program, will continue to play an important role in 
maintaining the viability of the city to hold its own 
financially and to move ahead in some areas. Of course, 
the stated purpose of General Revenue Sharing and Special 
Revenue Sharing was to strengthen state and local govern-
ments and although Lowi would support the strengthening 
of states he would be opposed to the strengthening of 
Portland or any other city in terms of their remaining 
important decision-making units of government. 
The Portland revenue sharing experience is very 
different from that of Eugene, Oregon. We will now 
turn to the Eugene experience and then to the concluding 
chapter of this paper where the "Sub-Conclusion" sections 
of the case studies will be brought together in the hope 
of making some final conclusions. 
CHAPTER VII 
GSNERAL REVENUE SHARING IN EUGENE 
I. CITY FINANCES AND REVENUE SHA.RING 
dHAT EUGENE HAS DONE 
Eugene, Oregon, lies deep in the Willamette Valley 
and is the home of light industry, farming, and the 
state's largest university, the University of Oregon. 
It is by far the smallest city in this study, with a 
population in 1970 of 78,389 persons. l Eugene is useful 
as a case study beca~se the size of its population con-
trasts to the other cities studied and because it lies at 
the foot of the Seattle to Eugene "development belt." 
In its revenue sharing deliberations, Eugene has 
used its regular city budget process. The city Budget 
Committee, made up of the entire City Council plus eight 
laymen (the Council has eight members as well) first de-
bates the budget issues and then makes its recommendations 
to the City Council itself. The eight laymen on the Uud-
get Committee are appc~nted by the Council members on the 
Committee, each Council member making one appointment. 
l'Tlh 
... e 
(New York: 
p. 193. 
1972/Jorld ;"'lmanac an'; Book of Fa::ts, 
IJewspFlper Enterprise :',ssociation, Inc., 1972), 
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As we shall see, the regular budget process was the main 
decision-making process used in Eugene, but other groups 
augmented this process because of the complexities and 
opportunities offered by the General Revenue Sharing funds. 
The laws of the State of Oregon forbid any city 
within the state from going outside the six percent prop-
erty tax limitation in a year's budget. However, if a 
city feels it cannot stay within these fiscal limits it 
can go to its voters and ask them to approve a higher bud-
get. In the past five years, Eugene has found its tax 
base to be inadequate, not only because of increased de-
mands for services, but also because of inflation. Con-
sequently, the city has sometimes had to go to the voters 
to ask them to approve a city budget in excess of the six 
percent limitation. In 1972 and 1973, the Eugene elec-
torate defeated the budgets put to them by the City Coun-
cil. Cn each occasion, the Budget Committee and the :ity 
Council had to make some changes and resubmit the budget 
to the voters. On the day most of this writer's inter-
views were conducted in Eugene, the voters had just the 
day before, by 150 votes, approved a budget for the city. 
Several weeks before, the voters had turned down a budget, 
but they approved a revised version. The battle over ap-
proval of Eugene's budget by the vot~rs is instructive in 
that it demonstrates something of the fiscal condition of 
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the city and it also shows the philosophical differences 
that exist on the Budget Committee and the City Council 
that highlight the ~ugene experience with General Revenue 
Sharing. 
Tom ~illiams is a member of the Eugene City Council 
and is President of the ~illiarns Bread Company, a major 
baking concern in Oregon that is based in Eugene. When 
asked what he thought of Eugene's overall financial sit-
uation, f"ir. .~illiams said he was of the opinion that the 
city had more money that it knew how to spend intelli-
gently. He went on to say: "One's opinion of whether 
Eugene is adequately supplied with revenue is probably a 
function of one's view of what activities are appropriate 
for city government." ~illiams felt that if one views the 
protection of people and property, the traditional roles 
of city government t~at would include funding parks, 
street maintenance, police and fire as what the city 
should be doing, then the city is not short of money. If 
one feels, however, that the purpose of the city is to be 
one of the vehicles to be used in altering the social in-
come structure of America, " ••• t_hen Eugene would not be 
seen as adequately funded because Lugene does not do as 
t l.- • 1 fl' t \- t t ,,2 many of those Illngs as sOrTIe peOr) eee 1. ougll o. 
21nterview with 'lorn,Hllidffls, Member of Eugene Cit.y 
CounCil, Lugen~, 0regon, 20 July lY73. 
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Mr. ~illiams considered himself a conservative on most 
political, social and economic issues. He contributed to 
the recent defeat of the Eugene budget by Eugene voters 
because he felt the Council had allocated some money un-
wisely, especially on unnecessary social programs. He 
also felt there was no reason for an increase in the tax 
levy beyond the six percent limitation since the city had 
enough money with revenue sharing to carry out its essen-
tial and proper functions. Williams wrote an open letter 
to the citizens of Eugene making this point, which very 
likely had an effect on them. At any rate, the voters 
turned down the budget request. ~illiams goes on to say 
that when the budget was referred back to the Budget Com-
mittee, compromises between the liberal majority on the 
City Council and the conservative minority were made that 
were satisfactory enough to Ailliams and those who support 
his position that there was no active, organized, opposi-
tion to the most recent budget proposal put before the 
voters. It thus passed, if only barely. 
hr. ~illiams' rather traditional viewpoint about 
the fiscal needs and responsibilities of Eugene is not 
shared by the City Manager, Hugh McKinley. McKinley be-
lieves the city must do more to help those who are disad-
vantaged and re~rets the city had not gotten farther into 
the social services area before the ~Jar on ~overty got 
304 
started. But now, he feels, more and more citizens and 
government officials at the local level are coming to feel 
that collective action for social good is a city responsi-
bility. Although ~ugene has outgrown its tax base, says 
the City Manager, and the property tax load is quite high, 
with federal aid, especially revenue sharing, the city 
should be able to go beyond minimum services and provide 
for some of the needs of its disadvantaged citizens. He 
points out that revenue sharing in fiscal 1973 makes up 
about twenty percent of Eugene's general fund. The city 
has experienced inflation at about a ten percent rate and 
hence the benefits of revenue sharing have already been 
compromised in terms of it being a real fiscal dividend. 
~cKin1ey fears that unless there is an increase in tradi-
tional revenue sources that in the next two years revenue 
sharing will be eaten up even if it is only spent on trad-
itional services, but the Council has decided to do new 
things with the money, too. The financial crunch of the 
city is such that the City Manager indicated that some 
revenue sharing money has had to go for projects such as 
the building of a new fire station that will require more 
money as revenue sharing receipts decrease or end in the 
future. His staff wanted the General rlevenue Sharing 
funds to go for nonrecurring expenditures, but the city 
needed the fire station and the revenue sharing money was 
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all there was to build it with. Eugene will have to fig-
ure out how to maintain the station as time goes on. 3 
Assuming Eugene plans to spend money for more than 
minimal services, it seems the city's property tax base is 
inadequate to support the additional services. Thus, 
there is the need to ask the voters frequently for per-
mission to go beyond the six percent limitation, and to 
continue to hope for increased traditional revenues and 
continued revenue sharing. It is in this fiscal climate 
that Eugene has allocated its General Revenue Sharing mon-
ey received to date. 
As we have seen, Eugene voters are not automatic in 
their approval of budgets going beyond the six percent 
limitation. In 1972, the voters turned down such a re-
quest from the Council. The city government then found 
itself in a financial bind, especially in funds for the 
police department and for parks. These two areas had 
been particularly suffering in recent years due to budget 
defeats. Jith the receipt of 1972 General Revenue Sharing 
funds, the city decided to develop a Supplemental Budget 
for fiscal year 1972-73. The Supplemental Budget was de-
bated and passed by the Budget Committee and the City 
Council. Most of the money in this budget was revenue 
sharing money, but not all of it. The money went for reg-
3Interview with Hugh McKinley, City Manager of 
Eugene, Euqenp., Oregon, 20 July 1973. 
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ular operating budget programs. Since an "emergency" was 
felt to exist, the money could not be spent on new pro-
grams. An accounting of General Revenue Sharing funds in 
the Eugene Supplemental Budget of 1972-73 is contained in 
Table VII. 
TABLE VII 
ACCOUNTING OF GENERAL REVENUE SHARING FUNDS 
EUGENE SUPPLEMENT.':'.L BUDGET OF 1972-73 
Department Funded 
Ci ty l'-1anager 
Personnel 
Data Processing 
Planning 
Library 
Airport 
Fire 
Finance 
Police 
Parks and Recreation 
Public Works 
General Overhead 
Equipment Service 
Capital Frojects 
TOTAL GSN~Rr..L HEVENUE SHARING FUNDS 
FIN ALLY APP =-.OP.RIi"\.TED 
$ 
$ 
Amount 
14,280 
11,568 
51,452 
58,949 
26,794 
12,730 
40,099 
26,282 
110,859 
38,479 
14,704 
79,200 
71,700 
196,100 
669,861 
TOTAL 1972 G~NERAL REVENUE SHARING FUNDS $ 1,807,617 
SOURCE: "Supplemental Budget Report, 1972-73, City of 
Eugene," Eugene, Oregon, 1973. Data cOlT,pi led from pp. 1-73. 
Although several social agencies asked for part of this 
money, little went to them. The General Revenue Sharing 
funds held by ~ugene but not allocated in th0 .jupplemen-
tal Budget went into the 1973-74 General !{evenue .jharing 
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In February of 1973 the Budget Committee first met 
to decide how to allocate Eugene's $4.3 million in rev-
enue sharing monies now allotted for the 1973-74 fiscal 
year. The money was dealt with as a block sum by itself 
and no special decision-making body was organized to deal 
with this money, just the regular Budget Committee. As 
we shall see, a special liaison joint committee with 
Lane County, however, was established to deal with Gen-
eral Revenue Sharing funds to be spent on social services. 
At the outset, the staff working in the Eugene City 
Manager's Office asked the city's department heads to make 
recommendations as to how their departments would prefer 
to use General Revenue Sharing funds. With this input, 
the city staff put together a list of programs it felt the 
Budget Committee and the City Council should consider as 
priority items for which to allocate General Revenue Shar-
ing monies. The staff recommended that some monies go for 
new programs that might continue operation for some time, 
but for the most part they encouraged the Budget Committee 
to spend the money on one-time only programs and capital 
projects. The staff proposed the largest amount of rev-
enue sharing money be spent on parks and recreation, the 
4"supp1emental Budget Report, 1972-73, City of 
Eugene," Eugene, Oregon, 1973, pp. 1-73. 
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needs of the fire department, the creation of a new plan-
ning division for the city, the police department in terms 
of new personnel and a public housing complex for persons 
in low to moderate income categories. The specific staff 
proposals are located in Appendix C and entitled "Eugene 
City Staff Proposals for Revenue Sharing." At this early 
stage, the public was not consulted or asked to make rec-
ommendations as to how Eugene might appropriate its rev-
enue sharing money. Also, as this early stage, it is im-
portant to note that a major issue of debate in Budget 
Committee meetings was how much money should go for prop-
erty tax relief, if any, and how much for social programs. 
So~e General Revenue Sharing money did go for tax 
relief in Eugene. The staff recommended to the Budget 
Committee, and the Committee accepted, a recommendation 
to fund certain existing programs with General ~evenue 
Sharing funds so there would not have to be an increase in 
the city's property tax rate to fund them. As Loren 
Stubbert, Budget Officer in ~ugene's Finance Department 
explains, a "spread sheet", which delineates programs in 
the general fund that were transferred to General Revenue 
Sharing funding to prevent a tax hike, was prepared • 
••• (T)he "spread sheet" of departmental general 
fund priorities ••• are all existing programs within 
the city's operations which were "put on the block" 
in an effort to prevent a substantial increase in 
the city's property tax rate. Those items that 
were cut from this "spread sheet" were shifted 
into the revenue sharing fund. The reasoning 
behind this shift of existing programs into rev-
enue sharing support is that the Budget Commit-
tee felt obligated, with the existence of revenue 
sharing, to keep any tax rate increase to a min-
imum, yet they also feltsthat existing services 
should not be curtailed. 
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The amount of revenue sharing money spent on these 
programs, that is, spent for property tax relief, was 
$929,499. That expenditure, plus all the rest of Eugene's 
revenue sharing allocations can be seen in Appendix C in 
a document entitled "Eugene Summary of General Revenue 
Sharing Allocations JV:ay 25, 1973." As can be seen from 
that document, of the $4.3 million in total revenue shar-
ing resources held by Eugene, $2.9 million had been allo-
cated by September, 1973. The remaining revenue sharing 
money will either be allocated in some sort of a supple-
mental budget this year or will revert to the next fis-
cal year. It is very likely Eugene will adopt a program 
such as Portland's where part of every year's revenue 
sharing allotment will be carried over to the next year 
because both cities are on fiscal years and the revenue 
sharing checks arrive on a calendar year basis. So, for 
the revenue sharing monies not to decrease over the five 
fiscal years the cities would receive the money, it is 
necessary to carryover sor;,e funds. 
5Loren L. 3tubbert, Budget Office, Eugene Finance 
IJepartment, letter expl"'lining the "spread sheet", received 
at IV1cji.innville, CJregon, 13 :jeptember 1973, p. 1. 
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The "Summary" sheet indicating how Eugene has so far 
allocated its revenue sharing funds indicates that the sug-
gestions of the City Manager's staff were largely followed. 
It is significant to note that the two largest allocations 
were for social services ($200,000) and for a low-moderate 
income housing project. The only allocation that was lar-
ger was the approximately $900,000 used to prevent a prop-
erty tax increase ("Spread Sheet" priorities). As we 
shall see in the next section of this chapter, all three 
of these allocations were hotly debated on the Budget 
Committee, especially the funding for the public housing 
project. 
The "Summary" sheet indicates that Eugene allocated 
$200,000 for social services. The document in Appendix C 
entitled "Joint Committee Recommendations" shows exactly 
what social services were funded. A look at that docu-
ment shows that it was $275,000 that was allocated for so-
cial services. The added $75,000 came from Lane County 
from part of its General Revenue Sharing funds. The co-
operation between the City of Eugene and Lane County in 
allocating General Revenue Sharing funds for social ser-
vices is the major diffe~ence in the Eugene revenue shar-
ing experience from the other cities studied in this pa-
per. 
Fairly early in its deliberations, the Eugene Budget 
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Committee decided to work with Lane County in deciding 
what social services in the area should be funded with 
General Revenue Sharing and in what amounts. The Budget 
Committee decided to work with the county because the coun-
ty had been in the social service business for some time 
and also, the city did not want to overlap its social ser-
vice programs with those of the county. Those interviewed 
in Eugene frankly admitted they were at a loss as to how 
best to decide which social programs of all those apply-
ing for funds should be fu~ded. They sought the exper-
ienced cooperation of the county and hence the Joint City 
of Eugene-Lane County Budget Committee was formed. 
This Committee pooled the social service requests 
that had been s~bmitted to them separately and processed 
over forty applications representing over $500,000 in ap-
plied-for funds. Together, the city and the county had 
decided to allocate, as we have seen, $275,000 for social 
services and so several applicants were to be disappointed. 
This Joint Committee decided to form a subcommittee to 
look over the applications and make recommendations to it. 
This was the Joint City/County Social Service Review Com-
mittee. This Committee decided to enlist the help of yet 
another group, the Lane County Organization of Governments. 
That group was asked for advisory help because they had a 
staff of experts in social service matters that might 
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advise the city/county committees on which social func-
tions are the responsibilities of which levels of govern-
ment. They were also asked to prioritize which social pro-
grams deserved funding and at what level. 
The Lane County Organization of Governments gave its 
report and it carried some weight with both the joint com-
mittees and the Eugene Budget Committee. The "Joint Bud-
get Committee Recommendations" document in Appendix C 
largely follows the recommendations of that report re-
garding which social services should be funded and at what 
levels. It ~ very significant that the report suggested 
that public housing was the responsibility of the state 
and federal governments and not of the county or the city. 
None of the joint county/city social service monies went 
for public housing, but a majority of the Eugene Budget 
Committee and City Council felt strongly enough about the 
city responsibility in the public housing area that they 
went ahead and allocated, as we have seen, $150,000 for 
public housing in Eugene. This was the biggest area of 
disagreement between the Lane County Organization of Gov-
ernments report and the final judgment of the Eugene Bud-
get Committee and the City Council. 
In its final report, the Joint City/County Social 
Service Review Committee suggested that the cooperation 
between the city and county on revenue sharing should 
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continue in the evaluation of programs funded and in other 
areas of joint city/county concern. The cooperation be-
tween these governments indicated to them that working 
together in the delivery and coordination of social ser-
vice programs is beneficial to both levels of government 
and the citizens they serve. 6 
In terms of citizen involvement in the decision-
making process, the city did hold open public hearings on 
the fund allocations and lay people do sit on the Eugene 
Budget Committee. Also, the Joint City/County Social 
Service Review Committee consisted of staff people from 
both governments and two lay representatives. The Joint 
Committee did hold public hearings as well. Several so-
cial agencies applied for funds and were heard, but no 
special effort was made to involve the public beyond the 
regular budget process of open meetings and public hear-
ings. An exception to this might be the lay people on the 
Joint Committee. 
II. THE POLITICS OF REVENUE SHARING IN EUGENE 
HOW CITY OFFICIALS VISW REVENUE SHARING 
In this section of each case study we look at the 
opinions of City Hall officials on how they interpret the 
6"Report to the Joint City of Eugene-Lane County 
Budget Committees from the Joint City/County Social Ser-
vice Review Committee," Eugene, Oregon, 30 May 1973, p. 5. 
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original intention of federal revenue sharing, how they 
feel about how their city has dealt with its General Rev-
enue Sharing money, what their feelings are about their 
city's decision-making process on the revenue sharing ques-
tion, and how they feel about the entire question of the 
various forms of federal aid to cities. This chapter 
will be concluded, as have the other case studies, by ex-
amining the data from Eugene on the basis of the goals 
and fears of the New Federalism. 
Views of City Officials on the Original Intention 
of Federal Revenue Sharing 
All of those interviewed in Eugene agreed that the 
Administration and Congress intended General Revenue Shar-
ing funds to be used by each political unit of government 
in accord with its most basic needs. If certain services 
had not been provided in the past or certain departments 
of government underfunded, then the "new" money should go 
for those purposes. Hugh McKinley is Eugene City Manager. 
He is active in the International City Manager Association 
which is closely associated with the National League of 
Cities. This affiliation has enabled him to keep close 
watch on revenue sharing proposals and legislation and he 
has gone to Congress to testify in support of revenue 
sharing on several occasions. The day before McKinley's 
interview for this study he had returned from testifying 
. .. 
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before a Congressional Committee on Special Revenue Shar-
ing. 
From this experience, McKinley was of the firm opin-
ion that neither the Congress nor the Administration in-
tended General Revenue Sharing to be used necessarily for 
property tax relief. He also felt General Revenue Shar-
ing funds were not to be a substitute for existing federal 
programs supported by categorical grants. As he saw it, 
the intent of General Revenue Sharing was to use the fed-
eral tax collecting ability to gather funds that could be 
returned to the local jurisdictions and used by them as 
they saw fit with no restrictions except that the money 
is not to be used for education or matching funds for fed-
eral grants. He felt Eugene was under no real obligation 
or directives from anyone in washington, D.C., with regard 
to how to use the money. 
From his vantage point as City Manager, McKinley 
has had the opportunity to observe the City Council for 
some time. He felt the Council in many ways reflected 
the philosophical differences that exist in the United 
States Congress. There is a wide disparity of views con-
cerning how to spend the revenue sharing money. From his 
own administrative point of view, however, McKinley felt 
that each city receiving revenue sharing should look at 
its own needs and determine where its most pressing needs 
316 
lie. It should examine the need for new services as well 
as the need to perform old duties better. He argues that 
the results may be different everywhere, but once needs 
are recognized then revenue sharing money should go to 
meet them. He strongly opposes those in the federal gov-
ernment and those in the Oregon Legislature that say "you 
have revenue sharing money and therefore you ought to be 
picking up this or that program." Such restrictions were 
not the intent of the legislation. It is up to each unit 
of government to decide independently how to spend the 
7 
money. For the most part, those interviewed on the 
Eugene City Council would agree with their City Manager. 
Mrs. Campbell is a member of the Eugene City Council 
who would go along with Mr. McKinley's interpretation of 
the original intent of revenue sharing, but she would 
emphasize that the revenue sharing money was "new money" 
that should largely be used for new programs. She was 
strongly opposed to using General Revenue Sharing for 
property tax relief alone. She felt the money should go 
for social programs as well. It will be remembered from 
Part I of this chapter that the major debate among members 
of the Council was whether the General Revenue Sharing 
funds should go for tax relief or social programs. Mrs. 
Campbell fought hard for social progr~ms. She inter-
7McKinley, Interview. 
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preted the Revenue Sharing Act guidelines very broadly and 
was reaffirmed in that interpretation as the result of a 
meeting in Washington, D.C., she and other Council mem-
bers had recently attended in the Office of Revenue Shar-
. 8 l.ng. 
Neal Murry is another Eugene Council member and he 
shares Mrs. Campbell's opinions on revenue sharing. In 
a way he was more outspoken than Krs. Campbell in that 
he felt revenue sharing money should not go at all for 
property tax relief. He saw the needs of the city as too 
great not to examine city service needs and then spend the 
General Revenue Sharing funds on them. Murry felt that no 
matter how nontraditional the needed service might be in 
terms of usual city responsibilities, the city should get 
into that area if the need is real. As did I1cKin1ey, 
Mr. Murry opposed the theory that revenue sharing money, 
at least General Revenue Sharing, was intended by Congress 
to be used in place of categorical grants. He said, 
n ••• it is not fair that the Administration shou+d cut 
those grants just when cities are deciding what to do with 
General Revenue Sharing. It puts them behing the eight-
ball." He believed in the services provided by categor-
ica1 grants, but he feels they should continue to be fund-
8Interview with Mrs. Campbell, Member, Eugene City 
Council, Eugene, Oregon, 20 July 1973. 
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ed by the federal government, not local government with 
General Revenue Sharing funds. 9 
Another member of the City Counci+, Tom ':v'illiams, 
agreed with the City Manager's interpretation of revenue 
sharing as a vehicle through which local government might 
gain the benefit of the efficient federal tax collecting 
system. The money redistributed back to the states and 
localities, he felt, could be used as the local unit of 
government wanted, but he felt a very justified use of 
General Revenue Sharing funds was for tax relief. Mr. 
Williams was a White House Fellow for one year during the 
Nixon Administration, working most closely with Secretary 
of Commerce Stans. Although he did not take part in rev-
enue sharing deliberations, ~illiams observed and formu-
lated his opinions on revenue sharing, he says, during 
his time in Jashington. He feels, therefore, that the 
Nixon Administration did not want to make suggestions to 
the states and localities as to how to spend revenue shar-
ing money in their own areas. "That was the whole intent 
of the General Revenue Sharing program. " He felt, there-
fore, it becomes a matter of local needs and local poli-
tics to how the money is allocated. 10 as 
9Interview with Neal Murry, Member, Eugene City 
Council, Eugene, Oregon, 20 July 1973. 
10Williams, Interview. 
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A man who would agree that it is largely a matter 
of politics as to how revenue sharing money is distributed 
is Louis Peters, City Minority Affairs Representative for 
Eugene. A few years ago, Eugene created the position 
Peters now holds as a special effort to give representa-
tion to the city's minorities, who comprise about three 
percent of Eugene's population. Although Peters is Black, 
he sees his job as not just to represent the interests of 
Blacks in the community, but all minorities, Native 
Americans, Chicanos and Orientals as well. In this posi-
tion, it is not surprising that Peters believes the rev-
enue sharing money so far received by Eugene should go 
for social services for the city's minorities and disad-
vantaged. He felt that the minorities of America were 
led to believe that the purpose of revenue sharing was to 
take over for categorical grants and since the " ••• whole 
social structure of many Black communities in America is 
based on programs frorr: categorical grants, when they 
heard of revenue sharing, they assumed it was going to 
replace categorical grants." Peters fel t this irnpression 
was reinforced by the cutbacks in categorical grants by 
the Nixon Administration, but he feels the reality of the 
situation, that is, that revenue sharing money need not 
necessarily go to replace cutback categorical grants, shows 
that "Blacks were either mistaken or mis1ed.,,11 
Views of City Officials on How Eugene Allocated 
its Revenue Sharing Funds 
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Mrs. Campbell and Mr. Murry are part of the liberal 
majority on the Eugene Budget Committee and City Council. 
As such, it would be expected that they would generally 
agree with the way those two bodies allocated revenue 
sharing monies, and they do. r"irs. Campbell first of all 
agreed with the allocation of the 1972 funds in the "emer-
gency" Supplemental Budget. The fiscal needs of the po-
lice and parks were acute due to recent budget defeats and 
the revenue sharing money was a blessing for taking up the 
slack. She also agrees with the approximately $1 million 
allocation that went for property tax relief, although the 
allocation "looks blatantly political." She was, however, 
particularly enthusiastic with the allocations for social 
programs, especially the money pooled with the county for 
social service programs and the money that went for public 
housing in E:ugene. She remarked, hO'wever, that the al1o-
cation was only about one-half of what the majority of the 
Council wanted, but they had to compromise with the con-
servatives. 
Mrs. Campbell remarked that the city had been in the 
llInterview with Louis Peters, Eugene City Minority 
Affairs Representative, Eugene, Oregon, 20 July 1973. 
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social service business to a degree before. It had 
financed a detoxification center, a drug clinic and a 
senior citizen's center. The pressure to increase its 
social service obligations has increased dramatically, 
she said, due to recent federal cutbacks in social 
service aid. She thought it was important to note that 
even though the city is spending General Revenue Sharing 
funds for new social services, the city itself is not 
really getting into the social service business on a 
large new scale. The county is in the process of 
setting up a special new Social Services Department and 
the city will contract for these social services through 
the county and will pay for the services through its 
$200,000 from General Revenue Sharing alotted for that 
purpose. She added that, "The city's General Revenue 
Sharing funds are going for social services but not 
its time or administration -- there would be too much 
duplication between city and ~ounty otherwise; hopefully 
other cities in Lane County will do the same but so far 
th h t k . . 1 t' ,,12 ey ave a en no Slml ar ac lone 
Councilman Murry agrees with Mrs. Campbell's 
positions on how Eugene allocated its General Kevenuc 
Shdring funds. He emphasizes that he feels the money 
l2r '11 
_dmpDE: , Interview. 
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should have gone to previously unmet city needs, espe-
cially high on such a list would be the needs of its 
senior citizens. Therefore, he was particularly grati-
fied that as much money as was allocated for them, 
especially the public housing, was allocated. He wished 
that more of the revenue sharing money could have gone 
for programs such as juvenile crime prevention and the 
many other programs that need funding if the city is 
really to address its problems. He felt that the city 
must now see it as its responsibility to deal with social 
ills on a major scale because, obviously the federal 
government was drawing back from its commitment. Murry 
regretted, however, being pushed into specific social 
service programs because of the federal withdrawal from 
them. He believed that certain social programs that the 
federal government has been funding for some time should 
continue to be funded, but he agreed that it is the duty 
of the city to take up the slack until Special Revenue 
Sharing or some other funding source comes along, if one 
does. Er. Kurry is cognizant of the many innovative 
. 
ideas that have emerged in recent years as to how a city 
might deal with its social responsibilities and he sees 
revenue sharing as "opportunity dollars" for the city 
to experiment with new programs. Therefore, he is very 
disappointed that the revenue sharing money is so small 
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and the federal categorical cutbacks are so large as to 
compromise the essence of the revenue sharing opportunity. 
He feels Eugene has taken only a small step so far in 
its social service responsibilities and it must go fur-
ther. 13 
Although Mrs. Campbell and Mr. Murry were quite 
pleased with the social service programs allocated with 
General Revenue Sharing, but wished it could have been 
more, Louis Peters, in his position as Minority Affairs 
Representative, felt the General Revenue Sharing alloca-
tions were completely inadequate in terms of the needs 
of Eugene's minorities. He was upset that the programs 
he specifically recommended for funding were turned down 
by the City Council and the Budget Committee. Peters 
wanted some of the General Revenue Sharing funds to go 
for the establishment of a Chicano, Native American 
Affairs Center. He wanted also to see funded an Afro-
American Institute. These were to be community centers 
for these minority populations to enable them to get 
together and study their heritage and reinforce their 
senses of identity. He was pleased, however, that the 
Affirmative Action procedures he advocated were adopted 
promising the employment of minorities in social service 
13Murry, Interview. 
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agencies contracted with General Revenue Sharing funds and 
the fact that all groups would have equal access to the 
funded social services. 
Although Peters felt that minorities hoped General 
Revenue Sharing money would go for social programs to a 
large extent, in reality he saw the money going mostly 
for public safety, public works and property tax relief. 
He added, " ••• this again is a situation where the middle 
class is bettered at the expense of the lower class." 
Peters did believe, however, that the Mayor of Eugene 
and the City Manager do have the interests of the city's 
minorities in mind and what progress has been made in 
their behalf, those men have had a great deal to do 
-th 14 Wl • 
Hugh McKinley does seem to have the interests of 
the city's minorities at heart, he nevertheless defended 
the Council decision not to fund the two community 
centers Peters wanted. He felt the money for these pro-
jects would be money for a special interest block; a 
request by one segment of the community to enhance their 
own community only. He, and the Council, saw the purpose 
of the centers as to develop the identities of these 
minority people, which was not seen by the city decision-
l4peters, Interview. 
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making units, or the Joint Committee, as a regular request. 
It was seen as being too particularized and too partisan. 
McKinley felt that giving money to Peters' projects 
"would have been giving money to an agency that would not 
be making its services available to the whole community 
and that would be wrong." 
The City Manager also remarked that he was glad the 
city did not succumb to pressures from the State Legisla-
ture to assume Day Care Center responsibilities with city 
revenue sharing money. The state feels the city is "fat" 
now with its General Revenue Sharing money and has been 
pressuring the city to take over such programs, but 
McKinley feels Day Care Centers should continue as a 
state responsibility. He also had hoped it would not be 
necessary to spend revenue sharing money on projects 
like a new fire station and fire trucks because with the 
future drawback of General Revenue Sharing funds, a 
possibility exists that the further support of such 
capital projects will be difficult. But the fire equip-
ment was necessary, and the General Revenue Sharing funds 
were all that was available to fund themo l5 
Tom Williams considered himself the conservative 
voice of the Eugene City Council and as such endorsed the 
15McKinley, Interview. 
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staff recommendations as to how the General Revenue 
Sharing funds should be allocated. Those recommendations 
were that the money should go primarily for the police 
department and the general administrative functions of 
the city and less money for social services and parks 
and recreation. He does not go along with the Budget 
Committee and City Council revenue sharing allocation 
decisions. Williams feels "the first responsibility 
of the city is to adequately serve the function of pro-
tection of people and property and as those needs become 
reasonably well satisfied, then, if the city has funds 
left over, it can spend them in the social service area." 
Especially, he agrees with the Lane County Organization 
of Government's recommendation that public housing re-
sponsibilities rest with the state and federal govern-
ments and not the city. He was flatly against spending 
General Revenue Sharing funds on public housing for the 
16 
elderly. 
Views of City Officials on the Eugene General Revenue 
Sharing Decision-Making Process 
In the opinion of the City Manager, Eugene's revenue 
sharing sharing decision-making process was an open one. 
It was open in the sense that persons or groups could make 
l6williams, Interview. 
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requests to the city staff on General Revenue Sharing 
funds and could attend the hearings of the Budget Commit-
tee, the City Council and/or the Joint Committee. Also, 
r/icKinley feels the City Council membership is broadly rep-
resentative of the various interests in Eugene. He did 
not regret that no special machinery for citizen partici-
pation was set up as he interpreted the Act as saying that 
General Revenue Sharing funds are to be allocated accord-
ing to regular budget processes. It should be remembered, 
however, that half the Eugene Budget Committee is made up 
of lay people, so the public has long been involved in the 
budget process. ~cKinley does feel, however, that minor-
ities were not represented in the Lane County Organization 
of Governments deliberations and that that was a serious 
oversight. As he put it, "At the county level, no one 
constantly goes to bat for minorities and so they are left 
out sometimes." McKinley endorses the Budget Committee 
decision not to fund the minority centers requested by 
Peters because they were going to serve only a part of the 
community. McKinley points out that the decision was not 
taken lightly and many representatives of minority groups 
carne to hearings asking for the centers, which supplement-
ed Peters' own appeal. 
~r. McKinley feels that the Community Action Program 
in Eugene has had some effect in politicizing the city's 
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minorities, but not much. In his opinion, the program in 
Eugene has been chiefly a failure due to mismanagement. 
Now, most of the Community Action Program responsibilities 
have been taken over by the county, but McKinley feels the 
real fault may lie with local government. He maintains 
that cities and counties should have taken up social ser-
vice responisbilities long ago before the War on Poverty, 
but they did not, so private groups had to fill the vac-
uum. He said he felt guilty for not responding long ago 
to the needy in his area. Now, however, revenue sharing 
has offered the city and county the financial ability to 
take up some social responsibilities and he is glad of it. 
McKinley has watched as the Council and Budget Committee 
have dealt with the General Revenue Sharing funds and he 
feels they were not sure what to do with so much money at 
first because they were used to having barely enough money 
to meet basic city needs. The idea of getting together 
with the county and the Lane County Organization of Gov-
ernments resulted from their earlier difficulties in de-
ciding how to deal with General Revenue Sharing funds. I ? 
Neal ~urry and Mrs. Campbell both mentioned a short-
coming in the decision-making process in Eugene that goes 
beyond the revenue sharing deliberations themselves. Both 
mentioned that the position of City Councilman in Eugene 
l7McKinley, Interview. 
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is a nonpaying, volunteer position. As such, it precludes 
moderate and low income people from either having the mon-
ey to run for office or taking the time from work during 
the week to meet City Hall demands. Murry estimated he 
spent about twenty hours per week doing city work apart 
from his administrative position with the University of 
bregon. So the Council itself may not be as broadly rep-
resentative of Eugene as it should be because of the vol-
unteer nature of the position. 
Mrs Murry also pointed out that it has been a long-
standing problem in Eugene that Budget Committee hearings 
are lightly attended and sometimes not attended at all by 
townspeople. In part, he feels, it is because of the com-
plexity of the issues. Regular citizens lack a knowledge 
of budgetary specifics. He added, " ••• it might be wise 
to try to find some creative ways to get citizens' par-
ticipation." Murry was concerned that the opinions of 
Eugene's small minority population were not adequately 
heard in the General Revenue Sharing decision-making pro-
cess. Because they make up only three percent of the pop-
ulation, some members of the Council feel the city really 
has no problem in the area of minority affairs. Mr. Murry 
is not one of those people. 
Murry pointed to one aspect of the Eugene political 
scene that is having increasing significance in terms of 
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representing people in city government. Many of Eugene's 
neighborhoods are developing neighborhood councils that 
send representatives to hearings. The whole city is not 
organized along these lines yet and all organization that 
exists so far has been done by the neighborhoods themselves 
and not at the initiative of city government. Some rev-
enue sharing funds, however, have gone to help these coun-
cils with clerical needs. Murry and ~rs. Campbell felt, 
however, that members on the City Council quite ade-
quately represent the city's neighborhoods, partly because 
th 1 t d d b . 18 ey are e ec e on a war as~s. 
Two of those interviewed in Eugene were less happy 
with the representation given all groups in the city in 
the revenue sharing decision-making process. As we have 
seen, no one has been wholely satisfied, but Tom Williams 
and Louis Peters seemed most critical. Mr. Williams felt 
that the Council and Budget Committee processes were not 
particularly open "as they never are in the governing 
process." He felt that the input from the community was 
not particularly representative of the community. He 
specifically pointed out that the only people who appeared 
at hearings in any numbers were not those who want and 
need city services, but those who want to provide them. 
He was clearly talking about social service agency activ-
18 Murry, Interview. 
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ist administrators who were worried about losing their 
jobs due to federal funding cutbacks. Further, Williams 
felt the minority populations of the city are not well 
represented. Mr. Peters, as minority affairs representa-
tive, "is supposed to represent all city minorities but 
he tends to represent mainly Blacks." "However ,It he adds, 
"minorities are not a major problem in the community.,,19 
Louis Peters felt he was largely excluded from the 
General Revenue Sharing decision-making process. As ~i-
nority Affairs Representative for the City of Eugene he 
does not have a vote on either the City Councilor the 
Budget Committee and so his input could only be in an ad-
visory capacity. When he heard that General Revenue Shar-
ing was coming to Eugene, he went to the various minority 
communities in the city and advised people there to go to 
public hearings on revenue sharing and push for the pro-
grams they wanted. 
While organizing the city's minorities to petition 
for revenue sharing funds, Peters also told the City Man-
ager and his assistant what the minority communities were 
asking. They wanted, as we have seen, an Afro-American 
Institute and a Chicano, Native Americans' Affairs Center. 
About seventy-five minorities came to the Budget Committee 
hearings and spoke for these projects. The Committee 
19williams, Interview. 
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listened and then reviewed the Joint Committee findings 
and decided not to fund the programs. Upon the advice of 
the city's Human Rights Commission, Peters went back to 
the Budget Committee and tried again, this time also ask-
ing for an Affirmative Action plan for equal treatment 
for minorities with revenue sharing funds be adopted. The 
Committee decided in favor of the Affirmative Action plan 
but still turned down the other proposals. Hugh McKinley, 
earlier in this chapter, gave the city's reasoning for 
turning the programs down. 
Although discouraged by not getting what he wanted 
from the Council, Peters is still pleased about one thing. 
He believed that the city's minorities are now more activ-
istic due to the revenue sharing struggle. Now they have 
formed a new organization, the Lane County Non-White Tax-
Payers Association. It is an effort to solidify Eugene's 
minorities for political purposes, says Peters. This new 
organization is also the outgrowth of the performance of 
the local Community Action Program. In his opinion, the 
local Community Action Program does not have the support 
of Blacks and other minorities in Eugene. He maintains 
that it has never been representative of the needs of the 
city's minorities. Peters has gotten minorities hired in 
the Community Action Program organization but they have 
all shortly quit because of the "institutionalized racism 
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that permeates the institution." He believes this is so 
partly because the chairman of the local organization is 
an unsympathetic white and partly because the program is 
so disorganized. A further reason, however, that local 
minorities were turned off to the organization to begin 
with was because it replaced an organization called Lane 
Human Resources. That organization was primarily staffed 
with minorities and when it became a Community Action 
Program they were replaced with nonminorities. Later, 
when Peters thought he could place some minorities in Com-
munity Action Program positions he had little luck be-
cause it was being led by whites living in rural Lane 
County, who have a long history of being anti-Black. So, 
Peters saw that the Community Action Program was not a 
group that could lobby for minorities and hence his new 
organization was created, the Lane County Non-white Tax-
payers Association. 
Peters joins McKinley in lamenting the lack of mi-
nority representation on the Lane County Organization of 
Governments staff. In Peters' opinion, its recommenda-
tions clearly showed they did not have much minority input. 
Mr. Peters, however, has great hope for the future success 
of his new interest group and thanks revenue sharing for 
indirectly helping it to get off the ground. He also be-
lieves the City Manager and the Mayor truly care about the 
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city's minorities. It is rural Lane County that seems 
least sympathetic to minority needs and that is a serious 
20 problem. 
In three areas, revenue sharing seems to have de-
veloped better communication and representation between 
units of government and citizens of the Eugene/Lane 
County area. First, there is the new minorities organ-
ization mentioned above. Second, there is the help rev-
enue sharing funds are giving to the further development 
of the neighborhood concept in Eugene. Neal Murry ex-
plains that the neighborhood organizations so far are 
developed in a wide range of neighborhoods in terms of 
socioeconomic levels. Each neighborhood organization is 
working to develop plans for its community in the context 
of the 1990 Comprehensive Plan already worked out for 
Eugene, which is a land use plan. The revenue sharing 
funds going to provide city staff help for the neighbor-
hood organizations should help to spur the neighborhood's 
work and bring them closer to city government, in Murry's 
opinion. Third, revenue sharing has definitely encour-
aged city/county cooperation in the area of social ser-
vices. As the Joint City of Eugene-Lane County Social 
Service Review Committee said in its report: 
20peters, Interview. 
Revenue Sharing presents a unique opportunity 
to promote coordination, cooperation, communi-
cation and continuity of care and services within21 
our rather complex and confusing delivery system. 
Through Joint City/County efforts, it is hoped 
that overall community priorities can be estab-
lished prior to the in~~iation of the review pro-
cess next fiscal year. 
Views of City Officials on Federal Aid to Cities 
If General Revenue Sharing has had a beneficial 
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effect in the greater Eugene area in terms of represen-
tation and communication, it has also been received en-
thusiastically by all but one of those interviewed as a 
very desirable form of federal aid. 
Mrs. Campbell and Mr. McKinley were specific in 
pointing out their belief that cities are very able to 
determine their most pressing needs and the flexibility 
and latitude given cities such as Eugene in block grant 
programs is thus seen as very desirable. I"lcKinley went 
on to say that block grants recognize the superior taxing 
ability of the federal government and at the same time the 
superior knowledge of local problems by local government. 
He strongly endorses this type of aid but feels cities 
should have to make application for Special Revenue Shar-
ing. He argued that a city should have a community devel-
opment plan that is submitted to the federal government 
2lReport to the Budget Committee, p. 5. 
22 Ibid., p. 7. 
that indicates in detail that the city is ready for its 
block grant and knows what it is going to do with it. 
Only then should the block grant be forthcoming. Such 
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a process, he said, is "better that a shotgun block grant." 
He feared, however, after his recent trip to Washington 
that Special Revenue Sharing was in deep trouble and 
would not come out of Congress for some time. 23 
Mrs. Campbell added that categorical grants tend to 
make the cities apply for them whether the city needs that 
specific form of federal aid very badly or not. This is 
wasteful of tax money and also the time and energies of 
local government as it tries to decide what to do with in-
appropriate categorical grant money. She preferred block 
grants for the same reasons stated by the City t.IJanager and 
she echoed the Tacoma City I'lanager' s hopes that the cities 
perform well with General Revenue Sharing so that Congress 
will continue it indefinitely.24 
As Minority Affairs Representative, Louis Peters 
said he would not be opposed to a block grant like revenue 
sharing if the money would go to the minorities and other 
disadvantaged in the community in the amounts they really 
need. He felt minorities were tricked into believing the 
General Revenue Sharing money would go into social pro-
23~cKinley, Interview. 
24 Campbell, Interview. 
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grams. In reality, not enough is, and under the guide-
lines of the Act, as he reads it, no revenue sharing 
money need necessarily go to replace cutback social ser-
vice categorical grants. He feels minorities are in-
creasingly alienated as a result of this. The specific 
guidelines of categorical grants are all that can insure 
the disadvantaged will get any federal aid, felt Peters. 
So far, he said, General Revenue Sharing has demonstrated 
the "typical neglect of the minorities by the white 
. . t ,,25 maJor~ y. 
III. EUGENE: SUB-CONCLUSIONS 
If the New Federalism is working, it means that 
power, funds and responsibility are flowing from Washing-
ton, D.C., to the states, localities and the people, in 
part, through General Revenue Sharing. The liberal major-
ity on the Eugene City Council seem to have taken the 
funds that have flowed to them and exerted considerable 
independent judgment and responsibility in deciding where 
the General Revenue Sharing funds should go. In spending 
as much as was spent on social services, and especially 
the funding of a public housing project, the increased re-
sponsibility of the Council over the restrictions of cat-
egorical grants was evidenced. To say that Eugene has 
25 Peters, Interview. 
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more power due to General Revenue Sharing is also pos-
sible. Certainly, Eugene faces the same categorical grant 
cutbacks, the same inflation and an increase,jn the demand 
for services that the other cities studied faced. And, 
although these were certainly compromising factors in the 
overall power increase gained by the city from General 
Revenue Sharing, the Council still dared to allocate 
heavily for other than traditional city service needs. 
Again, the public housing allotment and the relatively 
large amount spent on social services witness this fact. 
The amount of power gained by the city cannot be measured 
in any absolute sense, but an assessment of its General 
Revenue Sharing activities indicates a command over the 
allocation of resources was exercised by the City Council 
that it had been financially unable, together with being, 
perhaps, philosophically unwilling, to exercise before 
General Revenue Sharing. 
Eugene took unusual initiative in trying to assess 
its own social service needs through its cooperative pro-
gram with Lane County in that area. The New Federalism 
argues that it is desirable for cities to establish their 
own priorities in the community and social service areas 
and determine the best methods for meeting their needs. 
This is part of the decentralization aspect of the New 
Federalism. Although there was certainly considerable 
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debate in the Budget Committee and on the City Council on 
priorities and methods for realizing them, the city took 
the responsibility seriously and the availability of Gen-
eral Revenue Sharing funds made the whole thing possible. 
It would be going too far to suggest that the Eugene ex-
perience itself has measurably decentralized American gov-
ernment, but the interest and initiative shown by that 
city in independent priority setting and determining its 
own means to fulfill those priorities show that a measure 
of decentralization may be possible if not compromised by 
other fiscal constraints and interference by "higher" lev-
els of government that could infringe on local affairs. 
Eugene has taken seriously Hr. Nathan's categories 
for local decision-making under the New Federalism, namely, 
human and community service programs. Again, some on the 
Council and the Lane County Organization of Governments 
report may not agree with the majority on the Council that 
some of these functions are properly assumed by the city, 
but the majority has ruled that the city's responsibil-
ities are quite broad in these areas. It must be pointed 
out, however, that although the City Manager and some on 
the Council feel the city should take up responsibilities 
in these areas, it is the reality of federal cutbacks in 
categorical grants in the human and community service 
areas that has also driven the city to assume some respon-
340 
sibility in those areas. But one gets the impression 
that Eugene knows now that it will have to move increas-
ingly in the human and social service areas and programs 
such as city/county cooperation in the social services 
indicate that commitment. 
Mr. McKinley was careful to point out that the 
city and the county are in the process of evaluating 
social programs that have gone on in both units of gov-
ernment in an effort to see to it that worthwhile programs 
are continued to be funded and not lost in the shuffle 
from categorical grant funding to revenue sharing funding. 
Actually this process has gone on since the Lane County 
Organization of Governments' study was started. It 
appears that as long as the current administration and 
the current majority on the City Council exist in 
Eugene, their appraisal of which programs should be con-
.tinued will likely be sympathetic to the city's disad-
vantaged and its minorities. Mr. Peters might want the 
city to go further but he too agreed that the city of 
Eugene is the only hope for minorities in the area. Lane 
County government, in his opinion, is quite hostile to 
their interests. 
Has General Revenue Sharing brought the government 
closer to the people of Eugene? As we have seen, the 
Eugene Budget Committee has laymen equal in number to 
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Council members serving on it; thus the individual citizen 
has a voice on budget matters over and above the open 
hearing process. The regular budget decision-making 
process has already been designed to include "the people." 
Also, the Joint Committee making social service recommend-
ations had individual citizens serving on it as well. But 
revenue sharing had an effect in bringing the government 
of Eugene closer to the people, in individual and small 
group forms, at least potentially, in two areas. First, 
some revenue sharing money went to aid the development 
of Eugene's neighborhoods as effective representation 
units for their citizens at City Hall. Also the new 
minority interest group, the Lane County Non-White Tax 
Payers Association was formed to lobby for revenue shar-
ing money because the town's minorities saw the local 
Community Action Program as not really representative of 
their interests. In these two ways the access of indiv-
iduals and small divergent groups to the halls of govern-
ment seems to have been given impetus by General Revenue 
Sharing. But the importance of the individual and his 
need to have access to government se~ms already to have 
been recognized in the previously established decision-
making procedures for budgetary matters in Eugene. It 
is fair to say that the decision-making process for 
revenue sharing in Eugene was fairly open. Mr. Peters 
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and others argued, however, that the average citizen and 
particularly the average minority,did not have the repre-
sentation they should have had. And it is true that the 
city did not go out of its way to create a special citizen 
inclusion apparatus for deciding revenue sharing alloca-
tions, with the possible exception of the citizens on the 
Joint Committee. How "open" a decision-making process 
is is a relative question. Relative to the other cities 
in this study, Eugene is perhaps less open than Tacoma 
in making General Revenue Sharing decisions, but more open 
than either Portland or Seattle. The individual citizen 
was deliberately included in the decision-making process 
in Eugene and that leads to an "individualistic" inter-
pretation of the New Federalism in terms of how the city 
defined the Nixon Administration's goal of returning power 
to the people. 
A goal of the New Federalism was that various levels 
of government should play certain functional roles in 
providing services. As we have seen, in Eugene there was 
a willingness expressed by most of those interviewed to 
assume human and social service responsibilities at the 
city level. The main point being that if there is not 
enough money available, local government will not be able 
to do the job adequately. 
The New Federalism also has as its goal that the 
federal system should be decentralized. It was argued 
earlier that Eugene has gained a measure of power from 
General Revenue Sharing, but it would be going too far 
to suggest this small city has become so strengthened 
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as to be very "independent" from either the State of 
Oregon or the federal government. Eugene is financially 
and constitutionally incapable of functioning as sub-
stantially detached from either of those two units of 
government, with or without General Revenue Sharing. 
In Eugene we see a very special effort by the city's 
minorities to seek help from the city where help has been 
denied them from the Federal and State and even county 
governments. The Lane County Non-White Tax Payers Associ-
ation is an effort to petition City Hall for money and 
programs to address the needs of the town's minorities 
and the disadvantaged in the light of federal aid cut-
backs and the failure of the local Community Action 
Program to represent those groups. General Revenue Shar-
ing indirectly lea to the formation of this group because 
the town's minorities pulled together to lobby for 
General Revenue Sharing funds and then formed the new 
interest group having found a sense of group identity 
and a measure of effectiveness. Those fearful of the 
New Federalism worry about minorities not finding a hear-
ing at the local level with General Revenue Sharing, fear 
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a loss of politicization of the poor and minorities. 
In Eugene those disappointed by the cutback in federal 
grants for social programs are definitely seeking to 
open Eugene government to their requests for help. But 
these people are asking the city for help, less because 
they were politicized during the War on Poverty program 
period than because of Mr. Peters' current efforts. In 
fact, the minorities seem to be more active in spite of 
the Community Action Program in the area than because 
of its success. 
To a significant degree Eugene and Lane County are 
working to continue to fund social programs that existed 
during the ~ar on Poverty and are now threatened with 
financial cutbacks from the federal government. True, 
many of the social programs funded by the $275,000 for 
this purpose were not specifically War on Poverty pro-
grams, as Mr. McKinley reported, many of those programs 
folded long ago. But Head Start and other programs con-
sidered useful to the needy are going to continue to be 
evaluated by both the city and the county and if not 
funded, will be considered for funding at the midyear 
allocation period. There is no evidence the Council 
majority wants to abandon the recent national priority 
of helping the disadvantaged as much as limited funding 
will allow. The Council majority stated more specifically 
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that was the case in any other city studied, that they 
felt the community had a responsibility to solve social 
problems through the use of public resources. Mr. 
McKinley wished the city had started long ago. Mr. 
Williams represented the voice of the t0wn's conservative 
business community, but that group is in the minority 
on the Council and the Budget Committee. Thus it seems 
that as of now, there is no; danger the local special 
interests will be able to set priorities different from 
recent national goals in terms of responsibility of the 
collectivity to help the needy with public funds. But 
politics is fluid and the balance on the Council could 
change, and if a Williams majority ever takes power, 
then such national priorities as discussed here would 
be in danger in Eugene. 
There is no evidence those interviewed in Euqene 
believe General Revenue Sharing should come to them with 
strict guidelines from ~ashington, D.C., in order to 
protect national priorities and effect justice and the 
rule of law in America. They seem to feel law and 
justice are not jeopardized by locals making decisions 
that affect the whole community. It is not that the 
problems addressed by the possible use of revenue sharing 
monies are not problems that the federal government once 
would let locals deal with only under the direction of 
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of federal guidelines, bec8U.se the General Revenue Sharing 
funds used to car~y on categorical grants are funds being 
used for programs carefully regulated from Washington, 
D.C. It is simply that the New Federalism does not lay 
strict guidelines in its block grants and very area of 
society is potentially affected. The possibility that 
local interests could erase the progress made in this 
county in civil rights and other areas there, but in 
Eugene the Council majority seems to agree with the 
goals of national interests and Lowi, that justice for 
all citizens equally should be a local goal as well as 
a national one. In the brief time Eugene has had General 
Revenue Sharing, there is nothing to indicate the cause 
of civil rights or of minority interests are not also 
the cause of the majority who make the decisions in City 
Hall at this time. 
Interest group liberalism would have to be seen as 
being a considerable boost in Eugene as a result of Gen-
eral Revenue Sharing. The new minority organization that 
has already been active in seeking General Revenue Sharing 
money and the new neighborhood groups are indirectly 
the product of General Revenue Sharing and its surrounding 
politics. Many interest groups petitioned for General 
Revenue Sharing funds and were dealt with either by City 
Hall or by the Joint City/County committe~s. General 
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Revenue Sharing did nothing to weaken interest group 
liberalism in Eugene, it strengthened it. As to whether 
this will further frustrate the cause of justice in 
American remains to be seen. But Lowi would agree, that 
because General Revenue Sharing had so few guidelines in 
the first place, the bargaining at the state and local 
level as to what will be done with the funds is the 
inevitable result. Lowi would be upset over the wide 
range of areas touched by General Revenue Sharing with 
no firm guidelines from Washington protecting the rule 
of law and the cause of justice, but such is the design 
and intent of General Revenue Sharing. 
Lowi was particularly worried about the further 
decentralization of the American system that results from 
strong and "autonomous" cities. As a result of General 
Revenue Sharing, Eugene may be a measure stronger, but 
it is in no way autonomous. Again, the goal of the New 
Federalism was to strengthen the concurrent regimes below 
the national governmental level in our compound republic. 
It is clearly a philosophy of decentralization that is 
contrary to what Lowi advocates for the promotion of 
justice in this country. Lowi did want the states 
strengthened, but the cities eliminated as separate 
decision-making units of government. General Revenue 
Sharing may be helping the states, but it is also helping 
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the cities financially. But it is always important to 
remember that the strength of every level of government 
touched by General Revenue Sharing may be, and in many 
cases is, compromised by fiscal incun~erances that may 
be no net gain for the city or state if Special Revenue 
Sharing and other forms of federal aid are not forthcoming. 
In terms of Lowi, however, General Revenue Sharing by 
itself is doing nothing to lessen whatever autonomy the 
cit~has. 
~ 
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CHAPTER VIII 
GENERAL REVENUE SHARING AND THE NEW FEDERALISM: 
SOME EARLY CONCLUSIONS ON THE URBAN EXPERIENCE 
In this final chapter we will pull together and 
analyze the information contained in the "Sub-Conclusions" 
sections of the case studies of Seattle, Tacoma, Portland 
and Eugene. We will make a further effort to compare and 
explain the General Revenue Sharing experiences of these 
cities in terms of the goals and fears of the New Federal-
ism outlined in detail in Chapter III. Each of the goals 
and each of the fears will be specified. Under each head-
ing, a final evaluation of General Revenue Sharing and the 
New Federalism will be made in terms of that specific 
goal or fear. 
I. GOALS OF THE NEW FEDERALISM 
1. Seeing to it that Power, Funds and Responsibility Flow 
from Washington, D.C., to the States, Localities and the 
People. 
Throughout this study, we have defined power as the 
command over the allocation of resources. Each city could 
be assumed to have increased its power if, due to receiv-
ing General Revenue Sharing funds, it had a greater con-
trol over its fiscal situation than it did before receiv-
l 
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ing the revenue sharing funds. In each case, we have 
found that, although the city officials welcomed the Gen-
eral Revenue Sharing funds, and especially the fact that 
it came with so few federal guidelines, they found the 
money did not give them much new power. Inflation, rising 
labor costs, cutback federal categorical grants and in-
creasing demands for traditional city services have all 
combined to negate whatever control over the allocation of 
resources revenue sharing funds might have given the cit-
ies. We saw that in Portland, traditional urban responsi-
bilities were unmet or underfunded. With this being the 
case, the city had to spend its General Revenue Sharing 
funds on meeting the city's most basic needs. In the case 
of both Seattle and Tacoma, we found that the Washington 
State Legislature is further insuring that the cities do 
not gain any real power from General Revenue Sharing. The 
Legislature seems to feel that the cities are now wealthy 
with their new General Revenue Sharing funds and thus can 
absorb cutbacks in state aid. Those interviewed in Seat-
tle and Tacoma could not agree less with the Legislature. 
In Eugene, the situation seemed to be a bit differ-
ent. In that small city the City Council allocated con-
siderable General Revenue Sharing funds to public housing 
and other social programs that were not at all traditional 
city responsibilities. The Council allocated funds in new 
r 
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areas and thus demonstrated considerable power, new power, 
to do things they were financially unable to do without 
revenue sharing. It can perhaps be explained that being 
a smaller city, Eugene had fewer demands on its financial 
resources and thus ·could afford to spend the money in new 
areas that larger cities could not afford to do. This is 
probably the case, at least in part. In a larger sense, 
however, where the money goes is a function"of the priori-
ties of the City Council majority. In Eugene, the major~ 
ity wanted large parts of the General Revenue Sharing 
funds to go for nontraditional purposes. 
We saw the same thing in Seattle. The Council ma-
jority there wanted a large part of the General Revenue 
Sharing funds to go for housing rehabilitation, the reno-
vation of historical sights and other purposes. These are 
not usually funded with city monies. Certainly, Seattle 
is a large city with tremendous demands for the allocation 
of its funds. 
The reality, then, of the fiscal crunch shared by 
all cities is a constraint upon how much power has been 
gained through General Revenue Sharing. However, the city 
may venture forth into new areas with the General Revenue 
Sharing money if the City Council majority so authorizes. 
Doing so, of course, means that something else is not be-
ing funded. One thing that everyone interviewed seemed to 
r 
352 
agree on is that the General Revenue Sharing allocation to 
their city was not very much money. Especially consider-
ing the fact that Special Revenue Sharing has not passed 
Congress, the General Revenue Sharing funds were being de-
manded by social service agencies that should have been 
funded by categorical grants or Special Revenue Sharing. 
So the amount of power gained by each city was compromised 
by the fact that the actual amount of General Revenue 
Sharing that the city received was not as great as it 
might be if it was really to be the "new money" promised 
by the Administration. If the amount of General Revenue 
Sharing had in fact been greater it could have been the 
"new money" that could provide the opportunity for each 
city to undertake new programs without ignoring or under-
funding traditional services. But the demands on the Gen-
eral Revenue Sharing funds were too great for the money 
to be "new money." Where General Revenue Sharing allowed 
new programs to develop it was less because of the finan-
cial opportunity offered by revenue sharing than because 
of the political muscle used by council majorities. 
Pursuant to the goals of the Revenue Sharing Act, 
funds did flow from Washington, D.C., to Seattle, Tacoma, 
Portland and Eugene. Little power accompanied those funds 
because of fiscal constraints. In every city, however, 
the increased responsibility given the city through the 
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General Revenue Sharing block grant was definitely felt. 
Each city realized it had to decide how to allocate Gen-
eral Revenue Sharing funds and where to allocate them. 
The Revenue Sharing Act itself only gave the broadest 
guidelines as to how and where to allocate. Each city 
took this new responsibility very seriously. In terms of 
procedure, however, they varied. They varied principally 
in deciding who should participate in the revenue sharing 
decision-making process. This will be eEamined in some 
detail later. 
The cities were remarkably consistent in recognizing 
the need to set up some sort of bureau to help decide how 
to allocate and how to administer revenue sharing funds 
for human and community services. Each city had some vari-
ation of a human services bureau established. They seemed 
to recognize clearly one hard fact about the New Federal-
ism, that being that local government is going to have to 
take over deciding about and administering human and com-
munity service programs. The federal government will only 
supply the money. 
The severity of political conflict in Seattle over 
the allocation of General Revenue Sharing funds attested 
to this new responsibility. Some councilmen refused to 
believe or agree that human and community services were 
municipal responsibilities, regardless of the New Federal-
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ism. Councilman Williams in Eugene hel~. a similar senti-
ment. Yet the Council majority in each city seemed to . 
recognize the new responsibilities of revenue sharing and 
tried to organize for them. All that was missing was 
enough General Revenue Sharing (and Special Revenue Shar-
ing?) money to handle to new responsibilities properly. 
Later in this chapter, we will examine whether the 
power, funds and responsibility flowing from Washington, 
D.C., to the cities has reached "the people." 
2. Making Government, at All Levels, More Responsive. 
This Can Be Done by Making Specific Layers (National, 
State, Local) of Government Responsible for SpecifiC 
Programs So It Will Be Easier for the People to Know 
Which Layer of Government to Hold Accountable for Which 
Programs. A Goal Is the Decentralization of American 
Government in Terms of Certain Functions being Assumed 
by Certain Levels of Government. For Example, Human 
and Community Services Would be Functional Areas of 
Concern to State and Local Governments, Not the Nation-
al Government. 
This goal of the New Federalism suggests the_ Admin-
istration sees American federalism in terms of the layer 
cake theory. The top "layer" in Washington, D.C., should 
be responsible for some governmental responsibilities and 
the "lower" layer should have separate responsibilities. 
In seeking to so divide and separate governmental respon-
sibilities, the Nixon Administration appears to want to 
get away from the shared responsibility for most govern-
mental functions that has typified American federalism 
through history. This New Federalism goal wants to elimi-
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nate the shared responsibilities and decisions expressed 
in the "marble cake" theory of federalism. 
This goal of the New Federalism is difficult to as-
sess in terms of the cities studied because of the newness 
of General Revenue Sharing and the nonexistence of Special 
Revenue Sharing. As we have seen, although every city 
studied has taken very seriously the fact that they are 
expected under the New Federalism to take as their func-
tional concern human and community services, they have not 
received adequate federal funding to do the job. This is 
because General Revenue Sharing is inadequate and Special 
Revenue Sharing has been held up in Congress. The basic 
decentralization goal of the New Federalism simply cannot 
be accomplished unless Special Revenue Sharing becomes a 
reality and General Revenue Sharing is extended indefinite-
ly. 
The latter is the case because the cities studied 
are reluctant to fund anything but temporary or short-term 
programs with General Revenue Sharing because they do not 
want to get into an expensive long-term program and then 
find General Revenue Sharing ended, thus cuttingcrf their 
financial support of these programs. In every city the 
sentiment was shared that they were reluctant to undertake 
the long-term types of programs that the city must under-
take if it is to get into the human and community services 
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business permanently. They feared Congress would not re-
new the program when General Revenue Sharing expires. The 
human services bureaus set up in every city were a tenta-
tive step toward recognizing the city's new responsibili-
ties, but they were modest undertakings considering the 
bureaucratic undertaking each city will have to commit it-
self to once it is assured revenue sharing is a permanent 
thing. Before cities can do that, Congress will have to 
establish a permenent revenue sharing program that can 
withstand the partisan poli~ies of various administra-
tions and congresses. As of this writing there seems very 
little chance of Congress making such a commitment. Due 
to Watergate, the Nixon Administration appears to be sub-
stantially weakened in its ability to get legislation 
through Congress and this, too, lessens considerably the 
chance that revenue sharing will become the established 
national policy it must become if the cities are to com-
mit themselves to decentralization. 
Because the decentralization aspect of the New Fed-
eralism is so incomplete it is not possible for local 
citizens to hold their local governments responsible for 
human and community services in place of the national gov-
ernment. Thus, it is not possible to evaluate whether 
citizens at the local level feel their city governments 
are more responsive to them in these functional areas. 
I 
t 
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A feeling of some sort of "independence" from the 
state and national government that would accompany genuine 
decentralization of American government has not been felt 
in the cities studied. City officials still consider 
themselves the creatures of their states and greatly de-
pendent on the state and federal governments for financial 
aid. Of course, the New Federalism did not suggest that 
the decentralization it seeks would ever have as a compo-
nent part the financial independence of local government. 
The goal was that local government should decide how to 
spend federal monies at the local level on human and com-
munity service programs. Yet even in this sense, the of-
ficials interviewed felt the limited amount of revenue 
sharing funds they were getting, together with the great 
demand for funds, limited considerably whatever "inde-
pendence" they might exercise in allocating the funds. 
That is, demands were so strong from areas traditionally 
funded by the city that it was difficult to fund reduced 
federal programs, much less any new or innovative ones. 
Yet we did see Council majorities in Eugene and Seattle 
exercising some independence in allocating General Revenue 
Sharing funds for nontraditional purposes. But, as stated 
earlier, this exercise of "independence" seems less an op-
portunity given by the receiving of General Revenue Shar-
ing funds than the successful exercise of political power 
.L 
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by one group of Councilmembers. 
Cities became dependent on the federal government 
because they needed money to carry out basic services, to 
keep up with inflation and to meet increasing labor costs. 
For cities to develop any independence from the federal 
government in determining priorities in human and commu-
nity service areas, that is, for decentralization to bee 
come a reality, the federal government must give consid-
erably more money in the form of revenue sharing to the 
cities and must guarantee it indefinitely. Otherwise, the 
cities will not be able to make either the financial or 
psychological Gommi tment necessary to iir.·.fact assume re-
sponsibility for human and community services. That com-
mitment is necessary to make decentralization a reality. 
3. Involving the Average Citizen in Local Decision-
Making Processes on Public Policy Matters. The Goal Is 
to Bring Government Closer to the People. Thus the Citi-
zen Will be Able to Evaluate Both Programs and Officials 
and Will Seek to Retain Those That Are Useful and Dis-
pose of the Rest. Citizens and State and Local Offi-
cials Are to Work Together in Establishing Ptiorities 
and Policies Based Upon Local Characteristics and Needs. 
We saw in Chapter III that the New Federalism goal 
of returning government "to the people~I' is an ambiguous 
but important goal. Because the State and Local Fiscal 
Assistance Act of 1972 did not specify how "the people" 
were to be involved in the revenue sharing decision-making 
process, it was left to each city to decide how, and to 
359 
what extent, "the people" in their community were to par-
ticipate in the General Revenue Sharing experience. We 
have seen in the case studies that a wide variety of pro-
cedures were adopted for deciding how to allocate General 
Revenue Sharing funds. There was also variety in terms of 
how broad a cross section of citizens in the municipal 
area received benefits from the allocation of General Rev-
enue Sharing funds. 
In the January/February, 1974, issue of Society, .. 
Gregg Beyer examined the role of the individual citizen 
in the revenue sharing decision-making process. He said 
that, " ••• the trend toward greater citizen participation 
in the decision-making process seems irreversible. There 
is, after all, no power greater than an idea whose time 
has come."l There is no question but that this central 
fact of political life was recognized by those interviewed 
for this study. Nevertheless, the four cities did vary in 
how they addressed the current trend toward citizen par-
ticipation in this country. 
Tacomaa In Tacoma, we found a Mayor who was sup-
ported by an administrative staff and a majority of the 
City Council who felt that citizen participation in gov-
ernment decision-making was a good idea. Tacoma, under 
IGregg Beyer, "Revenue Sharing and the New Federal-
ism," Society, January/February, 1974, p. 61. 
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the Mayor's leadership, went out of its way to set up a 
very elaborate decision-making apparatus that included 
many citizens from all walks of life in various stages of 
the project evaluation and fund allocation of Tacoma's 
General Revenue Sharing monies. The ultimate decision on 
allocation rests with the Tacoma City Council, but there 
is no question but that the average Tacoma citizen had a 
representative in the pre-City Council decision-making 
activities. In Tacoma, "returning government to the peo-
ple" has meant returning government not just to city gov-
ernment institutions, but to individual citizens as well. 
There was an important element of Jeffersonian in-
dividualism in the Tacoma experience. Jefferson said that 
citizens in a local community should determine local pri-
orities and make policy decisions. In Tacoma, the average 
citizen could not participate in a direct democracy pro-
cess such as that advocated by Jefferson, but a large num-
ber of average citizens who would ordinarily not be in-
cluded in local public policy-making were given the op-
portunity to participate. Other citizens could partici-
pate in the regular manner, through their elected repre-
sentatives on the City Councilor through interest groups 
who petitioned the Council for part of the General Revenue 
Sharing funds. All in all, Tacoma went a long way toward 
recognizing the fact that today citizens want to partici-
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pate (at least some of them do) and that suitable mechan-
isms need to be established so they can participate, re-
gardless of their socioeconomic group, race or sex. The 
only explanation for the Tacoma experience being so dif-
ferent from the other cities studied has to be the deter-
mination of the Mayor and his staff to make citizen par-
ticipation a reality. In the other cities there was not 
the same commitment to such participation, or if there was, 
it did not manifest itself in their revenue sharing exper-
ience. 
Tacoma made the individual matter in an age when we 
are continually told that the average citizen's policy-
making role is over. Mayor Johnston of Tacoma believed 
in the citizen participation aspects of Model Cities and 
War on Poverty programs that had taken place in his city 
and wanted to continue citizen involvement in a meaningful 
way. It did not appear to be a political ploy, he sin-
cerely believed the average citizen has something to con-
tribute. 
Eugene. There was some citizen participation in 
Eugene as well. Tacoma is unique among the cities studied 
in that it set up a citizen participation process especial-
ly for the purpose of deciding on revenue sharing alloca-
tions. The process worked so well there were plans to use 
the evaluation process for all budget matters in the fu-
362 
ture. In Eugene we found a degree of citizen partici-
pation already established as part of the city's regular 
budget process. In Eugene, the Budget Committee is made 
up one-half by City Councilmembers and one-half by regular 
citizens. Because the Eugene City Council decided to use 
the regular budget process for deciding how to allocate 
revenue sharing funds, citizens on the Budget Committee 
did playa role. Also, in the city's effort to develop 
the best process for deciding how to allocate revenue 
sharing funds to particular social programs, it worked 
with Lane County in a joint effort. The decision-making 
mechanism established for that purpose also contained 
average citizens. 
In Eugene, it would be hard to say that General Rev-
enue Sharing and the New Federalism brought government 
closer to the individual citizen. Some degree of citizen 
participation was used as a matter of course in the city's 
decision-making activities on budget matters. This, of 
course, is to Eugene's credit. For some time the city has 
seemed to realize that citizen participation is indeed an 
idea whose time has come. But, we saw that Mr. Peters, 
Eugene's Minority Affairs Representative, did not believe 
the minorities of the city were effectively represented 
in the General Revenue Sharing decision-making process. 
It is also true that Mr. Peters and others interviewed in 
the city felt Eugene had had a bad experience with the 
War on Poverty and its citizen participation aspects. 
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Considering the small poor and minority population 
in Eugene, the pressures for broad citizen participation 
beyond the process already established were not very great. 
It would be going too far to say that Jeffersonian indivi-
dualism or the individualism of the War on Poverty was 
strengthened in the Eugene revenue sharing experience. 
It is true, however, that a new grass roots interest group 
made up of the city's minorities has emerged under Peters' 
di.'rection as a result of their feeling left out of the 
revenue sharing process. In this reverse sense, perhaps 
revenue sharing has helped activate same citizens in 
Eugene and maybe the result will be government brought 
closer to them. One gains the impression, however, that 
in Eugene, the Budget Committee, the City Council and the 
joint city-county committees did a good job in represent-
ing the majority of citizens in the revenue sharing de-
cision-making process. 
Portland. In Portla~a, the short-run influence of 
revenue sharing in bringing government closer to the peo-
ple of the city seems to be minimal. There are a few in-
dividual citizens who advise the city bureaus on budget 
matters. As a matter of course, citizens,can petition the 
City Council on budget matters. They can also petition 
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the Office of Management Services. But in the long run, 
the Portland situation may be very different and largely 
due to revenue sharing. Portland is moving toward the es-
tablishment of a neighborhood participation concept that 
seeks to involve individuals in policy-making matters that 
affect their neighborhoods. Representatives from the 
neighborhoods would be in contact with City Hall and thus 
represent their neighborhood needs to city officials. 
Those interviewed in Portland indicate that final 
realization of this citizen participation mechanism is not 
imminent, but they also indicate that General Revenue Shar-
ing funds "freed up" monies to get the program off the 
groupd. This plan was in the works before revenue shar-
ing, but it appears that General Revenue Sharing may be 
responsible for its final realization. Such a neighbor-
hood concept would go a long way toward establishing the 
individual Portland citizen as a more integral part of the 
city public policy-making process. As Commissioner 
Iavncie said, citizen participation is now a fact of life. 
It would be going too far to suggest that citizens in Port-
land are now working with local officials to determine lo-
cal priorities and allocate revenue sharing funds accord-
ingly, pursuant to the New Federalism goal, but when the 
neighborhood concept develops, assuming that revenues and 
politics will allow it to develop, citizen involvement 
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may become a reality in Portland. 
Seattle. In Seattle, there was the least amount of 
citizen participation in the General Revenue Sharing deci-
sion-making process of any city studied. Councilman 
Miller said the Seattle 2000 project had worn citizens out 
and there was little use in trying to get their help in 
deciding the allocation of General Revenue Sharing funds. 
Perhaps this was true. Nevertheless, nothing was tried in 
terms of including individual citizens in the General Rev-
enue Sharing decision-making process in Seattle. Citizens 
could petition the Office of Management and Budget or the 
City Council, but no specific citizen participation mech-
anism was set up or suggested for the future. Only t~e 
Human Rights Commission hoped to include citizens in Some 
of their future work, which mayor may not include revenue 
sharing allocations. It will if Special Revenue Sharing 
becomes a reality. 
General Revenue Sharing definitely did not bring 
government closer to the individual citizen in Seattle. 
In no way did the Jeffersonian model or the city's War on 
Poverty or Model Cities experience translate itself into 
a citizen involvement program from General Revenue Sharing 
allocations. At best, the Madisonian group competition 
model was active in Seattle. In the case of Seattle, then, 
"returning government to the people" meant not the indivi-
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dual, but the city government was beneficiary, along with 
the local special interests who have a regular hearing at 
City Hall. 
4. Participation Versus Benefits 
"Returning government to the people" can be evalu-
ated in one other dimension. In addition to seeing who 
participated in the General Revenue Sharing decision-mak-
ing process, we can see who benefitted from revenue shar-
ing allocations. 
In Eugene and Seattle, a rather broad cross section 
of the city's population would appear to benefit if funds 
are actually spent for the purposes indicated by city 
staff. In both these cities, large amounts of General Rev-
enue Sharing funds went for housing. In Seattle, the 
money was for housing rehabilitation, while in Eugene it 
was for building public housing for the city's aged and 
poor. An Asian and Indian Cultural Center in Seattle also 
shows that some General Revenue Sharing funds were going 
for the distinct interests of minority citizens. In 
Eugene a large amount of revenue sharing money was allo-
cated for social services in cooperation with Lane County. 
In Seattle, however, the tentative nature of the alloca-
tion in the "reserved" category must be kept in mind, but 
if those monies are approved, Seattle will have gone a 
long way toward including a large cross section of the 
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city in General Revenue Sharing benefits in terms of allo-
cations. 
In Tacoma, the City Council has yet tm finally ap-
prove General Revenue Sharing allocations. The Council 
has said that it will fund programs that have been evalu-
ated in the top fifty rankings on a "first ready" basis. 
It is ironic that in Tacoma, the city with the widest cit-
izen participation in the General Revenue Sharing alloca-
tion process, that the possibility exists that not much 
General Revenue Sharing money will be spent to benefit the 
city's poor and minorities. Most of the human and commu-
nity service programs are ranked in the last ten or fif-
teen places among the top fifty programs. Yet, if the 
Council does fund on a "first ready" basis, human and com-
munity service programs may be able to prepare themselves 
for final approval as quickly as any other program. What 
is clear from this &udy, however, is that as long as the 
City Council is the body with the final decision-making 
capability, it is ultimately dependent on the political 
and social disposition of the Council whether a broad 
cross section of the city's population will benefit from 
General Revenue Sharing funds. The citizen participation 
elements in the Tacoma experience are significant, but 
because the evaluation teams did not rank human and com-
munity service programs very high, it will be up to the 
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Council to see to it that those programs are funded if it 
is interested in spreading the benefits of General Revenue 
Sharing throughout the city. 
Because Portland did not allocate its General Revenue 
Sharing funds separately from other general fund monies, 
it is hard to assess who in the city benefitted from rev-
enue sharing. The city did draw up a list of programs for 
the purpose of satisfying u.S. Treasury requirements, that 
can be considered General Revenue Sharing funded, which 
were programs funded out of the general fund, which in-
cluded General Revenue Sharing monies. In examining these 
programs, it appears that human and community service pro-
grams did not receive a great deal of attention. Some 
money did go to the new Bureau of Human Resources. Large 
amounts of money went to parks and recreation, and it can 
be assumed that the poor and minorities enjoy these facil-
ities if they are near them. 
In Portland, the sentiment was strongly felt that 
the city was hard pressed to meet the financial demands 
for traditional city services and that, even with General 
Revenue Sharing, there was not much money for social ser-
vice programs. It would be up to Special Revenue Sharing 
to supply money for these programs. The emphasis in Port-
land, according to Mr. Scott, was to spend General Revenue 
Sharing funds to develop the neighborhood program and to 
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increase the efficiency of city government. This sort of 
allocation would ultimately bring the most benefit to all 
of Portland's citizens. 
As was the case in other cities, Portland was reluc-
tant to spend General Revenue Sharing funds on major pro-
grams because of the danger the revenue sharing funding 
may be withdrawn in a few years. Then how would the city 
pay for the programs? City officials in Portland cited 
this as a major reason why more money was not spent on new 
innovative human and community service programs. 
It must be emphasized that in everyone of the cit-
ies studied, those interviewed said they would spend money 
for a wider range of human and community service programs 
if they had adequate funds to do so. It is only fair to 
remember all the financial constraints faced by city gov-
ernment mentioned many times in this study. It should also 
be remembered that human and community service programs 
are new areas of concern for most cities. Consequently, 
they are not well organized nor do they have the expertise 
they feel they need to move boldly into these areas at 
this time. In every instance, however, these cities were 
preparing to move into these areas of concern with the 
development of Bureaus of Human Resources. 
In every city studied, a very large percentage of 
General Revenue Sharing money went for capital expenses. 
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Also, a great deal of money went for labor costs. In each 
city there was also the hope that General Revenue Sharing 
funds would hold down the need for the city to tax its 
citizens further, at least in the short run. These sorts 
of allocations benefit the whole community. We have paid 
particular attention to allocations specifically for the 
poor and the minorities because the goal of the New Fed-
eralism was not just to bring government closer to the 
people but to eng~ge the city in human and community ser-
vice responsibilities. Therefore, it is important to see 
the extent to which these four cities have done so, even 
without the help of Special Revenue Sharing. It is also 
interesting to note that so far it appears that there is 
not necessarily a correlation between degree of citizen 
participation and benefits going to those citizens in the 
famof General Revenue Sharing allocations. Tacoma, for 
example, had a sophisticated participation process yet 
there is still a chance the City Council will not substan-
tially fund programs beneficial to those who participated 
in the evaluation process. 
In sum, it can be said that in Seattle and Eugene, 
allocations of General Revenue Sharing funds specifically 
for the poor and minorities were significant. In Portland 
and Tacoma, the allocations were, in the former case, not 
significant, and in the latter area incomplete. In terms 
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of this aspect of bringing government closer to the people, 
the political and social disposition of the Councils com-
bined with brutal fiscal reality have brought General Rev-
enue Sharing benefits to a wide cross section of citizens 
in two cities and maybe three, but not in Portland. 
II. FEARS OF THE NEW FEDERALISM 
1. That the Decentralization of Government Cited as a 
Goal of the New Federalism May Bring Forth an Abandon-
ment of Programs on Behalf of the Poor and Minorities. 
We saw in the previous section that it would be an 
exaggeration to suggest that the decentralization of,'~Amer­
ican government sought through the New Federalism had been 
accomplished. The New Federalism is too new and all its 
programs have yet to be enacted. Yet General Revenue 
Sharing is a first step and it is possible to come to some 
preliminary conclusions as to its effect on previously 
established national programs for the poor and minorities. 
General Revenue Sharing has given an opportunity for 
the major interest groups and the city governments of the 
cities examined in this study to reinforce or move away 
from nationally established programs to benefit the poor 
and minorities. Because the General Revenue Sharing leg-
islation sets few guidelines, it is possible for a city 
to establish priorities and policies for the allocation of 
General Revenue Sharing funds that might ignore War on 
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Poverty and Model Cities programs established in the late 
1960's. In Tacoma, Seattle and Eugene the author got the 
distinct impression that city officials had no intention 
of abandoning the poor and minorities in their cities. 
Because these groups are, after all, a minority in the 
city, it is understandable that they did not receive as 
much money from General Revenue Sharing as did the pro-
grams designed to benefit the whole community. But the 
officials in these cities seemed genuinely to want to keep 
the good programs of the War on Poverty and Model Cities. 
They seemed to recognize that this nation had started 
something and now it had a commitment to continue to help 
the poor, the aged and racial and ethnic minorities. 
Those interviewed who had this sentiment were in the ma-
jority on the city councils of their cities. They did not 
speak for the entire council nor for the entire community. 
They spoke only for themselves and others who voted with 
them on these matters on the City Council. 
Mr. Williams in Eugene and Mr. Cooley in Seattle 
would disagree that the funding of programs for the poor 
and minorities should be a major priority in their cities. 
They feel that tradition services (fire, police, etc.) are 
underfunded and human and social programs should be funded 
only when traditional programs are adequately funded. Yet 
in these cities we saw that activity on behalf of the poor 
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and minorities had not been abandoned with the advent of 
General Revenue Sharing. Unless Special Revenue Sharing 
comes along soon or cutback categorical grants are re-
instated, the chances that those who want to continue to 
help the poor and minorities in these cities will be able 
to continue to do so are remote. Without adequate funds, 
the liberal tendencies of city officials will be frustra-
ted. 
In Portland, the activity that is taking place as 
a result of General Revenue Sharing to help the poor and 
minorities is less obvious. Among those interviewed, 
there seemed to be less commitment to national programs 
to help the city's disadvantaged. The development of the 
Department of Human Resources is an indication, however, 
that Portland intends to maintain programs for the disad-
vantaged when there is adequate funding. It remains to 
be seen how extensive that commitment is in~terms of funds 
expended and programs developed and preserved. In sum, it 
does not appear that the slight degree of decentralization 
so far accomplished by the New Federalism has caused 10-
cal government to abandon the poor and minorities. 
2. That Decentralization Will Strengthen Local Special 
Interests at the Expense of the Disadvantaged. 
In Chapter II, we saw a wide range of opinion that 
feared that local special interests would not allow local 
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governments to spend revenue sharing money on the poor and 
minorities in their communities. The lack of guidelines 
accompanying the Revenue Sharing Act provides an opportun-
ity for +ocal government to allocate General Revenue Shar-
ing funds in such a way that the poor and minorities of 
their communities are left out. With the reduction and/or 
elimination of many categorical grant programs by the 
Nixon Administration, further funding of programs to aid 
the poor and minorities must come from state, county or 
local funds. 
The fears of those who felt local government com-
bined with local special interests would not spend the 
General Revenue Sharing funds on the poor and minorities 
at the local level have not been confirmed by this study. 
All of the cities have allocated some funds for human and 
community services and Eugene and Seattle have allocated 
(in Seattle, "reserved") a great deal. It seems that it 
is the overall fiscal crunch that is prohibiting further 
allocations for these purposes, not lack of commitment to 
the needs of the disadvantaged. Unless General Revenue 
Sharing funding is substantially expanded and/or Special 
Revenue Sharing becomes a reality, local governments will 
have no choice but to underfund programs for the city's 
disadvantaged. In other words, in a very real sense, it 
is still up to national interests and the national gov-
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ernment to see to it that something is done for minorities 
and the poor. It is up to the national government to pro-
vide the money. The results of this study indicate that 
local government will spend a fair amount of it for the 
poor and minorities. It must be noted, however, that in 
every city those advocating this active role for local 
government in the social service area were a narrow ma-
jori ty. Political trends could erase them. 
Local special interests hostile to funding pro-
grams for the disadvantaged were represented among tho~e 
interviewed for this study. In the future, they could 
drastically cut aid for the disadvantaged if they get the 
political upper hand. So far, however, the fear of local 
elites forcing local government to abandon the less for-
tunate has not materialized. 
3. Decentralization Will Exclude the Disadvantaged 
from Local Decision-Making. 
The City Hall officials interviewed in three of the 
four cities studied felt that those citizens politicized 
during the War on Poverty and Model Cities programs had 
been very active in petitioning for General Revenue Shar-
ing funds. In Seattle, officials felt that Model Cities 
had done a particularly effective job in politicizing res-
idents in the Model Cities communities. Recognizing that 
the Nixon Administration intends to cut back on Model 
I 
I 
\ 
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Cities and categorical grant programs for the poor, those 
affected by such cutbacks have appealed to the City Council 
and Department of Human Resources for help. 
In Portland and Tacoma, the situation was much the 
same. In those cities, however, the War on Poverty pro-
grams seemed to have as much effect as Model Cities in po-
liticizing the poor and minorities. Mayor Johnson of 
Tacoma went out of his way to see to it that citizens ac-
tivated by the federal programs of the late 1960's were 
included in the evaluation process for General Revenue 
Sharing. He wanted to see to it that already established 
business elites in Tacoma would be balanced in their in-
fluence by those politicized by the War on Poverty. In 
Portland, the politicization of the poor in recent years 
has had influence in the decision to create the neighbor-
hood organization concept. It has also had a bearing on 
the increasing effort to include average citizens as ad-
visors in city bureaus as they draw up their budget pro-
posals. 
The Eugene situation was somewhat ironic. Mr. Peters 
suggested that the disadvantaged in Eugene were "turned 
off" by the Community Action Programs developed under the 
War on Poverty. Peters said the Community Action Program-
was dominated by white citizens from rural Lane County 
who did not allow much minority representation in the pro-
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gram. As a reaction to that organization and in an ef-
fort to petition for General Revenue Sharing and later 
Special Revenue Sharing funds, Peters has founded the Lane 
County Non-White Taxpayers Association. He hopes the or-
ganization will politicize the city poor and its minori-
ties so that they will have a permanent hearing at City 
Hall. So far he has met with some success as members of 
this organization have been active in City Hall hearings. 
At this stage, therefore, there is no basis to sub-
stantiate the fear that citizens politicized during the 
War on Poverty and Model Cities programs will be shut out 
of participating in General Revenue Sharing decisions at 
the local level. The extent to which these citizens are 
actually,heard, however, is dependent on the extent they 
are actually included in the formal procedures of decision-
making. If the poor are only allowed to participate at 
hearings and through sending program requests to bureau-
cratic departments, there is some question as to what 
real input they can make. If, however, they are included 
in the "machinery" of decision-making, such as was the 
case in the Tacoma evaluation process, then the poor and 
minorities are more likely to be actually represented and 
heard. In his article in Society on "Revenue Sharing and 
the New Federalism", Gregg Beyer suggests that citizen par-
ticipation in the revenue sharing process would be a good, 
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idea. "(G)reater research and experimentation, as well as 
careful analysis of past citizen-community action and mod-
el cities programs are needed before the model for most 
effective citizen participation can be outlined. n2 He rec-
ognizes the need to include all citizensi from all walks 
of life, in the revenue sharing process. Their partici-
pation cannot be left to chance. Simply allowing them to 
petition government or come to hearings is not insuring 
representation. "(C)itizen-consumer participation within 
the New Federalism is an important hedge against corrup-
tion and abuse of authority • .,3 
Beyer does not specifically say that the federal 
government should include guidelines with the revenue 
sharing legislation that might be forthcoming requiring 
that all segments of the community be included in local 
revenue sharing decision-making procedures. He seems only 
to suggest that local government should look closely at 
the establishment of such a policy. This, of course, fits 
the goal of the New Federalism that seeks to give more re-
sponsibility to local government in making decisions in 
the human and community service areas. In all the cities 
examined in this study except Seattle, there seemed to be 
an understanding of the issue and some positive action 
2Beyer, "Revenue Sharing," p. 61. 
3Ibid • 
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taken to address it. 
4. That General Revenue Sharing Will Strengthen Interest 
Group Liberalism at the City Level and Further Frustrate 
the Cause of Justice in America. 
Theodore Lowi in The End of Liberalism argued that 
the constant bargaining and compromise that takes place 
among competing interest groups in America after legis-
lation has been passed by Congress has frustrated the 
cause of justice in this country. The good intentions of 
liberal legislators have been bargained away in the ad-
ministration and implementation of laws as bureaucrats 
engage in brokerage politics with interest groups. Gen-
eral Revenue Sharing has done nothing to abate the devel-
opment of interest group liberalism in America. If any-
thing, the Revenue Sharing Act deliberately encouraged 
interest group competition at the local level after the 
Act was passed. Because the Act seeks to involve local 
citizens and interest groups in a process to determine 
local priorities and policies it encourages brokerage 
politics. 
In every city studied for this paper it was found 
that there was intense interest group lobbying for Gen-
eral Revenue Sharing funds. But the General Revenue Shar-
ing Act did not contain the guidelines Lowi was worried 
about compromising in the brokerage politics process. The 
letter of the legislation did not seek to further the 
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cause of justice and the rule of law in America. It ab-
dicated that responsibility to state and local government 
as they dealt with revenue sharing funds. Even though 
the programs for social justice that Lowi wanted to pre-
serve were not the goals of General Revenue Sharing, the 
fact that it encouraged interest group competition is sig-
nificant. Such encouragement increases the chances these 
groups will seek to eng~ge in bargaining with local ad-
ministrators when other legislation come from Washington 
that seeks to provide social justice for all Americans. 
The chances, therefore, of such legislation being success-
ful is thus diminished. 
The data from this study indicates that the disad-
vantaged recognize that they must form interest groups 
to be heard. They seem to recognize Lowi's fear that in 
spite of the good intentions of national legislators, jus-
tice may not be provided at the local level. They seem to 
also agree with Lowi's critics that to expect the courts 
to force the legislative branch to employ strict guide-
lines is not realistic. Because they see interest groups 
organized that seem unsympathetic with their needs, local 
poor and minorities feel the need to form their own in-
terest groups to compete for their interests. The new 
Lane County Non-White Taxpayers Association is just such 
an interest group. It is somewhat ironic that the exis-
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tence of interest group liberalism which Lowi feels im-
pedes the progress of justice in America has only created 
more interest groups fighting for their interests. Wfueh 
General Revenue Sharing, the poor and minorities see even 
less federal commitment to their needs and thus it is un-
derstandable that they would form groups to represent 
their interests. Lowi specifically pointed out the need 
to insure the basic civil rights of citizens in federal 
legislation. He would be distressed at the discretion 
given to local political forces under the New Federalism 
in the civil rights area. The Act prohibits discrimina-
tion in the use of revenue sharing funds but that is all. 
Under the New Federalism it is up to local minority groups 
and the local poor to organize to try to protect their 
interests. 
5. That General Revenue Sharing Will Only Strengthen 
the "Autonomous City'.'''and Frustrate Justice. 
Using "lay.er cake" theory terminology, Theodore Lowi 
argues that the city is developing powers and responsibil-
ities that make it a third layer of government in the fed-
eral system. This additional unit of federalism is ano-
ther place where interest group liberalism can thrive and 
thus compromise chances for attaining the rule of law in 
America. Mr. Lowi would be upset with what the New Fed-
eralism has set as its goal, the strengthening of the city 
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as a decision-making unit in matters dealing with human 
and community services. We have seen in this study that 
this goal of the New Federalism has not been fully ac-
complished. The city is still highly dependent on the 
state and national governments and will be for the for-
seeable future. The New Federalism does not seek to cre-
ate a truly "autonomous city" at all. It does seek to 
strengthen the ability of cities to deal with human and 
community services as free from the controls of Washington 
as possible. Of course, the city is to rely on the feder-
al government for funding of human and community service 
programs. Nevertheless, the New Federalism has done no-
thing to weaken cities as decision-making units and breed-
ing places for interest group liberalism. 
Mr. Lowi might be encouraged by the fact that the 
New Federalism also seeks to strengthen states as units 
of administration and decision-making in the federal sys-
tem. But because the Nixon policy is also to strengthen 
cities, the gain in strengthening the states would be ne-
gated. It will be remembered that Lowi felt states should 
be substantially strengthened through federal aid and by 
giving them discretion to deal with many matters within 
their sovereignty. The goal of the New Federalism, how-
ever, is to strengthen all levels of government below the 
national government, not just the states. Thus, Lowi's 
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fear of strong cities is not lessened by the development 
of revenue sharing and the New Federalism. 
6. Decentr~lization Will Jeopardize Civil Rights and 
Set Back Justice. 
In The End of Liberalism, Lowi argued that block 
grants with few str~ngs attached might be a useful form of 
federal aid to states for certain purposes. He believed, 
however, that strings should be attached when necessary 
to provide for social justice of all citizens and insure 
the rule of law in America. He specifically pointed out 
that in the area of civil rights there might be enough of 
a national consensus as to the need to maintain those 
rights for all citizens. That being the case, the federal 
government need not worry as much as it once did about 
attaching strings to legislation to preserve those rights. 
We saw in Chapter III, however, that many partici-
pants at the New Federalism Conference sponsored by the 
Woodrow Wilson Foundation disagreed. Their principal fear 
was that there was no national consensus on the need for 
basic civil rights for all Americans and that the in-
creased discretionary power given local government with 
the New Federalism might be used to deny civil rights to 
some citizens. As we have seen, the guidelines to the 
State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972 are very 
broad. The only civil rights provision is that the funds 
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not be spent in such a way as to discriminate against in-
dividuals. As critics of the New Federalism have argued, 
the funds could be spent on capital and physical projects 
and not for the poor or minorities directly and still be 
within the guidelines of the Act. They fear that the pro-
grams developed under the War on Poverty and Model Cities 
and the spirit of the Civil Rights Acts are in danger when 
the federal government loosens its control over how fed-
eral funds are spent. 
The data from this study indicates that it is up to 
those in city government who share the interests of nation-
al groups that have fought for civil rights acts and pro-
grams for the poor to work for those programs at the local 
level if they are to be maintained. This study indicates 
that there are considerable numbers of persons in local 
government who have just such an interest. As long as 
these persons maintain their activism and political power 
the spirit of national priorities that sought to bring 
collective action on behalf of the poor and minorities 
will be maintained. It is true that a lack of federal con-
trol or incentive to maintain public policy for the dis-
advantaged puts a big burden on local groups and individ-
uals who want to help the poor and minorities. Although 
observers of the American system from James Madison to the 
present fear the lack of tolerance for minorities at the 
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local level, this study indicates that it is a major goal 
of many local leaders to see to it that the disadvantaged 
in their communities are treated fairly. If one sympa-
thizes with this position it can only be hoped that those 
people remain in positions of power. As the national gov-
ernment moves away from these concerns the protection of 
basic rights for all Americans becomes more and more the 
concern of local politics. 
Based upon these conclusions, has the New Federalism 
hastened the "end of liberalism"? Lowi feared that Amer-
ican liberalism was unable to realize its goals because of 
interest group brokerage politics that compromised the 
"spirit" of liberal legislation when that legislation was 
being carried out. There is nothing in the New Federalism 
as viewed through General Revenue Sharing that seems to 
abate this feature of liberalism. Of course, it is doubt-
ful the President wants to further the cause of liberal-
ism if it must be done through a large national government 
looking out for the economic and social well-being of all 
citizens in terms of enabling all an equal opportunity to 
compete for the accouterments of the good life. Lowi saw 
the national government playing an important role in such 
an effort, perhaps in cooperation with state governments. 
But the Nixon Administration has decided to let all levels 
of government below the national level decide their own 
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priorities and policies on public policy regarding human 
and community service programs. Abdication of national 
direction in these matters does threaten liberal accomp-
lishments that have been made in recent years. Although 
we have found in the cities studied here that local City 
Council majorities seem to want to retain the progress 
made in human and community services in recent years, 
their holding onto power in determining local policy is 
tenuous. Thus, the social goals of liberalism are in 
danger of abandonment in every state and town in America. 
The New Federalism does nothing to lessen the chances of 
an end to liberalism in terms of Lowi's thesis. 
President Nixon's goal of decentralizing the Ameri-
can federal system is a significant one. The importance 
and magnitude of such a task is evidenced in the goals 
and fears held by the proponents and opponents of the New 
Federalism. 
It has been the purpose of this study to assess the 
success of the New Federalism/General Revenue Sharing ef-
fort in terms of the experiences of four cities. It can 
be concluded that although all four cities were well aware 
of the fact that decentralization through revenue sharing 
was being tried by the Nixon Administration, they were ex-
periencing few of the goals of decentralization. The heart 
of the matter is still money. The four cities studied 
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were not getting enough money to carry out traditional 
functions and also adopt the human and community service 
programs the New Federalism wants them to take over. They 
are not getting enough money because General Revenue Shar-
ing grants are not large enough to make up for the non-
existence of Special Revenue Sharing, cutback categorical 
grants, inflation, increasing labor costs and increasing 
demand for all services. The financial crunch is such 
that although most of those interviewed agreed with many 
of the goals of the New Federalism, they found themselves 
unable to do what the program indicates for lack of ade-
quate funds. Therefore, for the New Federalism to ac-
complish its goals, it must increase its General Revenue 
Sharing funding considerably, extend the program indefi-
nitely, and enact an ambitious Special Revenue Sharing 
program quickly. Only in this way will the American fed-
eral system move toward some degree of decentralization. 
This study has concerned itself with federalism and 
also with individualism. Is there a role for the individ-
ual citizen who wants to participate in making local pub-
lic policy under the New Federalism? Our findings demon-
strate that citizen participation is a function of whether 
and to what extent local officials will permit local par-
ticipation beyond the regular budget process. There is a 
role for the individual and all interest groups, the sys-
388 
tern is open, when local government specifically designs 
an open system. In this study, Tacoma is the best exam-
ple of such an effort. 
The goals of the New Federalism are dramatic and it 
will take many years of revenue sharing and enactment of 
other components of the program before any definitive no-
tion of whether it has succeeded or failed can be made. 
At this point, it appears that the revenue sharing element 
of the program lacks the substantial funding needed to 
make it an effective vehicle of decentralization. Until 
that situation is remedied, the New Federalism will re-
main more rhetoric than sUbstance. 
It was stated in Chapter I of this study that the 
author had one overriding bias. That bias was concern 
for the future of America's disadvantaged under a New 
Federalism. That concern seems justified. Although the 
results of this study are encouraging on this matter, the 
lack of national guidance to insure a place in society 
for the poor and minorities places these citizens in real 
danger of again becoming "outsiders." 
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APPENDIX A 
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS FOR 
TACOMA, WASHINGTON 
-r ~ 
Raw Scorea Converted Score b weightC EXElanation 
NA 0 Not Applicable A policy or evaluation 
criteria statement is not 
applicable to this pro-
gram. 
1 -3 Low or Poor Program doesn't appear to 
2 -2 meet the particular poli-
cy or evaluation criteria 
or meets it poorly. 
3 -1 Average or Fair Program appears to satis-
4 0 factorily meet the par-
5 +1 ticular policy or evalua-
tion criteria. 
6 +2 High or Program appears to meet 
7 +3 Very High the particular policy or 
evaluation criteria very 
well. 
Fiqure 4. Scoring Process for Revenue Sharing Proposal Evaluations. 
SOURCE: Staff of the Program Management System, "Scoring Process for 
Revenue Sharing Proposal Evaluations," Tacoma, Washington, 1973, p.l. 
aRating codes used by policy evaluators for both policy and evaluation 
criteria statements. 
bThis is the assigned value for each corresponding raw score. This is 
for use by the PMS staff only. 
c This is a pre-determined number assigned to each rated policy and eval-
uation criteria statement. These numbers are not used by technical team 
evaluators. These numbers are used in score calculation by the PMS staff. 
w 
~ 
-...J 
Formula for Policy Evaluation Score: 
x 
x 
W 
n 
= 
EWX 
n 
= weighted average or mean 
= weight 
= sum of weights 
Formula for Proposal Score: 
R.S. = c.S. (W) = x 
R.S. = Raw Score 
C.S. = Converted Score 
W = weight 
X = statement value 
EX = Proposal Score 
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Figure 5. Formulae for Proposal and Policy Evalua-
tion Scores. SOURCE: Staff of the Program Management 
System, "Scoring Process for Revenue Sharing Propo-
sal Evaluations," Tacoma, Washington, 1973, p. 1. 
'1 
Figure 6. General Revenue Sharing Program Proposal Evaluation Form. 
SOURCE: Staff of the Program Management System, Tacoma, Washington, 1973. 
OPTIONAL COMMENTS 
This pop is -"" ,., ,..,. __ s CIIftC_ing this proposal. F.I".. 10 ~t ... -
IIICh lIS: "..II1II S~s or Wealmoss. Program Modiflcatl.... FuMi .. Leftls. P...- AI..,. 
nati ..... Program Tillling. Priority. Conflie .. or Duplicati .... etc. 
mLDA110I can 10. ___ _ 
CITY OF TACOMA 
GENERAL REVENUE SHARING PROGRAM 
PROPOSAL EV/lI.IJA TlON FORM 
~-Tltle. __________________ _ 
Prop_ Nulltber. _____ _ h • .aton 0 .. ___ _ 
GENEIAL INSTIUCTIONS 
1. "'Ime,.., E.,.Iv'..tor Code ......... I ... 
."., rip ...... c.I_ 01 ~ ........ "... 
....... TI.1e. PftIgn_ ...... , and E.,.I .... 
0... .... .,-,."' ..... 
2. Ie ............ '_jIS 2 ... 3 ...... .... 
~ ... Rati." K., Ii ...... ,... 2 
"3. 
3. Art. ..... the ,...1 • .,... • I. optI...t 
,., ,..,. _ I • ...kit'I _fa _I • .... 
.... '-. 
•• RetIIIII ........ Ibn.nn. Sp_ SIeff 
.,.. CAlllllIetI-.. 
NOGIAM MANAGIMIN' .'11IM 
COUNTY.CJlY IUIlDING 
100M 33S 
TACOMA, WASHINGTON ,.. 
11lEPHONE C2N1 5'3-4170 
w 
\0 
\0 
, '1 
REVENUE SHARING POLICIES 
IN YOUR OPINION HOW WELL DOES THE PROPOSAL 
CQtlFOIIM TO THE FOLLOWING POLICIES: 
1. Empho~lle the imporlance of non· recurring pro· 
grems or e.pe<>dilures in view 01 Ihe praSl!nlly 
eslabllshed e.pirolion date for the revenue shor. 
in9 progralll, ond in recognition of the long term 
or permon~"t encumbrance associated with recur. 
ling pr0S'a~. 
2. Reco9"ize the wlue of .. panding or improving 
already eli~ling programs where such pragroms 
ore reco9"ized II'Id accepted as necessary and 
elfecl;ve. 
3. S, ,ve to select programs which wi II result in 
III ..... um ~nefltJ from the investment dollar. 
•• "Ol"'O;I'I~· cOl'Cem fOf citizel'l desires and opin. 
ions by selecting programs with which a moximum 
nUlllber of persons can identify and support. 
S. Consider programs which increase the level of 
operoliO!lol efl.ciency of Tacorno government 
!hr0U9h improved management techniques, job 
s"'''s and moreriol. 
6. Elpand the capabilities of the general fund for 
future program opportunities by meeling commit. 
me~IS to outstanding loons and encumbronces. 
7. Reel.ze!he importance of providing lor new ser· 
vices and programs of recognized need or demo 
OilS Iroted YO lue. 
DO HOT WRITE IH TlflS lOX 
""W SCORE 
o 
o 
o 
o 
00 HOT "RITE 
IH THIS .011 
o 
o 
o 
o 
010 
01 0 
010 
DO 
TOTAL IIAW TOTAL WEIGlfTED 
SCORE SCORE 
RATING INSTRUCTIONS 
r. 'LlASE RATl EACH 'OLICY AHD ,.RO. 
GRAM EVALUATION CRITERIA IN THE 
RAW SCORE COLUMH PROVIDED TO THE 
RIGHT OF lACH STATEMEHT. DO HOT 
LEAVE ANY SUNICS. 
l. USE OHLY THE RATING SCORES AS IHO/. 
CATED IN THE RATING ICEY PROVIDED 
SELOW. (DO NOT USE FRACTIOHS OR 
DEC/MALSI. 
l. USE OHLY THE RAW SCORE COLUIrIH FOR 
RATIHG - ALL OTHER COLUMNS AND 
SOXES ARE FOR STAFF USE OHLY. 
4. PROGRAM EVALUATION STATEI<4ENT NO. 
1 OH PAGE J ttlLL SE FILLED IH 8Y 
STAFF BASED ON THE RESULT OF YOUR 
POUCY EVALUATION ON PAGE Z. 
5. CHECIC TO SEE THAT ALL STATEMEHTS 
HAVE nEH RATED. 
~, 
RATING KEY 
A POLICY OR EVALUATIOH CRI. 
TERIA STATEMEHT IS HOT AP. 
'LICABLE TO THIS PROGRAM. 
~~[ 
aD 2 oao 
-' 
PROGRAM DOISH'T APPfArt TO 
MEET THE PARTICULAR POLIC;Y 
OR EVALUATIOH CRITERIA OR 
MEETS IT POORLY. 
:. 3 . [
:: 4 
• 5 ~
B~[ 
z.. 7 2. 
:1:" 
> 
PROGRAM AP'EARS TO SATiS. 
FACTORILY MEET fHE PAR. 
TlCULAR 'OLICY OR EVALUA. 
TlOH CRITERIA. 
PROGRAM A'PEARS TO MfEf 
THE PARTICULAR 'OLICY OR 
EVALUATIOH CRITERIA VERY 
WELL. 
PROGRAM EVALUATION CRITERIA 
1M YOUR OPINION HOW WELL DOES THIS PROPOSAL It"W I DO IIOT W.IT~ III Tms .ox 
COMPLY 11TH THE FOLLOWING CRITERIA: SCOtti . , 
1. Add,esses on identified n .. d or problem in the 0 0 0 c_unity which has been adequately documented. 
2. Objecti ... s ore consistent with established City DO ~T 0 0 Council Policy Guidelines. (To be filled in by IVALUATI P. M. S. Stoff baHd on ratings on Page 2). 
3, HOI given apprapriat. cansideratian to ocIminil' 0 0 0 Itoti ... and decision.moking structure_ 
4. Objectives Ofe clearly defined and understand. 0 0 0 obI., realistic and related to the defined nteds or stated obj.ctives. 
S, Technical design, work program or approach is 0 0 0 conliltent with project objectives and is con· 
.ideted f.asibl. to accomplish, 
6, Budget rlqUest il apparently ocIequat. in light 01 0 0 of stated objectives and does not require sub. stantiol modification, 
7, Prayides sufficient interfoce with and support 01 0 0 from pettinent clients. programs, and agencies, as w.II as the general public, where appropriot •• 
I. Worle el_tl provide for on odllfluat. internal 0 0 0 .valuation and monitoring process to IIIHSUfe project progress ond effectiveness. 
9. Will r.sult in apparent desirabl. ben,'its to the 0 0 0 eity ond its citizens • 
10, Apparent cost. or. justified consideri", the Gp. 0 0 0 parent resulti", benefits. 
11. Will howe 0 favorable impact beyond its .toted 0 D 0 obiecti ..... 
D o 
TOTAL UW 
SCOIt. 
'IOTA&. .. GlfTID 
SCOtI 
·. ~ 
u 
~ 
:;J 
o 
U1 
• 1M 
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.-1.-1 
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TABLE VIII 
REVENUE SHARING ENTITLEMENT PERIOD 3 & 4 
RECOMMENDED BUDGET PACKAGE 
JUNE 15, 1973 
Prog. Prog. Applicant/ 
Rank No. Title 
Requested Com- Recom. 
Fundin~ ___ mentsa Funding Evaluation Score 
1 18 
2 11 
3 60 
4 34 
Police Dept.-To modify City $ 50,000 
Jail so negotiation for 
jail consolidation with 
Pierce County Sheriff's 
Dept. may continue. 
City of Tacoma (interde- 200,000 
partmental)- Acquire, in-
stall and operate improved 
radio communication system 
City Clerk/Dept. of Gener- 500 
al Services-Provide money 
necessary to publish, ad-
vertise, etc., General 
Revenue Sharing money. 
DeLong Recreational Devel- 20,500 
opment Committee-Building 
a playground and nature fa-
cility adjacent to DeLong 
Elementary School 
$ 50,000 1,363.14 
200,000 1,355.89 
500 1,195.25 
20,500 1,174.50 
INTRODUCTORY NOTE: This report was transmitted first to the City Manager for 
his perusal and then to the City Council for final action. 
aComments will be listed in footnote form at the bottom of each page. ~ o ~ 
IL 
r 
Prog. Prog. 
Rank No. 
5 1 
6 15 
7 36 
8 25 
9 61 
10 73 
11 37 
Applicant/ Requested Com- Recom. Evaluation 
Score Title Funding ments Fundinq 
Personnel Dept.-Employment $ 138,506 $ 138,506 1,168.14 
training program to increase 
the proportion of minority 
and disadvantaged personnel 
in government service. 
Finance Dept.-Implement a 
cost allocation program as 
required by federal guide-
lines ref:BOB cir. A-87. 
Public Works Dept.-Provide 
funding for seal coating 
program. 
Public Works Dept.-Provide 
money to continue LID pro-
gram. 
19,000 
40,000 
500,000 
City Clerk/Dept. of General 280,000 
Services-Establish a self 
insurance fund through a risk 
management program. 
Public Utilities (Water Div- 252,000 
ision}-Install quick connect-
ing couplings for hydrants. 
Public Works Dept.-Supp1e- 205,181 
ment Equipment Rental "B" 
fund to provide for equip-
ment replacement. 
19,000 1,111.57 
40,000 1,110.00 
500,000 1,093.50 
b 250,000 1,068.07 
252,000 1,063.18 
205,181 1,030.57 
bA1right if legal. Reduced due to cost revision. ~ o 
V1 
----oIl 
"1 
~Y~ 
Prog. Prog. Applicarit/ Requested Com- Recom. Evaluation 
Score Rank No. Title Funding ments Funding 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
69 
26 
5 
47 
13 
Eastside Health Clinic $ 
Association-Provide Medical 
supplies, etc. for Eastside 
Health Clinic 
20,107 
Public Works Dept.-Acquire 1,120,954 
land and provide for con-
struction of consolidated 
Maintenance Center. 
Bicycle Committee (Moun- 15,000 
taineers) Provide funds for 
bicycle path construction. 
Finance Dept. (City Treas. 64,250 
Office}-Increase return ca-
pabilities of city money by 
developing a cash management 
system. 
Planning Dept.-Request fund- 50,000 
ing for acquisition of open 
space and/or waterfront prop. 
CAttach to Health Department. 
c $ 20,107 998.32 
d 1,120,954 984.82 
e 15,000 984.50 
64,250 984.25 
f 50,000 951.79 
dAlright, but hold in abeyance pending additional legislative encumbrances 
of next State legislative session. (Sept.) 
eCoordinate with City's Bicycle Committee. 
flnitial priority on Waterfront acquisition. 
,. 
~ 
r 1 
Prog. Prog. 
Rank No. 
App1icant/ 
Title 
Requested Com- Recom. 
Funding ments Fundinq 
17 10 
18 54 
19 35 
20 55 
21 22 
22 2 
23 9 
Personnel Dept.-Retain cer- $ 
tain critical positions now 
filled by temporary PEP 
personnel permanently. 
Planning Dept.-Establish a 
Recreational Pilot Program. 
Fire Dept.-Purchase detri-
mental capital outlay equip. 
Planning Dept.-Establish an 
Environmental Section. 
Metropolitan Park Dist.-Ex-
tend the summer supervised 
activities two weeks. 
Data Processing Divsion-Im-
prove operations of Data Pro-
cessing Division bi software 
purchase, research and devel-
opment, etc. 
Mary Bridge Hosp.-Expand pre-
natal and infant-nutri-prog. 
339,046 g 
15,270 h 
156,736 i 
49,140 j 
22,780 
55,967 
42,973 k 
g1973-32 positions, 1974 (1st half - 22 positions). 
hResponsibility placed in Program No. 56. 
iDelete non-essential equipment. 
$ 278,000 
-0-
124,000 
29,140 
22,780 
55,967 
42,973 
Evaluation 
Score 
926.46 
922.18 
918.43 
882.79 
869.06 
866.61 
858.01 
jReduced $20,000-consultant fee to be supplied as needed from contingency. 
kSubject to PCHC letters of conditions and administered by Health Dept. 
~ 
o 
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Prog. Prog. 
Rank No. 
24 62 
25 6 
26 56 
27 44 
28 42 
29 19 
30 24 
Applicant/ Requested Com- Recom. Evaluation 
Ti tIe Fundin~__ ments Fundinq Score 
Tacoma Comm. College-To pro-$ 134,712 $ 134,712 842.06 
vide and improve emergency 
medical services. 
Tacoma Pub. Library-Purchase 
of certain major pieces of 
equipment listed as critical 
needs. 
Planning Dept.-Establish an 
Urban Design Section. 
Finance Dept.-Increase Finan-
cial and Accounting Staff 
by four. 
Mary Bridge Hosp.-Expand 
Poison Information Center 
Police Dept.-Increase Patrol 
Division Manpower by 10 
Metropolitan Park Dist.-Im-
prove existing facilities of 
McKinley Park 
57,352 
32,225 
20,700 
40,999 
150,000 
34,500 
1 29,788 839.34 
m 32,225 816.50 
20,700 811.25 
n 40,999 809.56 
150,000 804.32 
34,500 795.86 
1voluntarily reduced to account for a change in telephone services. Pas-
senger car and pickup removed and rental charges added for equipment rental from 
City fund. 
mASsume responsibility for program No. 54. 
nAlright-subject to Pierce County participation. 
~ 
o 
(X) 
, 1 
Prog. Prog. 
Rank No. 
Applicant/ 
Title 
Requested Com- Recom. 
Funding __ ments_ Funding 
31 3 Tacoma-Pierce County YMCA-
Establish recreation pro-
gram for trainable mentally 
retarded. 
$ 6,000 o $ 6,000 
32 59 Urban Renewal Dept.-Supple- 70,000 p 
-0-
ment existing Neighborhood 
Development Prog, Wash A-3. 
33 67 Human Development Dept.-Pro·- 239,123 q 239,123 
vide funds for Senior Citi~ 
zens Program. 
34 32 Metropolitan Park Dist.-Ani- 9,000 9,000 
mal acquisition for Northwest 
Trek. 
35 68 Tacoma-Pierce County Health 75,224 r 37,612 
Dept.-Provide funds for Home-
maker- Home Health Aide Proj. 
36 12 Big Brothers of Tacoma-Pierce 17,815 s 17,815 
Co.-Provide guidance and com-
EanionshiE to fatherless bo~s. 
°Contingent on Program receiving other specified funding. 
PDoes not appear to be a priority item. 
qAssume duplicated services from program No. 31. 
Evaluation 
Score 
773.01 
751.57 
737.68 
732.43 
711.72 
707.04 
rReduced ~ reflecting City's part of Tacoma-Pierce County Health Dept. par-
ticipation. 
sAdministratively overseen by Human Development Department. 
::. 
o 
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Prog. Prog. 
Rank No. 
37 74 
38 23 
39 7 
40 31 
41 81 
42 38 
Applicant/ Funding ---Com- Recom. 
Title Request~q_ments . _F!!l1.ding 
Public Utilities (Water $ 126,000 t $ -0-
Division}-Construct 16" main 
on Alexander Ave. 
Central City Learning Cen-
ter-Provide supplemental 
funds to operate center. 
Tacoma Public Library-Re-
quest to continue special 
service to senior citizens. 
Amer. Red Cross-Establish 
Senior citizens Outreach ser-
vices in Wrights Park area. 
Tacoma School Disto#lO-Cov-
ered stands at Lincoln Bowl. 
Tacoma-Pierce County Health 
Dept.-Provide for additional 
Vector Control Staff. 
34,209 
74,576 
93,290 
262,000 
25,000 
u 34,209 
v 56,343 
w 60,000 
x 
-0-
25,000 
Evaluation 
Score 
707.04 
704.06 
695.31 
660.62 
658.96 
651.75 
tChanges precedent for routine process which other funds can provide. 
UAdministrative1y overseen by Human Development Department. 
vFunding for 1974 (1st half) ~ salaries & supplies, all of capital equip. 
WProgram will work jointly with Human Development Dept. Was reduced 
by negotiation because of duplicated services. 
xDesirab1e program. Possible future bond or other funding source. 
,j::a 
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Prog. Prog. 
Rank No. 
43 20 
44 28 
45 8 
46 40 
47 48 
App1icant/ 
Title 
Requested 'Com~ Recom. 
Funding ments Funding 
Planning Dept.-To purchase 
land for future Civ. Center. 
$ 270,000 
Pierce County Council on Al- 25,554 
colholism-Employee Counseling 
and AssistanceProgram for 
Alcoholism. 
Finance Dept. (Contract Com- 31,534 
pliance div.)-To continue and 
upgrade discrimination con-
trol in contract compliance. 
Tacoma Housing Authority- 22,848 
Building community neighbor-
hood center in Salishan area. 
Coalition of Child-Care Agen- 8,972 
cies/United Way- Provide coop-
erative child care staff train-
ing to increase treatment ef-
fectiveness, etc. 
y $ 
-0-
Z 
-0-
aa 31,534 
bb 12,000 
cc 8,972 
Evaluation 
Score 
641.25 
609.14 
558.29 
546.06 
538.16 
YDesirable program. Possible future bond or other funding source. 
ZReceiving other City funding. 
a~unding Jan. to June, 1974, Use PEP in interim period. 
bbpartial funding-possible other funding available. 
CCAdministratively overseen by Human Development Department. 
~ 
~ ,..... 
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Prog. Prog. 
Rank No. 
48 39 
49 21 
50 45 
51 27 
52 4 
53 51 
54 63 
Applicant/ Requested Com- Recom. 
Title Funding ments Fundinq 
Tacoma-Pierce Co. Arts Com.-$ 87,015 dd $ 25,000 
Expand present cult, and en-
vironmental enrichment prog. 
National Alliance of Busi-
nessmen-Provide Youth Em-
ployment Service. 
18,749 
Human Develop. Dept.-Provide 50,000 
Services for Handicapped. 
Public Works Dept.-Correct 500,000 
drainage problems in the Fleet 
Creek drainage basin. 
Tacoma Area Urban Coalition- 185,222 
Establish Youth Services Bureau 
to provide services, develop 
Mgmt. information system. 
Tacoma Urban League-Continue 152,462 
Adult Offender Outreach Prog. 
Human Relations Comm.-Estab-
1ish a Women's Riqhts Div. 
26,793 
ee 10,000 
50,000 
ff 
-0-
gg 150,000 
hh 120,000 
26,793 
ddDe1ete part for legal reasons. 
Evaluation 
Score 
532.87 
513.83 
494.64 
482.71 
479.30 
472.61 
451.79 
eeFor qualified city recipients~ Get county participation. VISTA director.: 
ffSeek other funding. 
ggReduction agreed to by applicant staff. 
hhReduce staff. Possible duplication. Seek special revenue sharing. ~ I-' 
I\J 
Prog-. Prog. ApplTcant/ Requested Com- Recom. Evaluation 
Score Rank No. Title Fundin~ men~s Funding 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
No.4. 
58 
33 
41 
80 
57 
17 
Tacoma Comm. College(Office $ 
of Veteran Affairs)-Provide 
loan assistance for vets. 
16,500 
Bates Voc. Tech.-Establish 102,639 
laboratory training and 
Child Care Center. 
Catholic Children's Service- 66,786 
Provide Group Shelter Care 
facilities for runaways. 
Tacoma Ambulatory Care Center- 5,000 
To provide a family clinic. 
Tacoma Public Library-Estab- 100,157 
lish Tacoma Mall branch lib. 
Finance Dept. (Purchasing 12,742 
Div. )-Hire a'·buyer for the Pur-
chasing Division due to in-
creased demand for services. 
ii $ 
-0-
jj 
-0-
kk 35,000 
11 
-0-
mm 
-0-
12,742 
iiOelete for legal reasons, duplications with program No. 52. 
445.86 
423.49 
411.63 
383.83 
374.90 
334.57 
jjQuestionable need. State legal restrictions. Use bond sources. 
kkWork with Human Development Dept. to prevent duplication with program 
110ther funds available. 
mmArea already served by South Tacoma Branch. Need not readily apparent. 
~ 
~ 
w 
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Prog. Prog. Applicantl Requested Com- Recom. Evaluation 
Score RankD No. Title Funding___TIlem ts Funding 
61 
62 
63 
29 
77 
52 
Boy Scouts-Hire reception- $ 
ist coordinator for Hilltop 
area. 
Metropolitan Deveopment Coun-
cil-Provide funds for expan-
sion of prenatal and infant 
nutrition program. 
Tacoma Urban League-Provide 
Assistance for a Veterans 
Action Center. 
7,287 nn 
37,880 00 
139,310 pp 
TOTAL FOR PROGRAMS 1-40 -------
TOTAL FOR PROGRAMS 41-63 ------
Total Funding Recommended -----
$ 
-0-
-0-
127,000 
$4,401,884 
634,041 
$5,035,925 
315.56 
313.97 
293.46 
SOURCE: Staff of the Program Management Team, "Revenue Sharing Entitlement 
period 3 & 4, Recommended Budget Package," Tacoma, Washington, 15 June 1973. 
nnAppears to be OK using volunteers. 
oOWorked out with program No.9. 
PPStaff reductions. Use 10% indirect cost factor instead of 15%. 
~ 
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Fiscal 
Year 
72-3 
73-4 
74-5 
75-6 
76-7 
77-8 
TOT-
ALS 
Cash Re-
ceived 
$10,509,000 
9,517,000 
9,778,000 
10,016,000 
7,795,000 
-0-
$47,615,000 
TABLE IX 
REVISED EXPENDITURE SCHEDULE FOR REVENUE SHARING 
PORTLAND, OREGON 
1972-3 - 1977-8 
Cash from Total Cash Suggested Expen-
Prior Years Interest: Available diture Schedule 
$ 
-0- $ 50,000 $10,559,000 $ 2~300,000 
8,259,000 550,000 18,326,000 9,650,000 a 
8,676,000 575,000 19,029,000 9,350,000 
9,679,000 600,000 20,295,000 9,425,000 
10,870,000 500,000 19,165,000 9,525,000 
9,640,000 -0- 9,640,000 9,640,000 
$2,275,000 $ 49,890,000 
SOURCE: Office of Management Services, Portland, Oregon, 1973. 
alnc1udes $1,769,000 left over from FY 1972-3. 
~ 
~ 
TABLE X 
REVENUE SHARING ALLOCATIONS 
PORTLAND, OREGON 
FY 1973-4 
417 
DEPARTMENT, BUREAU OR OFFICE FY 1973-4 AMOUNT 
Department of Finance and Administration 
Bureau of Police 
Convert to Civilian Dispatchers 
Equipment (Other Than for Federal 
Grant Projects) 
Civil Service Board 
Remodel and Equip City-County Civil 
Service Office 
Bureau of Buildings 
Equipment (Other Than for Federal 
Grant Projects) 
Bureau of Planning 
Arterial Study 
Bureau of Management & Budget 
Financial Management System 
Maintenance Facilities Study 
Bureau of Traffic Engineering 
Modernization of Signals 
Parking Meters - Contractual Obligation 
Equipment (Other That for Federal 
Grant Projects) 
Special Appropriations 
Assessments for Improvements 
Department of Public Affairs 
Bureau of Human Resources 
Coordination of Social Service Programs 
Indian Study 
Special Appropriations 
City-County Detoxification Center 
Multnomah County Health Program 
(Contractual Obligation) 
Senior Citizens Programs 
(continued) 
$ 796,600 
$ 182,000 
125,800 
11,700 
9,600 
50,000 
140,000 
50,000 
88,800 
85,900 
20,700 
32,100 
$ 1,007,000 
110,000 
7,500a 
36,500 
753,000 
100,000 
a Includes amount rebudgeted from 1972-3. 
SOURCE: Jim Setterberg, Office of Finances, City of 
Portland, Oregon, 1973. 
418 
DEPARTMENT, BUREAU OR OFFICE F~ 1973-4 AMOUNT 
Department of Public Safety 
Bureau of Fire 
$ 4,006,100 
Fire Apparatus 
Delta Park Fire Station 
Overhaul Fireboat 
Additional Personnel 
Equipment 
Fire Prevention Responsibility Unit 
Fire Alarm System Responsibility Unit 
Fire Alarm Telegraph Dispatch Respon-
sibility Unit 
Bureau of Parks 
Community Centers Improvements 
Playground Equipment 
Wading Pools 
Ballfield Lighting 
Tennis Court Lighting 
Modifications for Handicapped 
Columbia Pool Enclosure 
Recreation - Part-time 
Street Tree Program 
Stadium Tartan Turf - Contractual Obligation 
Woodlawn Park Summer Program 
Saturday & Sunday Community Centers 
Saturday and Sunday High School Gyms 
Columbia Swim Additional Service 
Summer Band Concerts 
Columbia Park Irrigation 
Pittock Mansion Sanitary Facilities 
Goldenball Basketball 
Portable Boxing Ring 
Construct Greenhouse 
Equipment (Other Than for Federal 
Grant Projects 
Special Appropriations 
Zoological Society - Contractual Obligation 
Department of Public Utilities 
Bureau of Building Maintenance 
City Hall Improvements 
(continued) 
$ 
$ 
bIncludes amount rebudgeted from 1972-3. 
b 430,000b 
250,000 
250,000 
lll,OOOb 
114,700 
548,200 
226,300 
240,400 
b 99,700b 22,600b 31,500b 3l7,700b 35,500b 45,000b 
207,000 
275,000 
166,800 
54,900 
22,700 
22,300 
38,000 
30,200 
10,000 
39,600 
7,000 
9,500 
4,100 
4,900 
41,500 
350,000 
559,400 
46,900 
419 
DEPARTMENT, BUREAU OR OFFICE FY 1973-4 AMOUNT 
Department of Public Utilities (cont.) 
Bureau of Communications & Electronic 
Communications Building Fire Safety System $ 
Fire Inspectors Communications System 
Council Crest Communications Building·. 
Equipment (Other Than for Federal 
Grant Projects) 
Bureau of Shops 
Fleet Management Information System 
Special Appropriations 
Replacement Autos 
25,000b 
25,000 
109,000c 
89,500 
14,000 
250,000 
Department of Public Works $ 1,506,200 
Bureau of Maintenance 
Traffic Signals 
Downtown Trash Pick-up 
Street Oiling Program 
Showers - Kerby Yard 
Lighting - Equipment Yard 
Equipment (Other Than for Federal 
Grant Projects) 
Bureau of Sidewalks & Structural Engineering 
Sidewalks for Schools 
Pedestrian Overpass - Beach School 
Neighborhood Street Construction 
S.E. 92nd Widening 
Curbs and Ramps for Handicapped 
SUMMARY 
FINANCE & ADMINISTRATION 
PUBLIC AFFAIRS 
PUBLIC. SAFETY 
PUBLIC UTILITIES 
PUBLIC WORKS 
GENERAL OPERATING CONTINGENCIES OF GENERAL 
FUND - MIDYEAR REVIEW 
TOTAL GENERAL REVENUE SHARING ALLOCATION 
REBUDGETED FROM 1972-3 
NEW ALLOCATIONS FOR 1973-4 
$ 
$ 
$ 
Clncludes amount rebudgeted fromm1972-3. 
dTo be allocated at midyear. 
361,200 
134,000c 
71,000 
21,200 
6,600 
219,800 
25,000c 
100,200 
440,000c 
105,200 
22,000c 
796,600 
1,007,000 
4,006,100 
559,400 
1,506,200 
d 1,893,700 
9,769,000 
1,769,000 
8,000,000 
APPENDIX C 
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS FOR 
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TABLE XI 
EUGENE CITY STAFF PROPOSALS FOR REVENUE SHARING 
EUGENE, OREGON 
1973-5 
PROJECT 
A. PARKS AND RECREATION. Operational and maintenance 
costs for new community centers: Amazon Community Center 
($59,452), Kaufman Senior Center ($27,712). Improved 
swimming pool maintenance (new Foreman position) and 
incidental equipment for relocating planning and devel-
1973-4 1974-5 
opment division. $ 113,641 $ 113,200 
B. PUBLIC WORKS. Rorganize Building Divison to improve 
public contact and keep up with increased construction 
activity (6 positions). 74,223 a 78,700a 
C. DATA PROCESSING. Continue development of financial 
informations system (payroll, fringe benefits distribu-
tion, program budget, cost accounting) commenced under 
1972-73 Supplemental Budget. 80,615 
D. GENERAL CAPITAL PROJECTS. Purchase park warehouse fa-
cility at 301 N. Lincoln ($50,000). Remodel south wing 
of City Hall to accomodate shift in office space. 100,000 
E. GENERAL CAPITAL PROJECTS. Construct new facility for 
Parks and Recreation to provide additional office space 
at City Hall. 110,000 
F. GENERAL CAPITAL PROJECTS. Construction Fire Station 
#9 in the vicinity of Delta and Belt Line Hiqhwa~. __ ~___ 125,000 
SOURCE: Hugh McKinley, City Manager, Eugene, Oregon, 1973. 
85,500 
-0-
-0-
164,600 
~his may be reduced by $37,000 if fee increase proposed in General Fund 
Priority 7 is adopted. 
,po 
N 
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PROJECT 
G. MUNICIPAL COURT. Hire another "full-time" judge to 
handle the increase in trials and the mounting backlog 
of cases on the docket. This includes necessary staff 
1973-4 1974-5 
support, prosecution expense and indigent counsel plus b b 
related equipment. $ 45,567 $ 48,300 
H. PUBLIC WORKS. Create a new planning division charged 
with transportation planning and environmental impact 
studies. Division would be responsible for updating 
of ESTATS study (3 new positions). 156,087 159,500 
I. PERSONNEL. Continue clerk-typist position approved in 
the 1972-73 Supplemental Budget. Position to handle in-
cceased work flow resulting from Affirmative Action and 
OSHA requirements. 9,995 
J. PARKS AND RECREATION. New maintenance position for 
Laure1wood Community facility ($9,720). Two foreman posi-
tions, one for Mall maintenance required by expansion of 
the Mall and the other for general park operations main-
tenance. 49,936 
K. POLICE. Use Revenue Sharing funds to pay for two PEP 
positions: Assistant lab technician and a Community Ser-
vice officer (CSO), in the Community and Internal Af-
fairs Division. 17,559 
L. FINANCE. Accountant I position to assist Auditor in in-
ternal and external auditing duties. Two clerk-typists to 
handle increased work load. (Auditor and one clerk-typist 
financed in 1972-73 Supplemental Budget)& 26,525 
M. EXECUTIVE. Clerk-typist to assist City Council in han-
10,600 
52,900 
18,700 
28,100 
dling complaints and general staff support. 9,177 9,700 
bRevenues should more than offset cost. 
~ 
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PROJECT 
N. PERSONNEL. New personnel specialist position to as-
sist in increased workload resulting from Affirmative 
Action, OSHA, labor/management problems and citywide 
training demands. $ 
O. POLICE~ One detective position to assist in area-
wide narcotics investigations. 
P. EXECUTIVE. New position requested by Human Rights 
Commission to assist in handling discrimination com-
plaints and Affirmative Action efforts within the com-
munity. 
~PUBLIC WORKS. City Hall maintenance. (Custodian posi-
tion in 1972-73 Supplementary Budget) 
R. GENERAL CAPITAL PROJECTS. Remodel City Council cham-
ber to provide handicapped and covered access, City 
Council offices and revised dais. 
S. POLICE. Major crime team (9 positions and arson in-
vestigator.) 
~. NON-DEPARTMENTAL. Create an assessment deferral fund 
to assist the aged or low-income in deferring payment on 
assessments until they dispose of their property. This 
would begin a five-year program of setting aside $100,000 
per year to establish an adequate fund to be used within 
guidelines established by the Council. 
U. PUBLIC WORKS. Create 3 new positions: A Traffic engin-
eering technician to work with neighborhood groups and 
handle increasing citizen requests, a public information 
officer to assist the Public Works Department in handling 
public requests, a draftsman to assist in designing pro-
jects financed by the November Streets and Storm Sewer 
Bond Issue. 
1973-4 1974-5 
12,815 $ 13,600 
14,811 15,700 
15,066 16,000 
7,399 7,800 
30,000 
-0-
182,395 193,300 
100,000 100,000 
23,207 24,700 
~ 
I\J 
W 
---, 
r ~ 
PROJECT 1973-4 
V. GENERAL CAPITAL PROJECTS. Remodel and Equip Fire Sta-
tion #5 to house a new ladder company. $ 175,000 
W. PARKS AND RECREATION. Community School Program. Ex-
pansion of City share as proposed in General Fund. 18,836 
X. EXECUTIVE. Legal fees for updating and revising 
City Charter. 10,000 
SUB-TOTAL $1,507,994 
Y. POLICE. Junior High school liaison youth program. 
Police officer to be placed in each of the junior high 
schools in the community to work with school counselors 
and juvenile court personnel in identifying and correct-
ing behavior which leads to criminal conduct. (6 positions) 90,224 
z. FIRE. Acquire ladder truck for Station #9 125,000 
AA. FIRE. Reorganization of the department as recom-
mended by ISO. Create two battalion chiefs per shift. 
BB. PLANNING. Expand duties of hearings official and 
add staff support to handle the work. 
CC. FINANCE. Increase business license enforcement ac-
tivity. Program should develop revenue to offset costs. 
(2 positions) 
DD. EXECUTIVE. Continue funding of second Community Rela-
58,410 
16,107 
18,333 
1974-5 
$ 161,000 
20,000 
-0-
$1,321,900 
95,600 
159,000 
61,900 
17,100 
-0-
tions position as approved in 1972-3 Supplemental Budget. 14,796 15,700 
EE. PARKS AND RECREATION. Provide extra help for Parks 
administration. Introduce mobile playground equipment 
and staff in neighborhoods lacking playground facilities 
and enrich existing recreational programs. 15,862 16,800 ~ 
N 
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PROJECT 
FF. PARKS AND RECREATION. Expand Mall maintenance and 
Park maintenance ($30,966). Expand recreational programs 
for low-income, special recreation, summer and outdoor 
1973-4 
activities plus miscellaneous administrative costs. $ 42,708 
GG. LIBRARY. Modify every circulating volume in Library 
in preparation for using new photographic check-out 
equipment. 63,522 
HH. GENERAL CAPITAL PROJECTS. Danebo Park improvements 
($50,000), improve irrigation systems in various parks 
because of high maintenance on existing systems ($20,000) 
Washington-Jefferson Bridge Park improvements ($35,000) 
acquire storage area in Mall ($6,000). 111,000 
II. POLICE. Noise abatement team to be used in develop-
ing a rea1istice approach to controlling noise within 
1974-5 
$ 45,300 
-0-
-0-
the community. (4 positions). 57,738 61,200 
JJ. PLANNING. Expand comprehensive planning effort with 
five neighborhood groups (50 percent of the cost for posi-
tions within the planning department, the other 50 per-
cent for other departments). 50,907 54,000 
KK. NON-DEPARTMENTAL. Low-moderate income housing program. 
Construction of 20-30 units using no-interest financing. 275,000 -0-
LL. FIRE. Institute an on-shift inspector program which 
provides each shift with its own investigator and super-
visor for the shift inspection activity. 40,705 43,100 
MM. PUBLIC WORKS. Supervising civil engineer for Mainten-
ance Division. If revenue sharing funds are not used to 
finance the position, it may be financed from other 
funds such as the Sewer Utility fund. 17,753 18,800 
~ 
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PROJECT 1973-4 
NN. PUBLIC WORKS. Utility worker position for f1usher-
sweeper operation. This position was kept vacant follow-
ing reduction in assessed value in 1972-73 budget, then 
reauthorized as a result of Supplemental BUdget. $ 9,591 
00. FIRE. Alarm systems improvement and construction of 
storage room at Substation 4 to house air tank storage 
and radio repeater station. Include some miscellaneous 
training costs. 14,570 
PP. POLICE. Acquire new microfilm equipment and replace 
Lektriever (the electronic file card storage machine). 13,890 
QQ. PAR~S AND RECREATION. Extra help for maintaining 
ballfields and community centers ($8,553) plus miscel-
laneous supplies and transportation for recreation pro-
grams. 12,439 
TOTAL $ 2,556,549 
1974-5 
10,200 
-0-
-0-
13,200 
$1,933,800 
~ 
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TABLE XII 
SUMMARY OF GENERAL REVENUE SHARING ALLOCATIONS 
EUGENE, OREGON 
MAY 25, 1973 
APPROVED EXPENDITURE AMOUNT AUTHORIZED 
AMOUNT AVAILABLE for expenditures (revenue sharing) 
Spread Sheet Priorities 
Reserve for Social Services 
A. Parks and Recreation-Amazon and Kaufman Centers 
B. Public Works-Building Division Reorganization 
C. Data Processing-Financial Information System 
D. General Capital Projects-Park Warehouse, City Hall Remodel 
E. General Capital Projects-New Park and Recreation Facility 
F. General Capital Projects-Fire Station #9 
G. Municipal Court-Second full-time judge 
H. Public Works-Create New Planning Division 
I. Personne1-C1erk-typist 
Parks and Recreation-Year-round operation of Jefferson pool 
J. Parks and Recreation-Maintenance at Laure1wood 
L. Finance-Accountant and two clerks 
M. Executive-C1erk-typist for City Council 
P. Executive-New Position for Affirmative Action, etc. 
$ 2,759,449 
$ 929,499 
200,000 
87,164 
74,223 
80,615 
100,000 
110,000 
125,000 
45,567 
131,087 
9,995 
57,547 
9,720 
26,525 
R. General Capital Projects-Council offices, ramp for handicap. 
9,177 
15,066 
17,000 
85,000 S. Major crime team 
T. Non-Departmental-Assessment deferral fund 
V. General Capital Projects-Remodel and Equip Fire Station #5 
W. Parks and Recreation-Community School Program 
X. Executive-Legal Fees for Charter Revision 
EE. Parks and Recreation-Mobile Playground Equipment and 
Administration and Recreation 
100,000 
175,000 
18,836 
10,000 
15,862 
~ 
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APPROVED EXPENDITURE AMOUNT AUTHORIZED 
FF. Parks and Recreation-Maintenance and Some 
Recreation programs 
GG. Library-Cataloging backload and retooling 
HH. General Capital Projects-Danebo, Irrigation, 
Washington, Jefferson and Mall Storage 
JJ. Planning-Comprehensive planning in neighborhoods 
KK. Non-Departmental-Low-moderate income housing 
(4) Community Service Officers. 
SUB-TOTAL 
less revenue from court (Item G) 
NET TOTAL 
encumbrance from unexpended Supplemental Budget 
1973-4 TOTAL APPROPRIATIONS 
TOTAL REVENUE SHARING 
RESOURCES- 1973-4 
$ 42,708 
63,522 
72,500 
50,907 
150,000 
36 1 980 $ 2,849,500 
45 1 567 
$ 2,803,933 
161 1 500 
$ 2 1 965 1 433 
$ 4.380.743 
SOURCE: Hugh McKinley, City Manager, Euoene, Oregon, 1973. 
oj:>. 
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TABLE XIII 
JOINT BUDGET COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS 
FUNDING OF SOCIAL PROGRAMS 
EUGENE, OREGON 
JUNE 28, 1973 
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The Joint Budget Committee met on June 28, 1973 and 
approved and recommended for adoption the following ex-
penditures for the $275,000 designated for social services: 
Total Agency Recommendations as listed 
Total contingency/agency 
Monitoring, evaluation and development 
$189,971 
56,029 
29,000 
$275,000 
A fund of $29,000 is recommended for the monitoring 
of contracts, the development of next year's process and 
assistance to the approved agencies. 
Of the original $275,000 designated for social ser-
vices,.~$59,029 is recommended to be held as a contingency 
for certain agencies if expected state funds are not 
available. If these state funds become available, it is 
recommended that the $56,029 be expended according to the 
recommended priority numbers 24-31 of this document. 
The Joint Budget Committee recommended that the 
Civil Rights provisions in the fee-for-service contracts 
to be signed include a clause requiring each agency to 
develop within the contract period an Affirmative Action 
Plan which covers all persons of minority status, i.e. 
persons of minority races, women and the aged. 
The Affirmative Action Plan should include the 
following elements: 
1. The extent of increased client services received 
by persons of minority status. 
2. The inclusion of persons of minority status on 
the organizations admioistering board. 
3. The recruitment and use of volunteers who are 
persons of minority status. 
4. The inclusion of persons of minority status on 
the staff of the agency. 
5. The education of the organization's staff and 
administering board in the areas of special prob-
lems and needs of persons of minority status. 
(data on specific programs begins on next page) 
SOURCE: Joint Budget Committee, City of Eugene, 
Oregon, 28 June 1973. 
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SERVICES BY PRIORITY AMOUNT RECOMMENDED 
1. Buckley House(FUll 36,957, Minimum 3l,SOO) $ 3l,S50a 
Detoxification of alcoholics provided through 
a live-in treatment facility. 
2. White Bird (Crisis and Counseling) (Full l5,000a 
56,092, Minimum 37,S62) 1. Crisis intervention 
unit-24hrs/7 days per week, emergency situa-
tions ranging from drug overdose, suicides, 
family crises, depressions and first aid. 
2. Counseling Department: Individual or group 
counseling for drugs, family, personal and 
communications problems. 
3. Pearl Buck (Full 2,256, Minimum NL) Develop- 2,256a 
ment of market outlets, and contracts for 
products produced by the mentally retarded and 
multiple handicapped children through a rehab-
ilitation program of adult-sheltered employment 
and work adjustment training center. 
4. Legal Aid (Full 67,649, Minimum 41,366) Free 25,000 
civil, legal services for low-income residents. 
5. Halfway House (Full 5,000, Minimum NL) Shel- 5,000 
tered, short term transitional living facilities 
for persons returning to the community from 
agencies or institutions which treat the emo-
tionally disturbed. 
6. Harmony House Friendship (Pull, 7,6S0, Mini- 1,500 
mum 1,128) A drop-in recreation center for 
lonely, isolated adults, most of whom have a 
history of psychiatric illness for the purpose 
of assisting clients in making a transition to 
wider social and community involvement. 
7. Carlton House (Full 6,992, Minimum NL) Lane 1,792 
County Council on Alcoholism. Rehabilitation 
of male alcoholics provided through a live-in 
facility which includes a counseling and therapy 
program. 
S. Behanna House (Full 10,569, Minimum NL) Rehab- 7,000a 
i1itative services for female alcoholics provided 
through a live-in facility which includes therapy 
and counseling. 
aAgencies designated for possible contingency funds. 
431 
SERVICES BY PRIORITY AMOUNT RECOMMENDED 
9. White Bird (Medical and Detox, see $ 15,000 
above) 1. Drug Detoxification Clinic: Live-in 
drug detoxification facility for persons vol-
untarily requesting assistance, services in-
clude counseling, referrals to other services 
and medical supervision or treatment. 2. Med-
ical clinics: VD, pediatrics, women, general 
medical, clinical lab, medical counsel and re-
ferrals for indigent persons. 
10. Family Shelter House (Full 7,500, Minimum 
NL) Emergency shelter and board for homeless 
families with children (the aged and pregnant 
women are also assisted), and the provision of 
supportive services, through referrals to so-
cial service agencies and the location of per-
manent housing which assist the families to 
regain their self-sufficiency. 
11. Volunteer Action Center (Full 10,280, Mini-
mum NL) The coordination of the local volunteer 
work force with the appropriate agencies in need 
of volunteer staff, including the education and 
training of agencies to fully utilize volunteer 
services. 
7,500 
5,000 
12. Family Counseling Services of Lane County 3,750b 
(Full 3,750, Minimum NL) Marital and family coun-
seling and related services which are utilized 
primarily by metro residents and an extension of 
the "Family Life Education Series," a preventa-
tive program, to the outlying communities. 
13. Looking Glass Family Crisis Intervention Cen- 5,400 
ter, Inc. (Full 16,800, Minimum NL) Family coun-
seling for children 12-18, and their parents dur-
ing crisis situations. Includes crisis center 
services, shelter care facilities, counseling pro-
gram, jobs and school placement, foster home 
placement program, recreation program and commu-
nity preventative education program. 
14. Planned Parenthood (Full 11,000, Minimum 6,000) 
Education, information, referral and counseling 3,500 
services in the area of family planning to the 
residents of Lane County. 
bAgencies designated for possible contingency funds. 
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SERVICES BY PRIORITY AMOUNT RECOMMENDED 
15. Lane County American Red Cross-Meals on $ 7,500 
Wheels (Pull 12,328, Minimum NL) Home deliv-
ery meals to persons aged 60 or over who are 
physically unable to prepare their own meals 
on a short-term or permanent basis. Noon meals 
are delivered 5 days/week. Other social ser-
vices, including health and welfare counseling, 
transportation and escort services, shopping 
assistance and nutritional education are also 
provided. 
16. Retired Senior Volunteer Program (RSVP) 1,000 
(Full 7,QOO"Minimum 7,000) Placement of Senior 
Citizen Volunteers in local community agencies 
with meal and transportation reimbursement. 
17. Senior Opportunities and Services (Full 3,500, 1,000 
Minimum NL) Outreach information and referral, 
food stamp assistance, shopping assistance, visi-
tation, social and recreational activities and 
friendly visiting services to low income senior 
citizens aged 55 or over. 
18. Information and Referral Service (Pull 4,950, 1,000 
Minimum NL) Telephone Assurance Program-Routine 
friendly calls to isolated elderly to assure 
that their safety and vital needs are being met. 
19. Help Elderly Locate Positions (HELP) (Full 1,000 
5,000, Minimum NL) Assistance to senior citizens 
in finding part-time jobs to supplement their 
retirement incomes. 
20. Drug Information Center (Full 5,070, Minimum 3,627 
3,627) Free information on drugs and drug-related 
topics upon request by persons of the general 
public, free and anonymous analysis of street 
drugs, publication of a weekly drug information 
bulletin, the conduct of a University class, Psy-
coactive drugs, which is open to the public, and 
maintains the largest drug information library in 
the Northwest. 
21. Mental Health Center (Full 3,687, Minimum NL) 3,687 
A coordinating unit for Lane County Mental Health 
Clinic, the Sacred Heart Johnson Unit, related 
mental health facilities, organizations and pro-
grams. Also, the center serves as a base for men-
tal health citizen advisory committees. 
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SERVICES BY PRIORITY AMOUNT RECOMMENDED 
22. Mental Health for Children (Full 28,465, $ 28,465 
Minimum 12,128) To be provided by the Lane 
Co. Dept. of Health and Social Services. Pro-
vides evaluation and referral services to 650 
children, treats 400 moderately disturbed chil-
dren, serves children between the ages of 4-19. 
23. Dental Health Program (Full 17,640, Mini- 13,144 
mum NL) To be provided by the Lane Co. Dept. of 
Health and Social Services. Provides dental 
health education, dental hygiene focusing on 
early detection, prevention and treatment of 
dental defects, develop community awareness of 
dental health problems. 
TOTAL $189,971 
Agencies designated for possible contingency funds: 
Contingency Reserve: 
Buckley House 
White Bird 
Pearl Buck 
Behanna House 
Mental Health Center 
$ 
$ 
31,850 
11,072 
5,485 
6,796 
826 
56,029 
Recommendations for the Expenditures of Possible Unex-
pended Contingency Funds ($56,029): 
24. Dental Health (see No.23) $ 4,496 
25. Child Center (Full 5,000, Minimum NL) 
(Amended Request: Full 7,580, Minimum 5,080) 5,080 
Provides supportive therapeutic learning en-
vironment for severely disturbed children ages 
3-12, including home visits, parent training 
and family counseling. 
26. S~~ech "and Hearing Center (Full 15,000, 5,000 
Minimum NL) Provides treatment for low income 
clients with speech, language or hearing dis-
orders on a fee-for-service basis. 
27. Home Makers Service (Full 19,416, Minimum 10,000 
16,716) To be provided by Family Counseling Inc. 
Provides home based assistance during health rela-
ted crisis in the areas of personal care for sick 
adults, care for children of incapacitated parents, 
general home management/maintenance services. 
4H 
SERVICES BY PRIORITY AMOUNT RECOMMENDED 
28. Looking Glass (Pull 16,800, Minimum NL) $ 2,500 
Provides family counseling for children 12-18, 
and their parents during crisis situations. 
29. Respite (Pull 11,000, Minimum 3,940) Pro- 3,940 
vides emergency and short term live-in and day 
care of mentally retarded and physically handi-
capped children. 
30. Legal Aid - See No.4. 12,000 
31. Planned Parenthood - See No. 14 
32. CARES (Full 44,154, Minimum 22,097) The 
Joint Budget Committee recommended that $10,000 
be used in conjunction with the monitoring and 
development fund ($30,000) for the development 
of the CARES program, i.e. an information and 
referral service for all areas of human service 
needs utilizing a computer information and data 
retrieval system. 
2,500 
10,513 
APPENDIX D 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
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QUESTIONNAIRE USED IN INTERVIEWING CITY OFFICIALS 
1. Did the city feel it was necessary to make any 
preparations when it knew that General Revenue Sharing 
was to become a reality? 
2. At the outset, what kinds of uses did the city 
feel General Revenue Sharing funds would be used for~ 
3. In view of the fact that Special Revenue Sharing 
monies were never reported out of the Committee in 
Washington, D~C., does the city perceive a need now to 
use General Revenue Sharing monies for social programs 
such as those previously funded by OEO grants? 
4. How accurate in the past do you feel have been 
the federal perceptions of the needs of cities? 
5. President Nixon has suggested that cities, rather 
than the federal government, are best able to decide the 
priorities and programs upon which money should be spent. 
Do you agree? Please give an example. 
6. Have your overall city expenses outstripped 
your tax potential~ 
7. Given the inflation of the past 3 to 5 years, 
will General Revenue Sharing furds help the city's fi-
nancial base significantly? 
8. Did the city anticipate various interest groups 
throughout the city would lobby for chunks of the General 
Revenue Sharing monies? Which groups seem to be lobby-
ing the most? 
9. Does the city anticipate an ability to meet the 
expenditure gap between the federal funds that were used 
for OEO programs and what is available in city funds with 
revenue sharing'2 
10. Did the city see any advantages to federal mon-
ey going directly to CAP's during the War on Poverty? 
11. Who participated in making the decisions on how 
General Revenue Sharing funds should be spent in the city? 
12. Were these decisions largely "in house" decisions 
made among elected and staff personnel of the city. 
13. What effort, if any, was made to include the 
general public in the decision-making process? 
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14. Was there a special effort to include represen-
tatives from various "publics" within the city who were 
not formally elected city officials in the decision-
making process'? 
15. Were representatives from CAP's sought out'? 
16. Were representatives from other district and 
neighborhood organizations sought out to participate in 
the decision-making process'? 
17. Was a special effort made to include racial 
minorities in the decision-making process'? 
18. What kind of formal processes were establis~ed, 
if any, t,o include the public in the decision-making pro-
cess'? Special General Revenue Sharing hearings'? Pub-
lished city council meetings that were to specifically 
deal with the dissemination of General Revenue Sharing 
funds at that meeting'? Special ad hoc committees formed 
from among city staff and officials and nonelected rep-
resentatives of the community to participate in decision-
making (or recommend to the city council how General Rev-
enue Sharing funds should be spent),? 
19. What effect has the counties' activities dealing 
with revenue sharing had on the cities~ activities on 
General Revenue Sharing'? 
20. What effect has the state's activities dealing 
with revenue sharing had on the cities' activities on 
General Revenue Sharing'? 
21. Have city officials perceived the Local Fiscal 
Assistance Act of 1972 as encouraging or requiring them 
to being citizens into the decision-making process over 
local disbursement of General Revenue Sharing funds? 
